{"id":"CVE-2026-48716","aliases":["EUVD-2026-37933","GHSA-3f63-vcp3-hvqr"],"status":"published","title":"nanobot: Path traversal via unsanitized WhatsApp document fileName enables arbitrary file write","description":"nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00326,"percentile":0.25881,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-06-18T18:46:28Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:30Z","products":[{"vendor":"hkuds","product":"nanobot"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/HKUDS/nanobot/security/advisories/GHSA-3f63-vcp3-hvqr","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/48xxx/CVE-2026-48716.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48716","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48716","title":"nanobot: Path traversal via unsanitized WhatsApp document fileName enables arbitrary file write","description":"nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T18:46:28.599Z","modified":"2026-06-22T15:41:03.264Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:47.998488Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-37933","description":"nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T18:46:28Z","modified":"2026-06-22T15:41:03Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:34.745289Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48716","description":"nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T20:16:13.85Z","modified":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:24.912854Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-48716","title":"nanobot: Path traversal via unsanitized WhatsApp document fileName enables arbitrary file write","description":"nanobot is a personal AI assistant. In versions 0.1.5.post3 and prior, the WhatsApp bridge in bridge/src/whatsapp.ts constructs a filesystem path using the fileName field from an incoming WhatsApp document message without sanitization. The WhatsApp bridge downloads media attachments and writes them to disk using a filename derived from the sender's message via documentMessage.fileName, which is concatenated with a prefix and its raw value is passed directly to path.join(mediaDir, outFilename). Node.js path.join resolves .. components, allowing an attacker to escape the intended media/ directory by sending a document with a crafted fileName such as ../../../.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the attacker also controls the file content (the downloaded buffer), this is a write-anywhere primitive — both path and content are attacker-controlled. A fix for this issue is planned for version 0.1.5.post4.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-18T18:46:28.599Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:30.723725522Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:06.701612Z"}]}}