{"id":"CVE-2026-52738","aliases":["EUVD-2026-61167","GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"],"status":"published","title":"ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00507,"percentile":0.43761,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-248"],"published":"2026-07-02T19:44:54Z","modified":"2026-11-09T20:10:00Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"zebra-state","fixed_in":["7.0.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"zebrad","fixed_in":["4.5.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"zebra-state","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"6.0.0"},{"fixed":"7.0.0"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"zebrad","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.4.1"},{"fixed":"4.5.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"zebra-state","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"7.0.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"zebrad","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.5.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"zcashfoundation","product":"zebra"},{"vendor":"zcashfoundation","product":"zebra-state"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d45117557b217a6cd","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/52xxx/CVE-2026-52738.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52738","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-52738","title":"ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-18T19:24:04.945Z","modified":"2026-08-19T15:19:04.654Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-248"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:57.334596Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-61167","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-18T19:24:04Z","modified":"2026-08-19T15:19:04Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:44.906351Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w","title":"Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","description":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.\n\nBecause the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid.\n\nThe code panics on the intermediate overflow via `.expect()` on the balance addition. Under Zebra's `panic = \"abort\"` release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic.\n\nAn attacker with approximately 1,100–2,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd's approach.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by `@sangsoo-osec`.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-02T19:44:54Z","modified":"2026-07-02T19:44:57Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-248"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:38.48196Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-52738","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-18T20:17:17.953Z","modified":"2026-11-09T20:10:00.2Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-248"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T22:15:51.558963Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-52738","title":"ZEBRA: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","description":"ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-18T19:24:04.945Z","modified":"2026-11-11T02:48:52.005962824Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-248"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:22:00.901153Z"},{"id":"GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w","title":"Zebra: Finalized address balance credit-first overflow on consensus-valid blocks","description":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node processes blocks on any Zcash network.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe finalized transparent address balance writer processes all newly-created outputs (credits) before processing spent outputs (debits) within the same block. A consensus-valid block containing a long chain of same-address transparent self-spends can cause the intermediate per-address balance during the credit pass to exceed `MAX_MONEY`, triggering a panic in the finalized state writer.\n\nBecause the triggering block is consensus-valid (zcashd accepts it), the panic recurs on restart when the node re-encounters the same block. This creates a persistent chain halt that can only be resolved by a software patch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe finalized state writer at `zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs` iterates all transaction outputs in a block and credits them to per-address balances before iterating inputs and debiting spent outputs. When a block contains many transparent self-spends to the same address, the intermediate credit-only balance can exceed the `MAX_MONEY` supply cap even though the final net balance (credits minus debits) is valid.\n\nThe code panics on the intermediate overflow via `.expect()` on the balance addition. Under Zebra's `panic = \"abort\"` release profile, this terminates the process. On restart, the node re-downloads and re-processes the same consensus-valid block, triggering the same panic.\n\nAn attacker with approximately 1,100–2,100 ZEC and mining capability can construct a block that permanently halts all Zebra nodes. The attacker recovers their capital (the self-spends return funds to the same address), so the net cost is the mining effort only.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched in Zebra 4.4.2. The fix processes credits and debits together per transaction rather than all credits then all debits, matching zcashd's approach.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available. Upgrade to Zebra 4.4.2.\n\n### Impact\n\nA single consensus-valid mined block can permanently halt all Zebra nodes on the network. The halt persists across restarts. Recovery requires deploying a patched version. Downstream consumers (light wallets, exchanges, mining infrastructure) lose service for the duration of the halt.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by `@sangsoo-osec`.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-02T19:44:54Z","modified":"2026-07-02T20:11:30.019575Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-248"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:58.401149Z"}]}}