{"id":"CVE-2026-52834","aliases":["EUVD-2026-62513","GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5","RUSTSEC-2026-0151"],"status":"published","title":"jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms","description":"jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00174,"percentile":0.0692,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-122","CWE-131","CWE-190"],"published":"2026-05-29T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-29T02:30:35Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"jxl-grid","fixed_in":["0.6.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"jxl-grid","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.6.1"},{"fixed":"0.6.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"jxl-grid","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.6.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"jxl-grid","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.0.0-0"},{"fixed":"0.6.2"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"tirr-c","product":"jxl-grid"},{"vendor":"tirr-c","product":"jxl-oxide"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/security/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/commit/3986dadd3926a95656a642e74a0702d52f5c92e2","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide/releases/tag/0.12.6","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0151.html","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/52xxx/CVE-2026-52834.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52834","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tirr-c/jxl-oxide","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://crates.io/crates/jxl-grid","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-52834","title":"jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms","description":"jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:55:32.138Z","modified":"2026-08-19T18:19:05.526Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-122","CWE-131","CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:40:57.334596Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-62513","description":"jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:55:32Z","modified":"2026-08-19T18:19:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:40.9092Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5","title":"jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms has an out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow","description":"### Summary\n\nOn 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation.\n\n### Details \u0026 PoC\n\nThe test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid`\n\nOr you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:\n\n`RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`\n\nThe following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`:\n\n```rust\nmod miri_ub {\n    use super::*;\n\n    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow\n    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.\n    #[test]\n    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {\n        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;\n        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::\u003cu8\u003e::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();\n        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();\n        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;\n        std::hint::black_box(grid);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:\n\n1. **Huge actual frame**\n   A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 \u003c= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.\n\n2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame**\n   This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.\n\n### Impact\n\nOn 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-02T20:45:59Z","modified":"2026-07-02T20:46:00Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-122","CWE-131","CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:38.48196Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-52834","description":"jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T15:17:09.81Z","modified":"2026-10-27T13:10:00.36Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-122","CWE-131","CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:39.962615Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-52834","title":"jxl-oxide: Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms","description":"jxl-oxide is a pure Rust implementation of a JPEG XL decoder. Prior to jxl-grid 0.6.2, decoding a crafted JPEG XL image on a 32-bit platform can overflow length calculations in AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker and related grid and subgrid arithmetic. A 65536 x 65536 frame can pass the frame-area limit while overflowing the usize element count, causing modular, VarDCT, or filter rendering paths to allocate a backing buffer smaller than the logical grid. A tiny bitstream-controlled cropped frame combined with a huge canvas or requested region can also reach the vulnerable composition path in crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs through ordinary render_frame(). Later mutable subgrid and raw-pointer operations can then perform attacker-controlled out-of-bounds writes, causing memory corruption, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution. This issue is fixed in jxl-grid version 0.6.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:55:32.138Z","modified":"2026-10-29T02:30:35.736895767Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-122","CWE-131","CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:07.431113Z"},{"id":"GHSA-5pmv-rx8r-wmv5","title":"jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms has an out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow","description":"### Summary\n\nOn 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation.\n\n### Details \u0026 PoC\n\nThe test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid`\n\nOr you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:\n\n`RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`\n\nThe following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`:\n\n```rust\nmod miri_ub {\n    use super::*;\n\n    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow\n    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.\n    #[test]\n    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {\n        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;\n        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::\u003cu8\u003e::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();\n        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();\n        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;\n        std::hint::black_box(grid);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:\n\n1. **Huge actual frame**\n   A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 \u003c= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.\n\n2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame**\n   This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.\n\n### Impact\n\nOn 32-bit platforms this can cause out-of-bounds writes with attacker-controlled data when decoding a crafted JPEG XL image. This could allow arbitrary code execution.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-02T20:45:59Z","modified":"2026-07-02T21:11:21.21163101Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-122","CWE-131","CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:38.553953Z"},{"id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0151","title":"Out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in jxl-grid on 32-bit platforms","description":"On 32-bit platforms, decoding a crafted image may lead to out-of-bounds writes due to integer overflow in length calculation. This could allow arbitrary code execution.\n\n### Details \u0026 PoC\n\nThe test listed below fail under miri with command `cargo +nightly miri test --release -p jxl-grid`\n\nOr you can use Address Sanitizer, which ignores Rust-specific UB like aliasing but still flags out-of-bounds accesses:\n\n`RUSTFLAGS=-Zsanitizer=address cargo +nightly test -Zbuild-std -p jxl-grid --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu`\n\nThe following tests should be appended to `crates/jxl-grid/src/test/subgrids.rs`:\n\n```rust\nmod miri_ub {\n    use super::*;\n\n    // `AlignedGrid::with_alloc_tracker` computes `width * height` unchecked. In release, overflow\n    // can create a tiny backing buffer for huge logical dimensions.\n    #[test]\n    fn aligned_grid_dimension_product_overflows() {\n        let width = usize::MAX / 2 + 1;\n        let mut grid = AlignedGrid::\u003cu8\u003e::with_alloc_tracker(width, 2, None).unwrap();\n        let mut subgrid = grid.as_subgrid_mut();\n        *subgrid.get_mut(0, 1) = 1;\n        std::hint::black_box(grid);\n    }\n}\n```\n\nThis issue can be reachable through decoding a crafted image in two ways:\n\n1. **Huge actual frame**\n   A frame such as `65536 x 65536` passes the current frame area limit (`2^32 \u003c= 2^40`) but overflows `usize` element count on 32-bit. Rendering then allocates too-small `AlignedGrid`s in modular/VarDCT/filter paths and later writes through mutable subgrids.\n\n2. **Huge canvas plus tiny cropped frame**\n   This is the more practical “small payload, huge logical output” case. A bitstream-controlled frame crop can be tiny, but if the canvas/default requested region is huge, composition can allocate an output grid sized to the canvas/ROI at crates/jxl-render/src/blend.rs. That is bitstream frame cropping, not API crop. With a 32-bit target and a full requested image region whose area overflows, this can happen through ordinary `render_frame()`.","status":"published","published":"2026-05-29T12:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-12T18:00:13.554286599Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:40.430679Z"}]}}