{"id":"CVE-2026-53712","aliases":["EUVD-2026-45246","GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf"],"status":"published","title":"SCRAM: Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms","description":"SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0026,"percentile":0.17866,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-636","CWE-757"],"published":"2026-07-01T21:51:17Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.ongres.scram:scram-client","fixed_in":["3.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.ongres.scram:scram-common","fixed_in":["3.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.ongres.scram:scram-client","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.2"},{"fixed":"3.3"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.ongres.scram:scram-common","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.2"},{"fixed":"3.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.ongres.scram:scram-client","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.3"}]}],"versions":["3.0","3.1","3.2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.ongres.scram:scram-common","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.3"}]}],"versions":["3.0","3.1","3.2"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"ongres","product":"scram"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ongres/scram/security/advisories/GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ongres/scram/releases/tag/3.3","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53712.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53712","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ongres/scram","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53712","title":"SCRAM: Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms","description":"SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T18:19:11.896Z","modified":"2026-07-17T19:09:07.924Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-636","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:59.761005Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-45246","description":"SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T18:19:11Z","modified":"2026-07-17T19:09:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:19:50.451546Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf","title":"OnGres SCRAM silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms","description":"## Summary\n\nA flaw in `com.ongres.scram:scram-client` allows an attacker capable of performing a TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to silently downgrade a connection from `SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS` (with channel binding) to standard `SCRAM-SHA-256` (without channel binding), bypassing strict client-side enforcement policies.\n\n## Component Breakdown\n\nThis occurs due to a two-part failure in `TlsServerEndpoint` when a server presents an `X.509` certificate using a modern signature algorithm that lacks traditional `WITH` naming structures (such as `Ed25519` or post-quantum algorithms):\n\n1. The internal hash derivation method fails to parse the algorithm name, swallows the resulting `NoSuchAlgorithmException, and silently returns an empty byte array via the deprecated `getChannelBindingData()` API.\n2. The client builder mistakenly interprets this empty byte array as an environmental absence of channel binding data rather than a cryptographic failure, falling back to non-channel-bound authentication.\n\n## Impact \u0026 Scope\n\nThis issue only impacts deployments where the downstream application layer explicitly enforces strict channel binding enforcement (e.g., channelBinding=require in pgJDBC).\n\nDrivers operating under a \"prefer\" or \"allow\" policy  (used by default) are structurally insulated from an unhandled exception since a fallback to standard SCRAM is within their expected configuration.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpdate your project configuration to pull in version 3.3 or later of the SCRAM library, which introduces strict exception propagation and explicit policy controls.\n\nIf you are interacting with the `ScramClient` builder API directly (e.g., writing a custom driver or database extension):\n\n- Migrate Deprecated APIs: Stop using `TlsServerEndpoint.getChannelBindingData()`. Transition immediately to `TlsServerEndpoint.getChannelBindingHash()`, which correctly propagates `NoSuchAlgorithmException` up the stack.\n- Adopt Explicit Policies: Leverage the newly introduced `ChannelBindingPolicy` API during client construction. Do not rely on implicit parameter presence to dictate your security boundaries.\n\n```java\nScramClient client = ScramClient.builder()\n    .advertisedMechanisms(serverMechanisms)\n    .username(user)\n    .password(pass)\n    // Explicitly enforce strict boundaries if needed.\n    .channelBindingPolicy(ChannelBindingPolicy.REQUIRE) \n    .channelBinding(TlsServerEndpoint.TLS_SERVER_END_POINT, certHash)\n    .build();\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-07-01T21:51:17Z","modified":"2026-07-01T21:51:18Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-636","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:37.437888Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53712","description":"SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T19:17:16.88Z","modified":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-636","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:30.250437Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53712","title":"SCRAM: Silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms","description":"SCRAM (Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism) is part of the family of Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL, RFC 4422) authentication mechanisms. Prior to 3.3, a flaw in com.ongres.scram:scram-client and com.ongres.scram:scram-common allows an attacker capable of a TLS man-in-the-middle attack to silently downgrade a connection from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS with channel binding to standard SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding when TlsServerEndpoint processes an X.509 certificate using a modern signature algorithm such as Ed25519; getChannelBindingData() can return an empty byte array after NoSuchAlgorithmException, and the ScramClient builder treats that as absent channel-binding data. This issue is fixed in version 3.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T18:19:11.896Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:48.53547634Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-636","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:08.132336Z"},{"id":"GHSA-p9jg-fcr6-3mhf","title":"OnGres SCRAM silent channel-binding authentication downgrade via unsupported certificate algorithms","description":"## Summary\n\nA flaw in `com.ongres.scram:scram-client` allows an attacker capable of performing a TLS man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack to silently downgrade a connection from `SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS` (with channel binding) to standard `SCRAM-SHA-256` (without channel binding), bypassing strict client-side enforcement policies.\n\n## Component Breakdown\n\nThis occurs due to a two-part failure in `TlsServerEndpoint` when a server presents an `X.509` certificate using a modern signature algorithm that lacks traditional `WITH` naming structures (such as `Ed25519` or post-quantum algorithms):\n\n1. The internal hash derivation method fails to parse the algorithm name, swallows the resulting `NoSuchAlgorithmException, and silently returns an empty byte array via the deprecated `getChannelBindingData()` API.\n2. The client builder mistakenly interprets this empty byte array as an environmental absence of channel binding data rather than a cryptographic failure, falling back to non-channel-bound authentication.\n\n## Impact \u0026 Scope\n\nThis issue only impacts deployments where the downstream application layer explicitly enforces strict channel binding enforcement (e.g., channelBinding=require in pgJDBC).\n\nDrivers operating under a \"prefer\" or \"allow\" policy  (used by default) are structurally insulated from an unhandled exception since a fallback to standard SCRAM is within their expected configuration.\n\n## Remediation\n\nUpdate your project configuration to pull in version 3.3 or later of the SCRAM library, which introduces strict exception propagation and explicit policy controls.\n\nIf you are interacting with the `ScramClient` builder API directly (e.g., writing a custom driver or database extension):\n\n- Migrate Deprecated APIs: Stop using `TlsServerEndpoint.getChannelBindingData()`. Transition immediately to `TlsServerEndpoint.getChannelBindingHash()`, which correctly propagates `NoSuchAlgorithmException` up the stack.\n- Adopt Explicit Policies: Leverage the newly introduced `ChannelBindingPolicy` API during client construction. Do not rely on implicit parameter presence to dictate your security boundaries.\n\n```java\nScramClient client = ScramClient.builder()\n    .advertisedMechanisms(serverMechanisms)\n    .username(user)\n    .password(pass)\n    // Explicitly enforce strict boundaries if needed.\n    .channelBindingPolicy(ChannelBindingPolicy.REQUIRE) \n    .channelBinding(TlsServerEndpoint.TLS_SERVER_END_POINT, certHash)\n    .build();\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-07-01T21:51:17Z","modified":"2026-07-01T22:11:32.861485Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-636","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:52.891208Z"}]}}