{"id":"CVE-2026-53942","aliases":["EUVD-2026-109068","GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh"],"status":"published","title":"Conda Organization Infrastructure: Pwn Request in update workflow allows PR-controlled template rendering with SYNC_TOKEN","description":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00325,"percentile":0.25902,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-10-23T14:25:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:08Z","products":[{"vendor":"conda","product":"infrastructure"},{"vendor":"conda-forge","product":"infrastructure"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/security/advisories/GHSA-pf87-fcg3-wjfh","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/conda/infrastructure/commit/9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53942.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53942","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53942","title":"Conda Organization Infrastructure: Pwn Request in update workflow allows PR-controlled template rendering with SYNC_TOKEN","description":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T14:25:00.085Z","modified":"2026-10-23T14:57:32.991Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:59.761005Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-109068","description":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T14:25:00Z","modified":"2026-10-23T14:57:32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:32.693959Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53942","description":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T15:17:32.157Z","modified":"2026-10-23T19:42:24.553Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:03.126833Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53942","title":"Conda Organization Infrastructure: Pwn Request in update workflow allows PR-controlled template rendering with SYNC_TOKEN","description":"Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-23T14:25:00.085Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:08.344589572Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:08.132336Z"}]}}