{"id":"CVE-2026-53983","aliases":["EUVD-2026-54279","GHSA-77cr-rrgg-p4wf","GHSA-mjp8-x6h7-229q"],"status":"published","title":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Persistent Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via Orbital Data Source URL","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00574,"percentile":0.47728,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-306","CWE-918"],"published":"2026-08-06T15:19:44.322Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:36Z","products":[{"vendor":"efstratios goudelis","product":"ground station"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/sgoudelis/ground-station","tags":["product","package"]},{"url":"https://github.com/sgoudelis/ground-station/security/advisories/GHSA-mjp8-x6h7-229q","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/sgoudelis/ground-station/commit/2ecde82a8814cbea18883ce023bf45cbf06172eb","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53983","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-77cr-rrgg-p4wf"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53983.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53984.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53984","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/53xxx/CVE-2026-53985.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53985","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53983","title":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Persistent Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via Orbital Data Source URL","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T15:38:02.143Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:05:15.028Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T15:43:33.322657Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-54279","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T15:38:02Z","modified":"2026-11-08T14:05:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-08T15:13:08.252361Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-77cr-rrgg-p4wf","title":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery...","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-07T00:31:19Z","modified":"2026-08-07T00:31:26Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:10.387883Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53983","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T22:17:42.12Z","modified":"2026-10-24T16:10:00.153Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.386166Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-53983","title":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Persistent Blind Server-Side Request Forgery via Orbital Data Source URL","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated blind server-side request forgery vulnerability in the orbital-source configuration path that allows any unauthenticated Socket.IO client to cause the ground-station process to issue outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen destinations. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then submit a data_submission event with submit-orbital-sources action to persist an attacker-supplied URL in the database, then trigger an orbital sync via the equally unauthenticated background_task:start event. The URL is stored with no scheme allowlist, no host validation, and no rejection of loopback, RFC1918, or link-local (cloud instance metadata at 169.254.169.254) addresses, and is passed directly to requests.get in _fetch_http_3le and _fetch_http_omm in backend/tlesync/source_adapters.py. HTTP status codes and error messages from the outbound request are emitted in the orbital_sync_state Socket.IO event to all connected clients, providing a serviceable oracle for interpreting internal-service and cloud-metadata responses even though the raw response body is not directly leaked. Because the malicious source persists in the database across restarts and re-fires every 24 hours on the scheduled sync cycle, the primitive gives durable long-term SSRF without the attacker needing to remain connected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T15:38:02.143Z","modified":"2026-11-09T02:30:42.426222685Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T03:16:44.651171Z"},{"id":"CVE-2026-53984","title":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated Database Wipe and Arbitrary Data Injection via Socket.IO database_backup full_restore Action","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated database-destruction and arbitrary-data-injection vulnerability in the Socket.IO server's database_backup event handler that allows any unauthenticated network peer to wipe or replace the entire SQLite database by sending a single full_restore command with a caller-supplied SQL blob. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then emit the database_backup event to drop every existing table and recreate the database from attacker-controlled CREATE TABLE and INSERT INTO statements executed via raw exec_driver_sql, permanently destroying all satellite records, orbital sources, hardware configurations, and observation schedules, or planting fabricated orbital-source URLs and observation entries that redirect the ground station to attacker-controlled servers on the next scheduled sync.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T15:33:49.861Z","modified":"2026-11-09T02:30:51.175597365Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-306"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T03:16:44.651171Z"},{"id":"CVE-2026-53985","title":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 Unauthenticated DoS via service_control Socket.IO","description":"Ground Station prior to 0.6.0 contains an unauthenticated denial-of-service vulnerability in the Socket.IO server's service_control event handler that allows any unauthenticated network peer to forcibly terminate the ground-station process by sending a single restart_service command. Attackers can connect to the Socket.IO server on port 7000 without credentials due to disabled authentication enforcement and a wildcard CORS policy, then emit the service_control event to terminate all active satellite-tracking sessions, SDR recording pipelines, demodulators, decoders, and rotator controllers, with repeated triggering possible in Docker deployments to create a persistent denial-of-service condition.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T15:19:44.322Z","modified":"2026-11-09T02:31:15.483325232Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-306"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T03:16:44.651171Z"}]}}