{"id":"CVE-2026-54077","aliases":["EUVD-2026-78786","GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg"],"status":"published","title":"ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.6.1, the IMPORT DATABASE statement in engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java did not require administrative privileges and passed its source to integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java without validation. An authenticated user with SQL command access through /api/v1/command or /api/v1/query can supply HTTP or HTTPS destinations to make server-side requests to internal services, or file:// paths to read files accessible to the server process and ingest the results as queryable records. The XML importer also permits DTD processing and external entities, enabling entity expansion. The root-only /api/v1/server administration endpoint is not affected. The fix requires updateSecurity permission, blocks local-network import destinations by default through arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, supports the arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths file allow-list, and disables XML DTD processing and external entities. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00447,"percentile":0.39119,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-776","CWE-918"],"published":"2026-07-16T20:05:56Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:16:45Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine","fixed_in":["26.6.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"26.6.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"26.6.1"}]}],"versions":["21.10.1","21.10.2","21.11.1","21.12.1","21.9.1","21.9.1-beta","22.1.1","22.1.2","22.1.3","22.10.1","22.11.1","22.12.1","22.2.1","22.8.1","22.9.1","23.1.1","23.1.2","23.10.1","23.11.1","23.12.1","23.12.2","23.2.1","23.3.1","23.4.1","23.5.1","23.6.1","23.7.1","23.9.1","24.1.1","24.10.1","24.11.1","24.11.2","24.2.1","24.4.1","24.5.1","24.6.1","25.1.1","25.10.1","25.11.1","25.12.1","25.2.1","25.3.1","25.3.2","25.4.1","25.5.1","25.6.1","25.7.1","25.8.1","25.9.1","26.1.1","26.2.1","26.2.2","26.3.1","26.3.2","26.4.2","26.5.1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"arcadedata","product":"arcadedb"},{"vendor":"com.arcadedb","product":"arcadedb-engine"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/pull/4422","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/commit/bdc414cbdeda094cf8c20637cdc937335a3a19ee","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/releases/tag/26.6.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54077.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54077","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54077","title":"ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.6.1, the IMPORT DATABASE statement in engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java did not require administrative privileges and passed its source to integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java without validation. An authenticated user with SQL command access through /api/v1/command or /api/v1/query can supply HTTP or HTTPS destinations to make server-side requests to internal services, or file:// paths to read files accessible to the server process and ingest the results as queryable records. The XML importer also permits DTD processing and external entities, enabling entity expansion. The root-only /api/v1/server administration endpoint is not affected. The fix requires updateSecurity permission, blocks local-network import destinations by default through arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, supports the arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths file allow-list, and disables XML DTD processing and external entities. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:17:35.047Z","modified":"2026-09-15T15:44:11.572Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-776","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:09.774038Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-78786","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.6.1, the IMPORT DATABASE statement in engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java did not require administrative privileges and passed its source to integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java without validation. An authenticated user with SQL command access through /api/v1/command or /api/v1/query can supply HTTP or HTTPS destinations to make server-side requests to internal services, or file:// paths to read files accessible to the server process and ingest the results as queryable records. The XML importer also permits DTD processing and external entities, enabling entity expansion. The root-only /api/v1/server administration endpoint is not affected. The fix requires updateSecurity permission, blocks local-network import destinations by default through arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, supports the arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths file allow-list, and disables XML DTD processing and external entities. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:17:35Z","modified":"2026-09-15T15:44:11Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:17.768191Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg","title":"ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users","description":"### Impact\n\nThe SQL `IMPORT DATABASE` statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only `root`/administrators) could therefore:\n\n- **Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918):** cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records.\n- **Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22):** read local files reachable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, credential files) by importing `file://` paths, exposing their contents as records.\n\nThe server administration endpoint (`/api/v1/server`) was already restricted to the `root` user and was **not** affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (`/api/v1/command`, `/api/v1/query`).\n\nA related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.\n\n### Affected component\n\n`integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java` (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for `file://`), reached from `engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java`.\n\n### Patches\n\n- `IMPORT DATABASE` now requires the administrative `updateSecurity` permission (no-op in embedded mode).\n- Import sources are validated in `SourceDiscovery`: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (`arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks`, default `true`), and an optional local-path allow-list (`arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths`) restricts `file://` reads.\n- The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.\n\nFixed in commit referenced by pull request [#4422](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/pull/4422).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).","status":"published","published":"2026-07-16T20:05:56Z","modified":"2026-07-16T20:05:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-776","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:44.915484Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54077","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.6.1, the IMPORT DATABASE statement in engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java did not require administrative privileges and passed its source to integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java without validation. An authenticated user with SQL command access through /api/v1/command or /api/v1/query can supply HTTP or HTTPS destinations to make server-side requests to internal services, or file:// paths to read files accessible to the server process and ingest the results as queryable records. The XML importer also permits DTD processing and external entities, enabling entity expansion. The root-only /api/v1/server administration endpoint is not affected. The fix requires updateSecurity permission, blocks local-network import destinations by default through arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, supports the arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths file allow-list, and disables XML DTD processing and external entities. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T16:17:13.71Z","modified":"2026-09-30T17:51:56.193Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-776","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:47.668237Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54077","title":"ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.6.1, the IMPORT DATABASE statement in engine/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java did not require administrative privileges and passed its source to integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java without validation. An authenticated user with SQL command access through /api/v1/command or /api/v1/query can supply HTTP or HTTPS destinations to make server-side requests to internal services, or file:// paths to read files accessible to the server process and ingest the results as queryable records. The XML importer also permits DTD processing and external entities, enabling entity expansion. The root-only /api/v1/server administration endpoint is not affected. The fix requires updateSecurity permission, blocks local-network import destinations by default through arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks, supports the arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths file allow-list, and disables XML DTD processing and external entities. This issue is fixed in version 26.6.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:17:35.047Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:16:45.832656099Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-776","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:08.132336Z"},{"id":"GHSA-8w86-m9h8-hvqg","title":"ArcadeDB: IMPORT DATABASE allows SSRF and arbitrary local file read by authenticated users","description":"### Impact\n\nThe SQL `IMPORT DATABASE` statement did not require administrative privileges and passed its source URL to the importer without validation. Any authenticated user with SQL command access (not only `root`/administrators) could therefore:\n\n- **Server-Side Request Forgery (CWE-918):** cause the server to issue HTTP(S) requests to arbitrary destinations, including cloud metadata endpoints (e.g. `169.254.169.254`) and internal-only services, and ingest the responses as queryable records.\n- **Arbitrary local file read (CWE-22):** read local files reachable by the server process (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, credential files) by importing `file://` paths, exposing their contents as records.\n\nThe server administration endpoint (`/api/v1/server`) was already restricted to the `root` user and was **not** affected; the exposure was through the database SQL command/query endpoints (`/api/v1/command`, `/api/v1/query`).\n\nA related lower-severity hardening gap (CWE-776): the XML importer did not disable DTD processing, leaving entity-expansion (Billion Laughs) possible.\n\n### Affected component\n\n`integration/src/main/java/com/arcadedb/integration/importer/SourceDiscovery.java` (no host allow-list for http(s); no path validation for `file://`), reached from `engine/.../query/sql/parser/ImportDatabaseStatement.java`.\n\n### Patches\n\n- `IMPORT DATABASE` now requires the administrative `updateSecurity` permission (no-op in embedded mode).\n- Import sources are validated in `SourceDiscovery`: HTTP(S) hosts resolving to loopback / link-local / private (site-local) / wildcard / multicast addresses are blocked by default (`arcadedb.server.security.importBlockLocalNetworks`, default `true`), and an optional local-path allow-list (`arcadedb.server.security.importAllowedLocalPaths`) restricts `file://` reads.\n- The XML importer now disables DTD processing and external entities.\n\nFixed in commit referenced by pull request [#4422](https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/pull/4422).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict SQL command/query access to trusted administrative users; do not grant query access to untrusted users on servers that can reach sensitive networks or hold sensitive local files. Upgrading is strongly recommended.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Bin Luo (luob87709@gmail.com).","status":"published","published":"2026-07-16T20:05:56Z","modified":"2026-07-16T20:26:44.480476Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-776","CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.78452Z"}]}}