{"id":"CVE-2026-54144","aliases":["EUVD-2026-117578","GHSA-936r-hw6f-jjf2"],"status":"published","title":"OpenHuman: Embedded Google Meet webview can silently capture the macOS desktop without a user gesture","description":"OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screen_share_begin_session IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00495,"percentile":0.42922,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-359"],"published":"2026-11-05T16:14:46Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:32:30Z","products":[{"vendor":"tinyhumansai","product":"openhuman"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/tinyhumansai/openhuman/security/advisories/GHSA-936r-hw6f-jjf2","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tinyhumansai/openhuman/pull/2636","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tinyhumansai/openhuman/commit/60050aa09a870f53ed7e4cd40ed41fd2860329e7","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/tinyhumansai/openhuman/releases/tag/v0.56.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54144.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54144","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54144","title":"OpenHuman: Embedded Google Meet webview can silently capture the macOS desktop without a user gesture","description":"OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screen_share_begin_session IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T16:14:46.83Z","modified":"2026-11-05T20:58:14.948Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-359"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T21:25:06.152449Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-117578","description":"OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screen_share_begin_session IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T16:14:46Z","modified":"2026-11-05T20:58:14Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T22:02:09.75306Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54144","description":"OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screen_share_begin_session IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T17:18:19.68Z","modified":"2026-11-06T21:32:18.733Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-359"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T00:02:36.318174Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54144","title":"OpenHuman: Embedded Google Meet webview can silently capture the macOS desktop without a user gesture","description":"OpenHuman is an open-source agent harness available as a desktop application and Rust library. Before 0.56.0 on macOS, the runtime injected into a supported remote account webview such as Google Meet allows page JavaScript to call getDisplayMedia without a live user gesture. Instead of rejecting the request, the shim falls through to native Chromium capture behavior, and the embedded CEF environment can auto-select the primary display because it lacks the normal desktop-media picker. If OpenHuman already has macOS Screen Recording permission and an attacker obtains JavaScript execution in an allowed embedded origin, the attacker can obtain a real desktop capture stream without a new user gesture. The stream can expose chats, documents, source code, email, meeting content, credentials, one-time codes, and other visible desktop information. The separate direct screen_share_begin_session IPC path failing origin validation does not prevent exploitation through getDisplayMedia. This issue is fixed in version 0.56.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T16:14:46.83Z","modified":"2026-11-11T10:47:40.295364383Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-285","CWE-359"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T03:08:07.221269Z"}]}}