{"id":"CVE-2026-54150","aliases":["EUVD-2026-77690","GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q"],"status":"published","title":"next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler","description":"next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00418,"percentile":0.36412,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-200","CWE-22"],"published":"2026-08-20T18:35:11Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:03Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-video","fixed_in":["2.8.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-video","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"2.8.0"},{"fixed":"2.8.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-video","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"2.8.1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"muxinc","product":"next-video"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/muxinc/next-video/security/advisories/GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/muxinc/next-video/commit/73abf1d534c2ac48db546ecfed0e89cbaf124f6f","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/muxinc/next-video/releases/tag/v2.8.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54150.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54150","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/muxinc/next-video","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54150","title":"next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler","description":"next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T17:25:38.429Z","modified":"2026-09-14T19:03:28.592Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:09.774038Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-77690","description":"next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T17:25:38Z","modified":"2026-09-14T19:03:28Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:19.730872Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q","title":"next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler","description":"### Impact\n\nThe HTTP route handler exported by `next-video/request-handler` — which the README instructs consumers to mount at `/api/video` — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary `.json` files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.\n\nThe handler's `GET` endpoint accepts a `url` query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between \"remote URL\" and \"local file path\" is a regex check for `^https?://`. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, `.json` is appended, and the file is read with `fs.readFile` and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.\n\nOn a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:\n- The **Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key** (`.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json`)\n- The **Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys** (`previewModeId`, `previewModeSigningKey`, `previewModeEncryptionKey`)\n- Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths\n- Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux `uploadId`, `assetId`, `playbackId` values stored in `videos/*.json`)\n\nAny application that mounted `/api/video` following the documented one-liner is affected.\n\n### Patches\n\n2.8.1\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUntil a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the `url` parameter before passing it through:\n\n- Reject any `url` value that does not begin with `https://`, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.\n- Alternatively, remove the `/api/video` route entirely if your application only uses build-time `import` of local video files and does not use `\u003cVideo src=\"https://...\"\u003e` with string URLs at runtime.\n\n### References\n\n- `src/request-handler.ts` — the vulnerable GET handler\n- `src/assets.ts` — `getAssetPath()`, where the local-vs-remote branching occurs\n- `src/utils/utils.ts` — `isRemote()`, the sole guard between the two branches\n- `src/config.ts` — `loadAsset()`, which performs the unconstrained `fs.readFile`","status":"published","published":"2026-08-20T18:35:11Z","modified":"2026-08-20T18:36:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:04.755504Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54150","description":"next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T18:17:52.277Z","modified":"2026-09-30T19:57:08.043Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:46.980627Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54150","title":"next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler","description":"next-video is a library for adding video to Next.js applications. Prior to 2.8.1, the GET endpoint exported by next-video/request-handler and commonly mounted at /api/video accepts an unauthenticated url query parameter, while src/utils/utils.ts isRemote() treats any value without an HTTP or HTTPS prefix as a local path. src/request-handler.ts passes that value through src/assets.ts getAssetPath() to src/config.ts loadAsset(), which appends a JSON suffix and uses fs.readFile without canonicalizing the path or verifying that it remains inside the configured video folder. A remote attacker can therefore escape the intended asset directory and read JSON files accessible to the application process, including Next.js server-action encryption material, preview-mode keys, build manifests, route metadata, absolute paths, and application video asset identifiers. Applications that do not expose the runtime request handler are not affected through this route. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T17:25:38.429Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:03.504569564Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:08.132336Z"},{"id":"GHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q","title":"next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler","description":"### Impact\n\nThe HTTP route handler exported by `next-video/request-handler` — which the README instructs consumers to mount at `/api/video` — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary `.json` files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.\n\nThe handler's `GET` endpoint accepts a `url` query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between \"remote URL\" and \"local file path\" is a regex check for `^https?://`. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, `.json` is appended, and the file is read with `fs.readFile` and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.\n\nOn a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:\n- The **Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key** (`.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json`)\n- The **Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys** (`previewModeId`, `previewModeSigningKey`, `previewModeEncryptionKey`)\n- Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths\n- Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux `uploadId`, `assetId`, `playbackId` values stored in `videos/*.json`)\n\nAny application that mounted `/api/video` following the documented one-liner is affected.\n\n### Patches\n\n2.8.1\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUntil a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the `url` parameter before passing it through:\n\n- Reject any `url` value that does not begin with `https://`, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.\n- Alternatively, remove the `/api/video` route entirely if your application only uses build-time `import` of local video files and does not use `\u003cVideo src=\"https://...\"\u003e` with string URLs at runtime.\n\n### References\n\n- `src/request-handler.ts` — the vulnerable GET handler\n- `src/assets.ts` — `getAssetPath()`, where the local-vs-remote branching occurs\n- `src/utils/utils.ts` — `isRemote()`, the sole guard between the two branches\n- `src/config.ts` — `loadAsset()`, which performs the unconstrained `fs.readFile`","status":"published","published":"2026-08-20T18:35:11Z","modified":"2026-08-20T18:48:09.472043Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:34.700741Z"}]}}