{"id":"CVE-2026-54447","aliases":["EUVD-2026-77804","GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc","PYSEC-2026-3467"],"status":"published","title":"garminconnect: Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store","description":"garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00151,"percentile":0.04355,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-732"],"published":"2026-07-15T17:33:00Z","modified":"2026-11-11T02:48:52Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"garminconnect","fixed_in":["0.3.5"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"garminconnect","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.3.4"},{"fixed":"0.3.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"garminconnect","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.3.5"}]}],"versions":["0.1.1","0.1.10","0.1.11","0.1.12","0.1.13","0.1.14","0.1.15","0.1.16","0.1.17","0.1.18","0.1.19","0.1.2","0.1.21","0.1.22","0.1.23","0.1.24","0.1.25","0.1.26","0.1.27","0.1.28","0.1.29","0.1.3","0.1.30","0.1.31","0.1.32","0.1.33","0.1.34","0.1.35","0.1.36","0.1.37","0.1.38","0.1.39","0.1.4","0.1.40","0.1.41","0.1.42","0.1.43","0.1.44","0.1.45","0.1.46","0.1.47","0.1.48","0.1.49","0.1.5","0.1.50","0.1.51","0.1.52","0.1.53","0.1.54","0.1.55","0.1.6","0.1.7","0.1.8","0.1.9","0.2.1","0.2.10","0.2.11","0.2.12","0.2.13","0.2.14","0.2.15","0.2.16","0.2.17","0.2.18","0.2.19","0.2.2","0.2.20","0.2.21","0.2.22","0.2.23","0.2.24","0.2.25","0.2.26","0.2.27","0.2.28","0.2.29","0.2.3","0.2.30","0.2.31","0.2.33","0.2.34","0.2.35","0.2.36","0.2.37","0.2.38","0.2.39","0.2.4","0.2.40","0.2.5","0.2.6","0.2.7","0.2.8","0.2.9","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"garminconnect","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.3.5"}]}],"versions":["0.1.1","0.1.10","0.1.11","0.1.12","0.1.13","0.1.14","0.1.15","0.1.16","0.1.17","0.1.18","0.1.19","0.1.2","0.1.21","0.1.22","0.1.23","0.1.24","0.1.25","0.1.26","0.1.27","0.1.28","0.1.29","0.1.3","0.1.30","0.1.31","0.1.32","0.1.33","0.1.34","0.1.35","0.1.36","0.1.37","0.1.38","0.1.39","0.1.4","0.1.40","0.1.41","0.1.42","0.1.43","0.1.44","0.1.45","0.1.46","0.1.47","0.1.48","0.1.49","0.1.5","0.1.50","0.1.51","0.1.52","0.1.53","0.1.54","0.1.55","0.1.6","0.1.7","0.1.8","0.1.9","0.2.1","0.2.10","0.2.11","0.2.12","0.2.13","0.2.14","0.2.15","0.2.16","0.2.17","0.2.18","0.2.19","0.2.2","0.2.20","0.2.21","0.2.22","0.2.23","0.2.24","0.2.25","0.2.26","0.2.27","0.2.28","0.2.29","0.2.3","0.2.30","0.2.31","0.2.33","0.2.34","0.2.35","0.2.36","0.2.37","0.2.38","0.2.39","0.2.4","0.2.40","0.2.5","0.2.6","0.2.7","0.2.8","0.2.9","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.3.3","0.3.4"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"cyberjunky","product":"python-garminconnect"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/cyberjunky/python-garminconnect/security/advisories/GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cyberjunky/python-garminconnect/commit/8256b577190b446e279c81b845d8e27d0ea1fbf5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cyberjunky/python-garminconnect/releases/tag/0.3.5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cyberjunky/python-garminconnect/commit/77a3837f1f79d486663c9646438e70e8319e1a48","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cyberjunky/python-garminconnect/commit/f74174a5647e1af78eca1f8f3a0aa5dc5a899947","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54447.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54447","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cyberjunky/python-garminconnect","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/garminconnect","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54447","title":"garminconnect: Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store","description":"garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T19:53:38.954Z","modified":"2026-09-14T20:10:01.561Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-732"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:09.774038Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-77804","description":"garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T19:53:38Z","modified":"2026-09-14T20:10:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:19.383429Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc","title":"garminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store","description":"## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store\n\n### Summary\n\n`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account.\n\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003c= 0.3.4`\n- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`\n\n### Details\n\n`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:\n\n```python\ndef dump(self, path: str) -\u003e None:\n    p = Path(path).expanduser()\n    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(\".json\"):\n        p = p / \"garmin_tokens.json\"\n    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=\n    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction\n```\n\nThe serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.\n\nUnder `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:\n\n- token directory → `0o755`\n- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)\n\nA separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token.\n\n### Impact\n\nLocal credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file:\n\n```python\np.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)\nwith contextlib.suppress(OSError):\n    p.parent.chmod(0o700)\nflags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC\nif hasattr(os, \"O_NOFOLLOW\"):\n    flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW\nfd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600)\nwith os.fdopen(fd, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n    f.write(self.dumps())\nwith contextlib.suppress(OSError):\n    p.chmod(0o600)\n```\n\nVerified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only:\n\n```bash\nchmod 700 ~/.garminconnect\nchmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json\n```\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect \u003e= 0.3.5`:\n   ```bash\n   pip install --upgrade garminconnect\n   ```\n2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions\n   on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until\n   then:\n   ```bash\n   chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json\n   # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store\n   ```\n3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as\n   compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so\n   a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially\n   read by others until rotated.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-15T17:33:00Z","modified":"2026-07-15T17:33:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-732"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:43.958448Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54447","description":"garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T20:16:46.29Z","modified":"2026-09-30T17:51:56.193Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-732"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:47.335523Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54447","title":"garminconnect: Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store","description":"garminconnect is a Python 3 API wrapper for Garmin Connect that retrieves statistics and manages activities. Prior to 0.3.5, garminconnect/client.py Client.dump creates the OAuth token directory and garmin_tokens.json without explicit owner-only modes, so a permissive umask such as 022 can leave the directory mode at 0755 and the token file mode at 0644. garmin_tokens.json contains di_refresh_token, and another unprivileged user on a shared Linux or macOS host can read the token and obtain persistent access to the victim's Garmin Connect account, including health, fitness, activity, and device data. The Garmin.login tokenstore path is affected, and a pre-existing loosely permissioned token file remains exposed until rewritten or manually restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.3.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T19:53:38.954Z","modified":"2026-11-11T10:47:31.448465467Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-732"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:21:38.364245Z"},{"id":"GHSA-wjhr-76vg-2hvc","title":"garminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store","description":"## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store\n\n### Summary\n\n`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account.\n\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003c= 0.3.4`\n- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`\n\n### Details\n\n`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:\n\n```python\ndef dump(self, path: str) -\u003e None:\n    p = Path(path).expanduser()\n    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(\".json\"):\n        p = p / \"garmin_tokens.json\"\n    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=\n    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction\n```\n\nThe serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.\n\nUnder `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:\n\n- token directory → `0o755`\n- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)\n\nA separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token.\n\n### Impact\n\nLocal credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file:\n\n```python\np.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)\nwith contextlib.suppress(OSError):\n    p.parent.chmod(0o700)\nflags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC\nif hasattr(os, \"O_NOFOLLOW\"):\n    flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW\nfd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600)\nwith os.fdopen(fd, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n    f.write(self.dumps())\nwith contextlib.suppress(OSError):\n    p.chmod(0o600)\n```\n\nVerified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only:\n\n```bash\nchmod 700 ~/.garminconnect\nchmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json\n```\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect \u003e= 0.3.5`:\n   ```bash\n   pip install --upgrade garminconnect\n   ```\n2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions\n   on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until\n   then:\n   ```bash\n   chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json\n   # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store\n   ```\n3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as\n   compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so\n   a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially\n   read by others until rotated.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-15T17:33:00Z","modified":"2026-07-23T15:11:39.561071147Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-732"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:58.767335Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-3467","title":"garminconnect Has Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store","description":"## Insecure Permission Assignment for Garmin OAuth Token Store\n\n### Summary\n\n`garminconnect` (≤ 0.3.4) wrote its OAuth token store to disk without restricting file-system permissions. Under the default Linux umask (`022`) the token file `garmin_tokens.json` was created world-readable (`0o644`). The file contains the DI **refresh token**, so any other local user on a shared host could read it and obtain persistent, unauthorized access to the victim's Garmin Connect account.\n\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Weakness:** CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource)\n- **Affected versions:** `\u003c= 0.3.4`\n- **Patched version:** `0.3.5`\n\n### Details\n\n`Client.dump()` created the token directory and file with no `mode` argument, leaving permissions entirely to the process umask:\n\n```python\ndef dump(self, path: str) -\u003e None:\n    p = Path(path).expanduser()\n    if p.is_dir() or not p.name.endswith(\".json\"):\n        p = p / \"garmin_tokens.json\"\n    p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)   # no mode=\n    p.write_text(self.dumps())                     # no permission restriction\n```\n\nThe serialized payload includes `di_token`, `di_refresh_token`, and `di_client_id`. The call is in the core library (`Garmin.login(tokenstore=...)` persists tokens this way), and all shipped usage examples default the token store to `~/.garminconnect`.\n\nUnder `umask 022` the resulting permissions were:\n\n- token directory → `0o755`\n- `garmin_tokens.json` → `0o644` (world-readable)\n\nA separate, unprivileged user on the same machine could read the file with a plain `open()` — no elevated privileges required — and extract the refresh token.\n\n### Impact\n\nLocal credential theft / privilege escalation on multi-user Linux or macOS hosts running under a permissive umask. The stolen refresh token can be exchanged for fresh access tokens via Garmin's OAuth endpoint, granting ongoing access to the victim's account (health/fitness data, activity history, device management) until the token is revoked.\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in **0.3.5** (commit `77a3837`). `dump()` now creates the directory as `0o700` and writes the token file as `0o600` regardless of umask — using `os.open(..., O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC, 0o600)` with `O_NOFOLLOW` where available, plus a defensive `chmod` that also tightens a pre-existing loose file:\n\n```python\np.parent.mkdir(mode=0o700, parents=True, exist_ok=True)\nwith contextlib.suppress(OSError):\n    p.parent.chmod(0o700)\nflags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC\nif hasattr(os, \"O_NOFOLLOW\"):\n    flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW\nfd = os.open(p, flags, 0o600)\nwith os.fdopen(fd, \"w\", encoding=\"utf-8\") as f:\n    f.write(self.dumps())\nwith contextlib.suppress(OSError):\n    p.chmod(0o600)\n```\n\nVerified under `umask 022`: directory `0o700`, file `0o600`, no group/other access.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict the token store manually and keep it owner-only:\n\n```bash\nchmod 700 ~/.garminconnect\nchmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json\n```\n\n### Remediation\n\n1. **Upgrade** to `garminconnect \u003e= 0.3.5`:\n   ```bash\n   pip install --upgrade garminconnect\n   ```\n2. **Fix any token file already on disk** — upgrading only tightens permissions\n   on the *next* write, so an existing world-readable file stays exposed until\n   then:\n   ```bash\n   chmod 600 ~/.garminconnect/garmin_tokens.json\n   # or remove it and log in again to mint a fresh token store\n   ```\n3. **If the file was exposed on a shared host, treat the refresh token as\n   compromised.** Re-authenticate (delete the token store and log in again) so\n   a new token is issued; consider the previously stored token potentially\n   read by others until rotated.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by **EQSTLab** via a private security advisory. garminconnect thanks them for the detailed, responsible disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-23T11:41:45.189927Z","modified":"2026-07-23T15:00:12.56170245Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:56.847083Z"}]}}