{"id":"CVE-2026-54508","aliases":["EUVD-2026-63704","GHSA-f5vh-p2h5-x735"],"status":"published","title":"TREK: Blind SSRF via unvalidated redirect-following in Google/Naver list import and Maps URL resolution","description":"TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00427,"percentile":0.37263,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-08-20T21:46:51Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:40Z","products":[{"vendor":"mauriceboe","product":"trek"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/security/advisories/GHSA-f5vh-p2h5-x735","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/pull/1185","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/commit/ad893eb1cc75b6d56f402d73a6d41bd48ba7ae11","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/releases/tag/v3.1.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54508.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54508","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54508","title":"TREK: Blind SSRF via unvalidated redirect-following in Google/Naver list import and Maps URL resolution","description":"TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-20T21:46:51.288Z","modified":"2026-08-21T21:45:07.846Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:09.774038Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-63704","description":"TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-20T21:46:51Z","modified":"2026-08-21T21:45:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:36.844009Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54508","description":"TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-20T22:17:21.41Z","modified":"2026-10-18T20:10:00.11Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:40.302911Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54508","title":"TREK: Blind SSRF via unvalidated redirect-following in Google/Naver list import and Maps URL resolution","description":"TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-20T21:46:51.288Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:40.159242188Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:10.818486Z"}]}}