{"id":"CVE-2026-54542","aliases":["EUVD-2026-77574","GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p"],"status":"published","title":"Nimiq: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof","description":"Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00443,"percentile":0.38782,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-125"],"published":"2026-07-16T20:03:25Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:52Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nimiq-primitives","fixed_in":["1.6.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nimiq-primitives","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.6.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"crates.io","package":"nimiq-primitives","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.6.0"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"nimiq","product":"core-rs-albatross"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3790","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/eabfc3e21731b0628c3f933163a0f1e1864217bf","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.6.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/54xxx/CVE-2026-54542.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54542","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54542","title":"Nimiq: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof","description":"Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T15:29:45.07Z","modified":"2026-09-14T20:07:10.225Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:38:09.774038Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-77574","description":"Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T15:29:45Z","modified":"2026-09-14T20:07:10Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:19.383429Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p","title":"nimiq-primitives: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof","description":"### Impact\n\nA malicious peer acting as a state-sync source can crash a syncing node with a crafted `TrieChunk` whose proof contains a `TrieNodeChild` whose `suffix`, when concatenated with the parent key via `KeyNibbles::Add`, exceeds the fixed 63-byte backing array. `Add` (`primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs:332` / `:341`) indexes `bytes[self.bytes_len()..self.bytes_len() + other.bytes_len()]` with no combined-length check, causing an out-of-bounds slice panic (both the even- and odd-length branches).\n\n`KeyNibbles` deserialization validates only the individual `length \u003c= 126`, not the combined parent + suffix length. The panic occurs at `put_chunk` → `child.key()` → `is_stump()` → `+`, i.e. **before** `proof.verify()`, so no valid proof is required. As with the related `child_index` issue, exploitation requires being the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting crash is transient (the node restarts and re-syncs).\n\nAffected: core-rs-albatross \u003c= 1.5.1 (`nimiq-primitives`).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.6.0** via https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3790 (commit `eabfc3e2`), which guards key-nibble concatenation against exceeding the maximum length instead of indexing out of bounds.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone other than syncing only from trusted peers. Upgrade to 1.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-16T20:03:25Z","modified":"2026-07-16T20:03:26Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:44.915484Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54542","description":"Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T16:17:12.377Z","modified":"2026-09-30T17:51:56.193Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:46.980627Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-54542","title":"Nimiq: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof","description":"Nimiq is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to 1.6.0, a malicious state-sync peer can crash a syncing node by sending a crafted TrieChunk whose proof contains a TrieNodeChild suffix that is individually valid but exceeds the 63-byte KeyNibbles backing array when combined with the parent key. KeyNibbles::Add in primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs performs the combined slice operation without checking the total length, and the input reaches put_chunk, TrieNodeChild::key, and TrieNodeChild::is_stump before proof.verify, so the attacker does not need a valid cryptographic proof. Exploitation requires the attacker to be selected as the victim's sync peer during state sync. The resulting out-of-bounds panic is transient because the node restarts and resynchronizes. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T15:29:45.07Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:52.994558579Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:10.818486Z"},{"id":"GHSA-5rg2-xv9j-gv5p","title":"nimiq-primitives: Out-of-bounds panic in KeyNibbles::Add from oversized child suffix in a deserialized proof","description":"### Impact\n\nA malicious peer acting as a state-sync source can crash a syncing node with a crafted `TrieChunk` whose proof contains a `TrieNodeChild` whose `suffix`, when concatenated with the parent key via `KeyNibbles::Add`, exceeds the fixed 63-byte backing array. `Add` (`primitives/src/key_nibbles.rs:332` / `:341`) indexes `bytes[self.bytes_len()..self.bytes_len() + other.bytes_len()]` with no combined-length check, causing an out-of-bounds slice panic (both the even- and odd-length branches).\n\n`KeyNibbles` deserialization validates only the individual `length \u003c= 126`, not the combined parent + suffix length. The panic occurs at `put_chunk` → `child.key()` → `is_stump()` → `+`, i.e. **before** `proof.verify()`, so no valid proof is required. As with the related `child_index` issue, exploitation requires being the victim's sync peer during state sync, and the resulting crash is transient (the node restarts and re-syncs).\n\nAffected: core-rs-albatross \u003c= 1.5.1 (`nimiq-primitives`).\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **1.6.0** via https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3790 (commit `eabfc3e2`), which guards key-nibble concatenation against exceeding the maximum length instead of indexing out of bounds.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone other than syncing only from trusted peers. Upgrade to 1.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-16T20:03:25Z","modified":"2026-07-16T20:26:44.362618Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":3.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"low"}],"cwes":["CWE-125"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:38.911014Z"}]}}