{"id":"CVE-2026-55488","aliases":["EUVD-2026-38804","GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh","PYSEC-2026-2667"],"status":"published","title":"motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read","description":"motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called \"motion,\" which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00605,"percentile":0.49247,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-06-23T18:32:46Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"motioneye","fixed_in":["0.44.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"motioneye","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.44.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"motioneye","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.44.0"}]}],"versions":["0.27","0.27.1","0.27.2","0.28","0.28.1","0.28.2","0.28.3","0.29","0.29.1","0.29rc1","0.29rc2","0.30","0.30rc1","0.30rc2","0.31","0.31.1","0.31.2","0.31.3","0.31.4","0.31.5","0.32","0.32.1","0.32.2","0.33","0.33.1","0.33.2","0.33.3","0.33.4","0.34","0.34.1","0.34rc1","0.35","0.35.1","0.35.2","0.35rc1","0.36","0.36.1","0.37","0.37.1","0.37rc1","0.38","0.38.1","0.39","0.39.1","0.39.2","0.39.3","0.40","0.40rc1","0.40rc2","0.40rc3","0.40rc4","0.40rc5","0.41","0.41rc1","0.42","0.42.1","0.43.1","0.43.1b1","0.43.1b2","0.43.1b3","0.43.1b4","0.43.1b5","0.44.0b1","0.44.0b2","0.44.0b3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"motioneye","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.44.0"}]}],"versions":["0.27","0.27.1","0.27.2","0.28","0.28.1","0.28.2","0.28.3","0.29","0.29.1","0.29rc1","0.29rc2","0.30","0.30rc1","0.30rc2","0.31","0.31.1","0.31.2","0.31.3","0.31.4","0.31.5","0.32","0.32.1","0.32.2","0.33","0.33.1","0.33.2","0.33.3","0.33.4","0.34","0.34.1","0.34rc1","0.35","0.35.1","0.35.2","0.35rc1","0.36","0.36.1","0.37","0.37.1","0.37rc1","0.38","0.38.1","0.39","0.39.1","0.39.2","0.39.3","0.40","0.40rc1","0.40rc2","0.40rc3","0.40rc4","0.40rc5","0.41","0.41rc1","0.42","0.42.1","0.43.1","0.43.1b1","0.43.1b2","0.43.1b3","0.43.1b4","0.43.1b5","0.44.0b1","0.44.0b2","0.44.0b3"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"motioneye-project","product":"motioneye"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55488.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55488","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/motioneye","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55488","title":"motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read","description":"motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called \"motion,\" which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-24T15:03:26.208Z","modified":"2026-06-24T17:29:03.016Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:11.925815Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-38804","description":"motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called \"motion,\" which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-24T15:03:26Z","modified":"2026-06-24T17:29:03Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:30.242414Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh","title":"motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read","description":"### Summary\n\nmEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.\n\nThe affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.\n\nThe filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:\n\n```python\ndef get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):\n    target_dir = camera_config.get('target_dir')\n    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)\n    return full_path\n```\n\nWhen path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python's `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):\n\n```\ndef get_absolute_path(self, root, path):\n    return path\n\ndef validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):\n    return absolute_path\n```\nThis allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access.\n\nThe same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers:\n\n- GET /movie/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/download/\u003cfilename\u003e\n- GET /picture/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/download/\u003cfilename\u003e\n- GET /picture/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/preview/\u003cfilename\u003e\n\n# PoC\n\n```\nGET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:8765\n```\n\n# Fix\n\nDo not allow absolute paths supplied by user input.\n\nValidate that the fully resolved canonical path remains within the configured camera media directory before serving a file.\n\nAdditionally, Tornado’s built-in path validation should not be bypassed unless equivalent validation is performed by motionEye.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T18:32:46Z","modified":"2026-06-23T18:34:18Z","cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:32.744157Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55488","description":"motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called \"motion,\" which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-24T16:16:32.793Z","modified":"2026-10-25T22:10:00.15Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:25.288279Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55488","title":"motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read","description":"motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for a piece of software called \"motion,\" which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 contain an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem. The affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks. As a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process. Version 0.44.0 fixes the issue.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-24T15:03:26.208Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:07.365898621Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.22012Z"},{"id":"GHSA-rw9q-97r9-8gvh","title":"motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read","description":"### Summary\n\nmEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.\n\nThe affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.\n\nThe filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:\n\n```python\ndef get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):\n    target_dir = camera_config.get('target_dir')\n    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)\n    return full_path\n```\n\nWhen path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python's `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):\n\n```\ndef get_absolute_path(self, root, path):\n    return path\n\ndef validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):\n    return absolute_path\n```\nThis allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access.\n\nThe same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers:\n\n- GET /movie/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/download/\u003cfilename\u003e\n- GET /picture/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/download/\u003cfilename\u003e\n- GET /picture/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/preview/\u003cfilename\u003e\n\n# PoC\n\n```\nGET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:8765\n```\n\n# Fix\n\nDo not allow absolute paths supplied by user input.\n\nValidate that the fully resolved canonical path remains within the configured camera media directory before serving a file.\n\nAdditionally, Tornado’s built-in path validation should not be bypassed unless equivalent validation is performed by motionEye.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-23T18:32:46Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:43:00.858247644Z","cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:56.281047Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-2667","title":"motionEye's Absolute Path Traversal in Media File Handlers Allows Arbitrary File Read","description":"### Summary\n\nmEye contains an absolute path traversal vulnerability in multiple media file handlers that allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem.\n\nThe affected handlers accept a user-controlled filename parameter and construct filesystem paths using `os.path.join()`. When an absolute path is supplied, Python discards the configured media directory and returns the attacker-supplied path directly. The application then bypasses Tornado's built-in path validation by overriding the relevant safety checks.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can access files outside of the configured camera media directory, subject to the permissions of the motionEye process.\n\n### Details\n\nThe issue exists in the media playback and download functionality.\n\nThe filename parameter is passed to `mediafiles.get_media_path()`:\n\n```python\ndef get_media_path(camera_config, path, media_type):\n    target_dir = camera_config.get('target_dir')\n    full_path = os.path.join(target_dir, path)\n    return full_path\n```\n\nWhen path is an absolute path (e.g. `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`), Python's `os.path.join()` discards `target_dir` entirely and returns the absolute path as-is. This would normally be caught by Tornado's StaticFileHandler path validation, but MoviePlaybackHandler explicitly overrides both safety checks (`movie_playback.py` lines 111-115):\n\n```\ndef get_absolute_path(self, root, path):\n    return path\n\ndef validate_absolute_path(self, root, absolute_path):\n    return absolute_path\n```\nThis allows reading any file on the filesystem that the motionEye process can access.\n\nThe same path traversal exists in the movie download, picture download, and picture preview handlers:\n\n- GET /movie/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/download/\u003cfilename\u003e\n- GET /picture/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/download/\u003cfilename\u003e\n- GET /picture/\u003ccamera_id\u003e/preview/\u003cfilename\u003e\n\n# PoC\n\n```\nGET /movie/1/playback//etc/motioneye/motion.conf HTTP/1.1\nHost: target:8765\n```\n\n# Fix\n\nDo not allow absolute paths supplied by user input.\n\nValidate that the fully resolved canonical path remains within the configured camera media directory before serving a file.\n\nAdditionally, Tornado’s built-in path validation should not be bypassed unless equivalent validation is performed by motionEye.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-13T15:46:23.499449Z","modified":"2026-07-13T16:32:39.62403824Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:55.961245Z"}]}}