{"id":"CVE-2026-55673","aliases":["EUVD-2026-67863","GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7"],"status":"published","title":"PowSyBl: Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s","description":"PowSyBl (Power System Blocks) is a framework to build power system oriented software. Prior to 7.2.2, UnixLocalCommandExecutor and WindowsLocalCommandExecutor concatenate command arguments and environment variables into strings interpreted through bash -c or cmd /c without sufficient escaping. Attacker-controlled values reaching UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute, WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute, LocalComputationManager.execute, ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run, ActionSimulatorTool.run, AmplModelRunner.run, or AmplModelRunner.runAsync can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell commands as the JVM user. The affected itools paths include action-simulator with task-count, security-analysis with external, and dynamic-security-analysis. Downstream CLI tools, libraries, REST front ends, and multi-tenant grid-analysis services that forward less-trusted contingency identifiers or computation parameters into these APIs can expose the injection remotely. This issue is fixed in version 7.2.2.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00604,"percentile":0.49171,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-88"],"published":"2026-08-28T18:36:53Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:15:02Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local","fixed_in":["7.2.2"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"7.2.1"},{"fixed":"7.2.2"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"7.2.2"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0","1.1.0","2.0.0","2.1.0","2.2.0","2.3.0","2.4.0","2.4.1","2.5.0","2.5.1","2.5.2","2.6.0","2.6.1","3.0.0","3.1.0","3.2.0","3.3.0","3.3.1","3.3.2","3.4.0","3.5.0","3.6.0","3.7.0","3.7.1","3.7.2","3.8.0","3.8.0-RC1","3.8.1","4.0.0","4.0.0-RC1","4.0.0-RC2","4.0.1","4.1.0","4.1.1","4.1.2","4.10.0","4.10.0-RC1","4.10.0-alpha-1","4.10.1","4.10.2","4.2.0","4.2.0-RC1","4.3.0","4.3.0-RC1","4.3.0-RC2","4.3.0-alpha-1","4.3.1","4.4.0","4.4.0-RC1","4.5.0","4.5.0-RC1","4.5.1","4.6.0","4.6.0-RC1","4.6.1","4.7.0","4.7.0-RC1","4.7.0-RC2","4.8.0","4.8.0-RC1","4.8.0-RC2","4.9.0","4.9.0-RC1","4.9.1","4.9.2","5.0.0","5.0.0-RC1","5.1.0","5.1.0-RC1","5.1.1","5.2.0","5.2.0-RC1","5.2.0-alpha-1","5.2.1","5.3.0","5.3.0-alpha-1","5.3.0-alpha-2","5.3.1","5.3.2","6.0.0","6.0.0-RC1","6.0.1","6.0.2","6.0.3","6.1.0","6.1.0-alpha-1","6.1.1","6.1.2","6.2.0","6.2.0-RC1","6.2.1","6.2.2","6.2.3","6.2.4","6.3.0","6.3.0-alpha-1","6.3.1","6.3.2","6.4.0","6.4.0-RC2","6.4.1","6.5.0","6.5.0-RC1","6.5.1","6.6.0","6.6.0-RC1","6.6.1","6.7.0","6.7.0-RC1","6.7.1","6.7.2","6.8.0","6.8.0-RC2","6.8.1","7.0.0","7.0.0-RC1","7.0.1","7.1.0","7.1.0-RC1","7.1.1","7.1.2","7.2.0","7.2.0-RC1","7.2.1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"powsybl","product":"powsybl-core"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/security/advisories/GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/pull/3973","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/17461264d1d18f9bba43bb7855f251e9fa55a4db","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/7aa28d8c2492bbcd061585cb498acce72d5ed79a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/releases/tag/v7.2.2","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55673.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55673","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55673","title":"PowSyBl: Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s","description":"PowSyBl (Power System Blocks) is a framework to build power system oriented software. Prior to 7.2.2, UnixLocalCommandExecutor and WindowsLocalCommandExecutor concatenate command arguments and environment variables into strings interpreted through bash -c or cmd /c without sufficient escaping. Attacker-controlled values reaching UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute, WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute, LocalComputationManager.execute, ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run, ActionSimulatorTool.run, AmplModelRunner.run, or AmplModelRunner.runAsync can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell commands as the JVM user. The affected itools paths include action-simulator with task-count, security-analysis with external, and dynamic-security-analysis. Downstream CLI tools, libraries, REST front ends, and multi-tenant grid-analysis services that forward less-trusted contingency identifiers or computation parameters into these APIs can expose the injection remotely. This issue is fixed in version 7.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T18:36:53.11Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:51:53.245Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-88"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:12.260247Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-67863","description":"PowSyBl (Power System Blocks) is a framework to build power system oriented software. Prior to 7.2.2, UnixLocalCommandExecutor and WindowsLocalCommandExecutor concatenate command arguments and environment variables into strings interpreted through bash -c or cmd /c without sufficient escaping. Attacker-controlled values reaching UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute, WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute, LocalComputationManager.execute, ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run, ActionSimulatorTool.run, AmplModelRunner.run, or AmplModelRunner.runAsync can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell commands as the JVM user. The affected itools paths include action-simulator with task-count, security-analysis with external, and dynamic-security-analysis. Downstream CLI tools, libraries, REST front ends, and multi-tenant grid-analysis services that forward less-trusted contingency identifiers or computation parameters into these APIs can expose the injection remotely. This issue is fixed in version 7.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T18:36:53Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:51:53Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:20.215322Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7","title":"PowSyBl Core has Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s","description":"### Impact\n\n#### Description\nBoth `AbstractLocalCommandExecutor` OS-dependent implementations are subject to **CWE-78** (OS Command Injection), with a secondary **CWE-88** (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.\n\nThe local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through `bash -c` for Unix, or `cmd /c` for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.\n\nThe sink is reachable through public APIs that accept `List\u003cString\u003e` arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.\n\nAny caller — CLI, library integration, or embedding service — that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.\n\n#### Vulnerable elements\nThe vulnerable elements are:\n- Public methods:\n  - `UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `LocalComputationManager.execute(...)`\n  - `ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...)`\n  - `ActionSimulatorTool.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...)`\n- **itools** commands:\n  - `action-simulator`, when the `task-count` option is defined\n  - `security-analysis`, when the `external` option is defined\n  -  `dynamic-security-analysis`\n\n\n#### Characteristics\n\nThe vulnerability characteristics are the following:\n- It allows **arbitrary shell command execution** as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.)\n- There are **multiple independent injection vectors** within a single vulnerable call:\n  - `args` elements (weakly escaped — bypassable via `$(...)`, backticks, escaped quotes)\n  - Environment variable values (unescaped — bypassable via `;`, `\\n`, or shell metacharacters)\n- It is **silent** from the caller's perspective: the `List\u003cString\u003e` API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs.\n- It exposes **downstream projects:** any service embedding `powsybl-core` (REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl's code directly.\n\n\n#### Am I impacted?\n\nYou are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the \"Vulnerable elements\" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.\n\n\n### Patches\n\n`com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2` and higher\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot update your `powsybl-computation-local` version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters:\n- On Unix/Linux systems:\n  - `\\`, `!`, `#`, `$`, `^`, `\u0026`, `*`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`, `|`, `[`, `]`, `\\`, `;`, `\\`, `\"`, `,`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `?`, ` `\n- On Windows:\n  - `%`, `!`, `\"`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `^`","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T18:37:28Z","modified":"2026-08-28T18:37:29Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-88"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:08.084849Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55673","description":"PowSyBl (Power System Blocks) is a framework to build power system oriented software. Prior to 7.2.2, UnixLocalCommandExecutor and WindowsLocalCommandExecutor concatenate command arguments and environment variables into strings interpreted through bash -c or cmd /c without sufficient escaping. Attacker-controlled values reaching UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute, WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute, LocalComputationManager.execute, ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run, ActionSimulatorTool.run, AmplModelRunner.run, or AmplModelRunner.runAsync can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell commands as the JVM user. The affected itools paths include action-simulator with task-count, security-analysis with external, and dynamic-security-analysis. Downstream CLI tools, libraries, REST front ends, and multi-tenant grid-analysis services that forward less-trusted contingency identifiers or computation parameters into these APIs can expose the injection remotely. This issue is fixed in version 7.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T20:18:29.77Z","modified":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.08Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-88"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:42.366888Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55673","title":"PowSyBl: Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s","description":"PowSyBl (Power System Blocks) is a framework to build power system oriented software. Prior to 7.2.2, UnixLocalCommandExecutor and WindowsLocalCommandExecutor concatenate command arguments and environment variables into strings interpreted through bash -c or cmd /c without sufficient escaping. Attacker-controlled values reaching UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute, WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute, LocalComputationManager.execute, ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run, ActionSimulatorTool.run, AmplModelRunner.run, or AmplModelRunner.runAsync can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell commands as the JVM user. The affected itools paths include action-simulator with task-count, security-analysis with external, and dynamic-security-analysis. Downstream CLI tools, libraries, REST front ends, and multi-tenant grid-analysis services that forward less-trusted contingency identifiers or computation parameters into these APIs can expose the injection remotely. This issue is fixed in version 7.2.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T18:36:53.11Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:15:02.436118564Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-88"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.22012Z"},{"id":"GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7","title":"PowSyBl Core has Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s","description":"### Impact\n\n#### Description\nBoth `AbstractLocalCommandExecutor` OS-dependent implementations are subject to **CWE-78** (OS Command Injection), with a secondary **CWE-88** (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.\n\nThe local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through `bash -c` for Unix, or `cmd /c` for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.\n\nThe sink is reachable through public APIs that accept `List\u003cString\u003e` arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.\n\nAny caller — CLI, library integration, or embedding service — that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.\n\n#### Vulnerable elements\nThe vulnerable elements are:\n- Public methods:\n  - `UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `LocalComputationManager.execute(...)`\n  - `ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...)`\n  - `ActionSimulatorTool.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...)`\n- **itools** commands:\n  - `action-simulator`, when the `task-count` option is defined\n  - `security-analysis`, when the `external` option is defined\n  -  `dynamic-security-analysis`\n\n\n#### Characteristics\n\nThe vulnerability characteristics are the following:\n- It allows **arbitrary shell command execution** as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.)\n- There are **multiple independent injection vectors** within a single vulnerable call:\n  - `args` elements (weakly escaped — bypassable via `$(...)`, backticks, escaped quotes)\n  - Environment variable values (unescaped — bypassable via `;`, `\\n`, or shell metacharacters)\n- It is **silent** from the caller's perspective: the `List\u003cString\u003e` API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs.\n- It exposes **downstream projects:** any service embedding `powsybl-core` (REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl's code directly.\n\n\n#### Am I impacted?\n\nYou are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the \"Vulnerable elements\" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.\n\n\n### Patches\n\n`com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2` and higher\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot update your `powsybl-computation-local` version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters:\n- On Unix/Linux systems:\n  - `\\`, `!`, `#`, `$`, `^`, `\u0026`, `*`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`, `|`, `[`, `]`, `\\`, `;`, `\\`, `\"`, `,`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `?`, ` `\n- On Windows:\n  - `%`, `!`, `\"`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `^`","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T18:37:28Z","modified":"2026-08-28T18:55:35.942913Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-78","CWE-88"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:50.687609Z"}]}}