{"id":"CVE-2026-55675","aliases":["EUVD-2026-98742","GHSA-wr2h-fpxm-ff4x"],"status":"published","title":"Salty documentation workflow executes fork-controlled Python build hooks with deployment secrets","description":"The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00427,"percentile":0.37427,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-1357","CWE-829","CWE-94"],"published":"2026-10-13T15:15:25Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35Z","products":[{"vendor":"saltyorg","product":"docs"},{"vendor":"suitenumerique","product":"docs"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/security/advisories/GHSA-wr2h-fpxm-ff4x","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/saltyorg/docs/commit/649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55675.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55675","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55675","title":"Salty documentation workflow executes fork-controlled Python build hooks with deployment secrets","description":"The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-13T15:15:25.023Z","modified":"2026-10-13T16:22:51.021Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-829","CWE-1357"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:11.925815Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-98742","description":"The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-13T15:15:25Z","modified":"2026-10-13T16:22:51Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:20.028612Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55675","description":"The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-13T16:17:21.89Z","modified":"2026-10-13T17:17:42.177Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-94","CWE-829","CWE-1357"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:57.132005Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55675","title":"Salty documentation workflow executes fork-controlled Python build hooks with deployment secrets","description":"The Salty documentation repository builds and deploys the docs.saltbox.dev website. Prior to commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220, .github/workflows/trigger-pr-build.yml records an untrusted fork commit in the pr_info artifact, and the secret-bearing workflow_run job in .github/workflows/build-pr.yml checks out that commit before running pip install -r requirements.txt. A fork pull request can therefore supply attacker-authored setup.py or PEP 517 build hooks whose installation code executes in the privileged base-repository workflow with CF_API_TOKEN, GH_TOKEN, MKDOCS_GIT_COMMITTERS_APIKEY, and a write-capable GITHUB_TOKEN, allowing secret disclosure and follow-on compromise. The vulnerability is not caused by the repository-fork guard, and the demonstrated path requires attacker control of fork content rather than merely the artifact metadata. This vulnerability is fixed with commit 649c9aea2daef1168eeb0415b44e65dbbde9f220.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-13T15:15:25.023Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:35.307442107Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-1357","CWE-829","CWE-94"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.22012Z"}]}}