{"id":"CVE-2026-56422","aliases":["EUVD-2026-38225","GHSA-mf7v-x7r6-fq57"],"status":"published","title":"MISP Core: Mass Assignment and Object Re-ownership via Unvalidated Request Fields","description":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object.\n\nIn affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context.\n\nThe fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00603,"percentile":0.49289,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-639"],"published":"2026-06-22T11:43:02Z","modified":"2026-11-11T02:49:02Z","products":[{"vendor":"misp","product":"misp"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/7acf8220cafac58bcfb362da37aca512fe4bb396","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/bc182d55dde5686a36ca2eb88fe6c2adabb9fad9","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/58f637aaab4d133e72f1454ebb963191d96d3b78","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/05aad418c57bb78e6b58a843d70d45de8f50db45","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/63aebc27a878233b9475c742985aaef909bc755b","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/00b2e3dae56fa24ea750eb525cc4709b7e5bee85","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/634f1f87c295193486c08c2c7ba1fee8a7339baa","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/ab9619dfa6cb5210fd20fb3b0b57006e4fc93916","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/8311427c2edd72a8341f0a65e1f11073d7ad9191","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/c80a3533b3d787f45f5185a4621cc0f05b0cf2e5","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/025f711506850aadb69cde1b57e5e5d57628c87f","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/3ff6bd9cfdab5d41b4667ea7298d88ffd6f3fcb8","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/84bafe69f5d0ab7f811371c0801a613f271ebc0b","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/2cc26f38f3e85c594957899f09043d5193146607","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/57433015815e59db5a1f11536f90920952cf3fcd","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/9341690e9b6dde7f0605edea5533e05ba7362e35","tags":["fix"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56422","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mf7v-x7r6-fq57"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/56xxx/CVE-2026-56422.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/misp/misp","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56422","title":"MISP Core: Mass Assignment and Object Re-ownership via Unvalidated Request Fields","description":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object.\n\nIn affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context.\n\nThe fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T11:43:02.69Z","modified":"2026-06-23T05:58:54.059Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:37:02.780526Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-38225","description":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object.\n\nIn affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context.\n\nThe fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T11:43:02Z","modified":"2026-06-23T05:58:54Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:33.850201Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-mf7v-x7r6-fq57","title":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields...","description":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object.\n\nIn affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context.\n\nThe fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T12:32:02Z","modified":"2026-06-22T12:32:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:08:55.672723Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56422","description":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object.\n\nIn affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context.\n\nThe fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T12:16:26.92Z","modified":"2026-06-22T18:16:49.92Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:24.912854Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56422","title":"MISP Core: Mass Assignment and Object Re-ownership via Unvalidated Request Fields","description":"Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object.\n\nIn affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context.\n\nThe fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T11:43:02.69Z","modified":"2026-11-11T10:47:20.276132166Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:21:28.618498Z"}]}}