{"id":"CVE-2026-56450","aliases":["EUVD-2026-38239","GHSA-hc8r-p4jw-p6fr"],"status":"published","title":"AIL Framework - Missing Rate Limiting Enables Brute-Force Attacks Against Two-Factor Authentication Codes","description":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.\n\n\nThe patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00577,"percentile":0.47984,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-307"],"published":"2026-06-22T13:02:30Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:53Z","products":[{"vendor":"ail project","product":"ail framework"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ail-project/ail-framework/commit/d3a394fe68fd5aeee86f3a3c91d4a0350f91e974","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56450","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hc8r-p4jw-p6fr"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/56xxx/CVE-2026-56450.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ail-project/ail-framework","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56450","title":"AIL Framework - Missing Rate Limiting Enables Brute-Force Attacks Against Two-Factor Authentication Codes","description":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.\n\n\nThe patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T13:02:30.32Z","modified":"2026-06-22T15:48:49.228Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:36:51.6229Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-38239","description":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.\n\n\nThe patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T13:02:30Z","modified":"2026-06-22T15:48:49Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:34.745289Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-hc8r-p4jw-p6fr","title":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code....","description":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.\n\n\nThe patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T15:30:45Z","modified":"2026-06-22T15:30:52Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:08:56.309175Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56450","description":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.\n\n\nThe patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T14:17:50.76Z","modified":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:24.912854Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56450","title":"AIL Framework - Missing Rate Limiting Enables Brute-Force Attacks Against Two-Factor Authentication Codes","description":"AIL did not restrict repeated failed attempts to verify a two-factor authentication (OTP) code. An attacker who had reached the 2FA verification step, such as after successfully completing the password-authentication stage, could submit an unlimited number of OTP guesses. This could enable brute-force guessing of a valid code and bypass the intended second authentication factor, resulting in unauthorized account access.\n\n\nThe patch introduces per-user failed-OTP tracking, blocks verification after 30 failed attempts for one hour, clears the counter after a successful OTP verification, and provides administrator recovery actions to purge affected lockouts.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-22T13:02:30.32Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:53.737200604Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-307"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.609219Z"}]}}