{"id":"CVE-2026-56671","aliases":["EUVD-2026-51401","GHSA-pj59-g5vv-74q4"],"status":"published","title":"ComfyUI: Path traversal in /experiment/models/preview allows arbitrary image file read","description":"ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, get_model_preview in app/model_manager.py joins an unrestricted filename route capture to a selected model directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to use traversal, encoded traversal, absolute paths, or an unbounded path_index to read image-decodable files and enumerate host paths. get_model_preview (app/model_manager.py) built the path with os.path.join(folder, filename) where filename is an unrestricted {filename:.*} route capture. Literal ../, percent-encoded %2e%2e%2f, and absolute paths all escaped the model directory; path_index was also unbounded. The target file is piped through Pillow and re-encoded as WEBP, so disclosure is limited to image-decodable files plus a file-existence/enumeration oracle (and internal-path leakage via path_index errors). This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00971,"percentile":0.62387,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-07-31T04:21:54Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:22Z","products":[{"vendor":"comfy-org","product":"comfyui"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Comfy-Org/ComfyUI/security/advisories/GHSA-pj59-g5vv-74q4","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Comfy-Org/ComfyUI/pull/14734","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Comfy-Org/ComfyUI/releases/tag/v0.28.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/56xxx/CVE-2026-56671.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56671","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56671","title":"ComfyUI: Path traversal in /experiment/models/preview allows arbitrary image file read","description":"ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, get_model_preview in app/model_manager.py joins an unrestricted filename route capture to a selected model directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to use traversal, encoded traversal, absolute paths, or an unbounded path_index to read image-decodable files and enumerate host paths. get_model_preview (app/model_manager.py) built the path with os.path.join(folder, filename) where filename is an unrestricted {filename:.*} route capture. Literal ../, percent-encoded %2e%2e%2f, and absolute paths all escaped the model directory; path_index was also unbounded. The target file is piped through Pillow and re-encoded as WEBP, so disclosure is limited to image-decodable files plus a file-existence/enumeration oracle (and internal-path leakage via path_index errors). This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-31T04:21:54.417Z","modified":"2026-07-31T23:19:15.408Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:37:02.780526Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-51401","description":"ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, get_model_preview in app/model_manager.py joins an unrestricted filename route capture to a selected model directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to use traversal, encoded traversal, absolute paths, or an unbounded path_index to read image-decodable files and enumerate host paths. get_model_preview (app/model_manager.py) built the path with os.path.join(folder, filename) where filename is an unrestricted {filename:.*} route capture. Literal ../, percent-encoded %2e%2e%2f, and absolute paths all escaped the model directory; path_index was also unbounded. The target file is piped through Pillow and re-encoded as WEBP, so disclosure is limited to image-decodable files plus a file-existence/enumeration oracle (and internal-path leakage via path_index errors). This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-31T04:21:54Z","modified":"2026-07-31T23:19:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:25.159179Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56671","description":"ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, get_model_preview in app/model_manager.py joins an unrestricted filename route capture to a selected model directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to use traversal, encoded traversal, absolute paths, or an unbounded path_index to read image-decodable files and enumerate host paths. get_model_preview (app/model_manager.py) built the path with os.path.join(folder, filename) where filename is an unrestricted {filename:.*} route capture. Literal ../, percent-encoded %2e%2e%2f, and absolute paths all escaped the model directory; path_index was also unbounded. The target file is piped through Pillow and re-encoded as WEBP, so disclosure is limited to image-decodable files plus a file-existence/enumeration oracle (and internal-path leakage via path_index errors). This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-31T06:16:29.86Z","modified":"2026-10-23T23:10:00.157Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:33.955581Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-56671","title":"ComfyUI: Path traversal in /experiment/models/preview allows arbitrary image file read","description":"ComfyUI is a modular diffusion model GUI, api and backend with a graph/nodes interface. Prior to 0.28.0, get_model_preview in app/model_manager.py joins an unrestricted filename route capture to a selected model directory without a containment check, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to use traversal, encoded traversal, absolute paths, or an unbounded path_index to read image-decodable files and enumerate host paths. get_model_preview (app/model_manager.py) built the path with os.path.join(folder, filename) where filename is an unrestricted {filename:.*} route capture. Literal ../, percent-encoded %2e%2e%2f, and absolute paths all escaped the model directory; path_index was also unbounded. The target file is piped through Pillow and re-encoded as WEBP, so disclosure is limited to image-decodable files plus a file-existence/enumeration oracle (and internal-path leakage via path_index errors). This issue is fixed in version 0.28.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-31T04:21:54.417Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:22.014135504Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:11.609219Z"}]}}