{"id":"CVE-2026-58076","aliases":["BIT-airflow-2026-58076","EUVD-2026-57315","GHSA-8prw-8m6x-8w6f","PYSEC-2026-3991"],"status":"published","title":"Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary","from":"nvd"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00484,"percentile":0.42178,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-502"],"published":"2026-08-12T15:40:59Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:30:28Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"apache-airflow","fixed_in":["3.3.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"airflow","fixed_in":["3.3.1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"apache-airflow","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.3.0"},{"fixed":"3.3.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"airflow","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"3.3.0"},{"fixed":"3.3.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"apache-airflow","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.3.0"},{"fixed":"3.3.1"}]}],"versions":["3.3.0","3.3.1rc1","3.3.1rc2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"apache-airflow","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.3.0"},{"fixed":"3.3.1"}]}],"versions":["3.3.0","3.3.1rc1","3.3.1rc2"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"apache","product":"airflow"},{"vendor":"apache software foundation","product":"apache airflow"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/68511","tags":["patch","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/t81p688t15jozxsng8521o60nh2kfsos","tags":["vendor-advisory","Mailing List","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-33264","tags":["related","Not Applicable","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58076","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/3a08a3d7792335ac9456cd44c92d8de3ae0d6ec1","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/airflow/commit/560f117525d201ed64327c4185050705339e07b1","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/airflow/releases/tag/3.3.1","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/apache-airflow/PYSEC-2026-3991.yaml","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8prw-8m6x-8w6f","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://pypi.python.org","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/58xxx/CVE-2026-58076.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/apache/airflow","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-58076","title":"Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T15:40:59.934Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:58:44.859Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T07:42:18.253008Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-57315","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T15:40:59Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:58:44Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T08:50:00.381029Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-8prw-8m6x-8w6f","title":"Apache Airflow exception-node deserialization permits arbitrary callable execution","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T18:31:17Z","modified":"2026-10-02T23:12:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:25.889593Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-58076","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T16:17:08.317Z","modified":"2026-11-03T07:20:55.73Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T11:52:51.440043Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-58076","title":"Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T15:40:59.934Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:30:28.707121824Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:55:01.518827Z"},{"id":"GHSA-8prw-8m6x-8w6f","title":"Apache Airflow exception-node deserialization permits arbitrary callable execution","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T18:31:17Z","modified":"2026-10-02T23:40:41.99427607Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-502"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.78452Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-3991","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T16:17:08.317Z","modified":"2026-10-15T14:45:08.193566958Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:57.255153Z"},{"id":"BIT-airflow-2026-58076","title":"Apache Airflow: Unguarded import_string() of airflow_exc_ser / base_exc_ser exception nodes in BaseSerialization.deserialize enables DAG-author RCE on Scheduler / API Server","description":"Apache Airflow's serialization layer reconstructed exception nodes by calling `import_string()` on a class name taken from the serialized blob and instantiating it with arguments from the same blob, with no restriction on what could be imported. An operator's `executor_config` reaches that branch, so a Dag author could place a value there that causes an arbitrary callable to be imported and invoked -- for example `subprocess.check_output`, or `builtins.eval` on the `builtins`-prefixed variant. The code runs in the **Scheduler**, which reconstructs serialized Dags in its normal loop with no request involved, and in the **API server**, on any authenticated read of the Dag such as `GET /api/v2/dags/{dag_id}/details`. Both are components the Airflow security model states must never execute Dag-author code, and both hold the metadata database credentials and the JWT signing secret. No non-default configuration is required. This is a **different sink from CVE-2026-33264**, which covered only the trigger branch of the same deserializer: deployments that upgraded in response to that advisory are still affected through the exception branch and must upgrade again. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow 3.3.1 or later, which restricts the imported class to a subclass of `BaseException`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-17T05:39:22.851Z","modified":"2026-10-02T23:40:41.99427607Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:28.267217Z"}]}}