{"id":"CVE-2026-59227","aliases":["EUVD-2026-42618","GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g","PYSEC-2026-3604"],"status":"published","title":"Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission","description":"Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.0042,"percentile":0.36771,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-862","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-07-09T15:56:44Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:14Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","fixed_in":["0.10.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.8.11"},{"fixed":"0.10.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.8.11"},{"fixed":"0.10.0"}]}],"versions":["0.8.11","0.8.12","0.9.0","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4","0.9.5","0.9.6"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"open-webui","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.8.11"},{"fixed":"0.10.0"}]}],"versions":["0.8.11","0.8.12","0.9.0","0.9.1","0.9.2","0.9.3","0.9.4","0.9.5","0.9.6"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"open-webui","product":"open-webui"},{"vendor":"openwebui","product":"open_webui"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26009","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/e038bab66dec8d17212eec35b5cb6d6b785a4200","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Product","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59227","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59227.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/open-webui","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59227","title":"Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission","description":"Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-09T15:56:44.042Z","modified":"2026-07-14T00:58:25.667Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:58.560602Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-42618","description":"Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-09T15:56:44Z","modified":"2026-07-14T00:58:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:20:00.696533Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g","title":"Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission","description":"## Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/images/edit` performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the `/api/v1/images/generations` route, the built-in `edit_image` tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator's credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated, non-admin user can:\n\n- bypass the global `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False` administrator control;\n- bypass a denied per-user/group `features.image_generation` permission;\n- cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (`IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY` for the OpenAI engine).\n\nNo cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n`\u003e= 0.8.11, \u003c 0.10.0` (the `/api/v1/images/edit` route was introduced in 0.8.11 and was ungated from the outset). Fixed in **v0.10.0**.\n\n## Details\n\n`/api/v1/images/generations` enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION` (403 if globally disabled) and `features.image_generation` (403 for non-admins without the permission). The `edit_image` built-in tool and the chat image-edit middleware likewise gate on `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and `features.image_generation`. The direct `POST /api/v1/images/edit` route ran on `Depends(get_verified_user)` alone and proceeded straight to provider dispatch, applying none of these controls.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAs a verified non-admin user, with image editing globally disabled (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or `features.image_generation` denied for the user:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/images/edit\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cnon_admin_user_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"image\":\"data:image/png;base64,\u003cpng\u003e\",\"prompt\":\"edit\",\"model\":\"gpt-image-1\"}\n```\n\nThe request reaches the configured image-edit provider and returns an edited image despite the disabled control/permission.\n\n## Patch\n\nThe direct route is split from its shared implementation (mirroring `generate_images`/`image_generations`): a thin `/edit` route now enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and the per-user `features.image_generation` permission before delegating to the shared `image_edits()` implementation. The internal callers (the `edit_image` tool and the chat middleware) call the implementation directly and already gate themselves, so they are unaffected.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T16:58:48Z","modified":"2026-07-24T16:58:48Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:52.46233Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59227","description":"Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-09T17:17:04.223Z","modified":"2026-07-14T02:16:57.267Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":5.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:28.4135Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59227","title":"Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission","description":"Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.11 before 0.10.0, POST /api/v1/images/edit required only a verified account and did not enforce the global image-edit switch or the per-user image-generation permission, allowing a non-admin user to invoke server-side image editing with administrator-configured provider credentials. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-09T15:56:44.042Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:14.899103579Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:12.496548Z"},{"id":"GHSA-rqj7-6wrp-6g2g","title":"Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission","description":"## Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/images/edit` performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the `/api/v1/images/generations` route, the built-in `edit_image` tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator's credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated, non-admin user can:\n\n- bypass the global `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False` administrator control;\n- bypass a denied per-user/group `features.image_generation` permission;\n- cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (`IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY` for the OpenAI engine).\n\nNo cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n`\u003e= 0.8.11, \u003c 0.10.0` (the `/api/v1/images/edit` route was introduced in 0.8.11 and was ungated from the outset). Fixed in **v0.10.0**.\n\n## Details\n\n`/api/v1/images/generations` enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION` (403 if globally disabled) and `features.image_generation` (403 for non-admins without the permission). The `edit_image` built-in tool and the chat image-edit middleware likewise gate on `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and `features.image_generation`. The direct `POST /api/v1/images/edit` route ran on `Depends(get_verified_user)` alone and proceeded straight to provider dispatch, applying none of these controls.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAs a verified non-admin user, with image editing globally disabled (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or `features.image_generation` denied for the user:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/images/edit\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cnon_admin_user_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"image\":\"data:image/png;base64,\u003cpng\u003e\",\"prompt\":\"edit\",\"model\":\"gpt-image-1\"}\n```\n\nThe request reaches the configured image-edit provider and returns an edited image despite the disabled control/permission.\n\n## Patch\n\nThe direct route is split from its shared implementation (mirroring `generate_images`/`image_generations`): a thin `/edit` route now enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and the per-user `features.image_generation` permission before delegating to the shared `image_edits()` implementation. The internal callers (the `edit_image` tool and the chat middleware) call the implementation directly and already gate themselves, so they are unaffected.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T16:58:48Z","modified":"2026-08-04T14:40:38.337435666Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-862","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:56.281047Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-3604","title":"Open WebUI: POST /api/v1/images/edit bypasses the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission","description":"## Summary\n\n`POST /api/v1/images/edit` performed no authorization beyond requiring a verified account. Every other image-editing surface in Open WebUI enforces the global image-edit switch and the per-user image-generation permission — the `/api/v1/images/generations` route, the built-in `edit_image` tool, and the chat image-edit middleware — but the direct edit route enforced neither. A verified non-admin user could therefore invoke server-side image editing, reaching the configured image-edit provider with the administrator's credentials, even when the administrator had globally disabled image editing (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or denied that user image-generation permission. The image-editing UI is surfaced only to administrators (Playground), so the route additionally exposed an admin-only capability to any verified user.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated, non-admin user can:\n\n- bypass the global `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False` administrator control;\n- bypass a denied per-user/group `features.image_generation` permission;\n- cause the server to send billable image-edit requests to the configured provider (OpenAI-compatible, Gemini, or ComfyUI) using administrator-configured credentials (`IMAGES_EDIT_OPENAI_API_KEY` for the OpenAI engine).\n\nNo cross-user data is exposed and the provider credentials are never returned to the caller; the impact is the control/permission bypass and the associated billable resource consumption.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n`\u003e= 0.8.11, \u003c 0.10.0` (the `/api/v1/images/edit` route was introduced in 0.8.11 and was ungated from the outset). Fixed in **v0.10.0**.\n\n## Details\n\n`/api/v1/images/generations` enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_GENERATION` (403 if globally disabled) and `features.image_generation` (403 for non-admins without the permission). The `edit_image` built-in tool and the chat image-edit middleware likewise gate on `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and `features.image_generation`. The direct `POST /api/v1/images/edit` route ran on `Depends(get_verified_user)` alone and proceeded straight to provider dispatch, applying none of these controls.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nAs a verified non-admin user, with image editing globally disabled (`ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT=False`) or `features.image_generation` denied for the user:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/images/edit\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cnon_admin_user_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"image\":\"data:image/png;base64,\u003cpng\u003e\",\"prompt\":\"edit\",\"model\":\"gpt-image-1\"}\n```\n\nThe request reaches the configured image-edit provider and returns an edited image despite the disabled control/permission.\n\n## Patch\n\nThe direct route is split from its shared implementation (mirroring `generate_images`/`image_generations`): a thin `/edit` route now enforces `ENABLE_IMAGE_EDIT` and the per-user `features.image_generation` permission before delegating to the shared `image_edits()` implementation. The internal callers (the `edit_image` tool and the chat middleware) call the implementation directly and already gate themselves, so they are unaffected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-04T11:34:42.578333Z","modified":"2026-08-04T14:30:29.519042665Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:56.847083Z"}]}}