{"id":"CVE-2026-59252","aliases":["EEF-CVE-2026-59252","EUVD-2026-45160","GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47","GHSA-vp7w-82cm-hj3h"],"status":"published","title":"Missing gas_limit validation in mpp Tempo fee-payer enables wallet drain","description":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.0046,"percentile":0.40164,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1284","CWE-20"],"published":"2026-07-17T10:11:54Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:06Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Hex","package":"mpp","fixed_in":["0.6.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"mpp","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0.2.0"},{"fixed":"0.6.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"mpp","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.2.0"},{"fixed":"0.6.0"}]}],"versions":["0.2.0","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.4.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"mpp","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0.2.0"},{"fixed":"0.6.0"}]}],"versions":["0.2.0","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.3.2","0.4.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"zenhive","product":"mpp"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47","tags":["vendor-advisory","related","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-59252.html","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-59252","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/d84e3e528db39654540c2035ea0fbdf7b950d3d1","tags":["patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/releases/tag/v0.6.0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59252","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vp7w-82cm-hj3h"},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://repo.hex.pm","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59252.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://hex.pm/packages/mpp","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59252","title":"Missing gas_limit validation in mpp Tempo fee-payer enables wallet drain","description":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T10:11:54.436Z","modified":"2026-07-18T04:12:42.459Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-1284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:58.560602Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-45160","description":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T10:11:54Z","modified":"2026-07-18T04:12:42Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:19:50.065723Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47","title":"mpp vulnerable to Gas Draining with low gas limit","description":"## Vulnerability\nWhen the server acts as the fee payer, `mpp` Elixir 0.4.0 (ZenHive/mpp) does not validate whether the `gas_limit` set by the client is enough before broadcasting. A malicious client can drain the server's gas without paying.\n\nA `transferWithMemo` call on Tempo Moderato testnet requires **~51,299 gas** to complete successfully. By setting `gas_limit = 51,298`:\n\n1. The Tx gets cosigned and broadcast by the server.\n2. The Tx runs out of gas during EVM execution. All state reverts.\n3. The server's fee-payer wallet is charged for gas used.\n4. The client pays nothing and receives no resource.\n\n```bash\n# Run the PoC\nunzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC.zip\ncd mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC\ndocker build -t mpp-elixir-low-gas .\ndocker run --rm mpp-elixir-low-gas\n```\n\n**Zero-Cost DoS Attack:** Unlike gas draining with `access list` or `padding`, where the malicious client needs to complete a payment to drain the gas, this vulnerability allows malicious users to continuously drain the server's gas at virtually no financial cost (requiring only computing power). Therefore, an attacker can spawn *N* malicious clients to completely drain the funds from the server's wallet to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Once the server's wallet is empty, it has no more funds to pay the gas fees for upcoming requests from legitimate clients. \n\n```bash\n# Run the DoS PoC\nunzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC.zip\ncd mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC\ndocker build -t mpp-elixir-dos .\ndocker run --rm mpp-elixir-dos\n```\n\n**Vulnerable code path:** `broadcast_and_verify/7` in `mpp/methods/tempo.ex` (ZenHive/mpp 0.4.0).\nWhen `wait_for_confirmation = true` (the default), it calls `rpc_broadcast_sync` directly without any gas-adequacy check or simulation. The alternative `wait_for_confirmation = false` path does call `simulate_payment_call` via `eth_call`, but that simulation omits the `gas` parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\n## Impact\nA malicious client can drain the server's wallet without any financial cost.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T21:47:36Z","modified":"2026-09-25T21:47:39Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:22.654187Z"},{"id":"GHSA-vp7w-82cm-hj3h","title":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated...","description":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T12:31:28Z","modified":"2026-07-17T12:31:29Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:09:35.141236Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59252","description":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T11:17:13.803Z","modified":"2026-10-24T20:10:00.137Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-1284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:30.250437Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59252","title":"Missing gas_limit validation in mpp Tempo fee-payer enables wallet drain","description":"Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc_broadcast_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait_for_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate_payment_call via eth_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T10:11:54.436Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:06.04655824Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:12.496548Z"},{"id":"EEF-CVE-2026-59252","title":"Missing gas_limit validation in mpp Tempo fee-payer enables wallet drain","description":"## Summary\n\nImproper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet, resulting in denial of service for legitimate clients.\n\nWhen the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee\\_payer: true), the MPP.Methods.Tempo payment method co-signs and broadcasts a client-supplied EVM transaction without first validating that the client-supplied gas\\_limit is sufficient to complete the intended call. A malicious client can submit a signed transferWithMemo transaction with gas\\_limit deliberately set just below the amount required for successful execution. The server co-signs the transaction and broadcasts it via rpc\\_broadcast\\_sync. The transaction runs out of gas during EVM execution and reverts, but the fee-payer wallet is still charged for the burned gas while the client pays nothing and receives no resource. Repeated requests from one or more malicious clients drain the fee-payer wallet at near-zero cost to the attacker, ultimately preventing the server from sponsoring gas for legitimate payment requests.\n\nThe wait\\_for\\_confirmation = false (optimistic) path is also affected: it invokes simulate\\_payment\\_call via eth\\_call, but that simulation omits the gas parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.\n\n## Configurations\n\nThe vulnerable code path is only reachable when the MPP.Methods.Tempo method is configured with fee\\_payer: true (server-side gas sponsorship). Default deployments with fee\\_payer: false are not affected, since the client pays for gas out of its own wallet.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-17T10:11:54.436Z","modified":"2026-09-08T03:30:05.319636354Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-1284"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.520522Z"},{"id":"GHSA-vj8p-hp9x-gh47","title":"mpp vulnerable to Gas Draining with low gas limit","description":"## Vulnerability\nWhen the server acts as the fee payer, `mpp` Elixir 0.4.0 (ZenHive/mpp) does not validate whether the `gas_limit` set by the client is enough before broadcasting. A malicious client can drain the server's gas without paying.\n\nA `transferWithMemo` call on Tempo Moderato testnet requires **~51,299 gas** to complete successfully. By setting `gas_limit = 51,298`:\n\n1. The Tx gets cosigned and broadcast by the server.\n2. The Tx runs out of gas during EVM execution. All state reverts.\n3. The server's fee-payer wallet is charged for gas used.\n4. The client pays nothing and receives no resource.\n\n```bash\n# Run the PoC\nunzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC.zip\ncd mpp_elixir_low_gas_PoC\ndocker build -t mpp-elixir-low-gas .\ndocker run --rm mpp-elixir-low-gas\n```\n\n**Zero-Cost DoS Attack:** Unlike gas draining with `access list` or `padding`, where the malicious client needs to complete a payment to drain the gas, this vulnerability allows malicious users to continuously drain the server's gas at virtually no financial cost (requiring only computing power). Therefore, an attacker can spawn *N* malicious clients to completely drain the funds from the server's wallet to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Once the server's wallet is empty, it has no more funds to pay the gas fees for upcoming requests from legitimate clients. \n\n```bash\n# Run the DoS PoC\nunzip mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC.zip\ncd mpp_elixir_low_gas_dos_PoC\ndocker build -t mpp-elixir-dos .\ndocker run --rm mpp-elixir-dos\n```\n\n**Vulnerable code path:** `broadcast_and_verify/7` in `mpp/methods/tempo.ex` (ZenHive/mpp 0.4.0).\nWhen `wait_for_confirmation = true` (the default), it calls `rpc_broadcast_sync` directly without any gas-adequacy check or simulation. The alternative `wait_for_confirmation = false` path does call `simulate_payment_call` via `eth_call`, but that simulation omits the `gas` parameter and therefore does not catch out-of-gas conditions.\n\n## Impact\nA malicious client can drain the server's wallet without any financial cost.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-25T21:47:36Z","modified":"2026-09-25T23:00:31.010937362Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-20"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:57.348035Z"}]}}