{"id":"CVE-2026-59979","aliases":["EUVD-2026-112145","GHSA-256m-gg99-4274"],"status":"published","title":"YosemiteCrew: Missing organization authorization on service and PMS library/template routes","description":"YosemiteCrew provides organization-based service and task management. In the source-reported affected main and dev snapshots, YosemiteCrew's service and PMS task-library/template routes omit organization and permission checks. `authorizeCognito` in `apps/backend/src/middlewares/auth.ts` sets the authenticated user's ID but does not provide the `withOrgPermissions()` and `requirePermission(...)` checks used by protected siblings. In `apps/backend/src/routers/service.router.ts`, `PATCH /fhir/v1/service/:id` and `DELETE /fhir/v1/service/:id` are authentication-only, while `GET /fhir/v1/service/:id` has no authentication middleware. The trace through `apps/backend/src/controllers/web/service.controller.ts` to `apps/backend/src/services/service.service.ts` passes a global record ID into `ServiceModel.findById(oid)` without an `organisationId` filter. In `apps/backend/src/routers/task.router.ts`, `PUT /v1/task/pms/library/:libraryId`, `POST /v1/task/pms/templates`, `PATCH /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` and `DELETE /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` likewise lack organization/role enforcement. Any registered platform user, including a patient/companion-app account, can modify or delete another organization's service catalogue and PMS task-library/template data, affecting bookings and billing; service records can additionally be read without authentication. An earlier security change protected create routes but left these sibling operations exposed. A fixed release cannot be established from the available evidence.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00295,"percentile":0.22347,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862"],"published":"2026-10-28T15:36:57Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:31:07Z","products":[{"vendor":"yosemitecrew","product":"yosemite-crew"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/YosemiteCrew/Yosemite-Crew/security/advisories/GHSA-256m-gg99-4274","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/59xxx/CVE-2026-59979.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59979","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59979","title":"YosemiteCrew: Missing organization authorization on service and PMS library/template routes","description":"YosemiteCrew provides organization-based service and task management. In the source-reported affected main and dev snapshots, YosemiteCrew's service and PMS task-library/template routes omit organization and permission checks. `authorizeCognito` in `apps/backend/src/middlewares/auth.ts` sets the authenticated user's ID but does not provide the `withOrgPermissions()` and `requirePermission(...)` checks used by protected siblings. In `apps/backend/src/routers/service.router.ts`, `PATCH /fhir/v1/service/:id` and `DELETE /fhir/v1/service/:id` are authentication-only, while `GET /fhir/v1/service/:id` has no authentication middleware. The trace through `apps/backend/src/controllers/web/service.controller.ts` to `apps/backend/src/services/service.service.ts` passes a global record ID into `ServiceModel.findById(oid)` without an `organisationId` filter. In `apps/backend/src/routers/task.router.ts`, `PUT /v1/task/pms/library/:libraryId`, `POST /v1/task/pms/templates`, `PATCH /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` and `DELETE /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` likewise lack organization/role enforcement. Any registered platform user, including a patient/companion-app account, can modify or delete another organization's service catalogue and PMS task-library/template data, affecting bookings and billing; service records can additionally be read without authentication. An earlier security change protected create routes but left these sibling operations exposed. A fixed release cannot be established from the available evidence.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T15:36:57.833Z","modified":"2026-11-02T20:20:43.233Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:01:31.308004Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-112145","description":"YosemiteCrew provides organization-based service and task management. In the source-reported affected main and dev snapshots, YosemiteCrew's service and PMS task-library/template routes omit organization and permission checks. `authorizeCognito` in `apps/backend/src/middlewares/auth.ts` sets the authenticated user's ID but does not provide the `withOrgPermissions()` and `requirePermission(...)` checks used by protected siblings. In `apps/backend/src/routers/service.router.ts`, `PATCH /fhir/v1/service/:id` and `DELETE /fhir/v1/service/:id` are authentication-only, while `GET /fhir/v1/service/:id` has no authentication middleware. The trace through `apps/backend/src/controllers/web/service.controller.ts` to `apps/backend/src/services/service.service.ts` passes a global record ID into `ServiceModel.findById(oid)` without an `organisationId` filter. In `apps/backend/src/routers/task.router.ts`, `PUT /v1/task/pms/library/:libraryId`, `POST /v1/task/pms/templates`, `PATCH /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` and `DELETE /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` likewise lack organization/role enforcement. Any registered platform user, including a patient/companion-app account, can modify or delete another organization's service catalogue and PMS task-library/template data, affecting bookings and billing; service records can additionally be read without authentication. An earlier security change protected create routes but left these sibling operations exposed. A fixed release cannot be established from the available evidence.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T15:36:57Z","modified":"2026-11-02T20:20:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T05:08:37.390802Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59979","description":"YosemiteCrew provides organization-based service and task management. In the source-reported affected main and dev snapshots, YosemiteCrew's service and PMS task-library/template routes omit organization and permission checks. `authorizeCognito` in `apps/backend/src/middlewares/auth.ts` sets the authenticated user's ID but does not provide the `withOrgPermissions()` and `requirePermission(...)` checks used by protected siblings. In `apps/backend/src/routers/service.router.ts`, `PATCH /fhir/v1/service/:id` and `DELETE /fhir/v1/service/:id` are authentication-only, while `GET /fhir/v1/service/:id` has no authentication middleware. The trace through `apps/backend/src/controllers/web/service.controller.ts` to `apps/backend/src/services/service.service.ts` passes a global record ID into `ServiceModel.findById(oid)` without an `organisationId` filter. In `apps/backend/src/routers/task.router.ts`, `PUT /v1/task/pms/library/:libraryId`, `POST /v1/task/pms/templates`, `PATCH /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` and `DELETE /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` likewise lack organization/role enforcement. Any registered platform user, including a patient/companion-app account, can modify or delete another organization's service catalogue and PMS task-library/template data, affecting bookings and billing; service records can additionally be read without authentication. An earlier security change protected create routes but left these sibling operations exposed. A fixed release cannot be established from the available evidence.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T16:17:08.62Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:17:38.91Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:02:39.144061Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-59979","title":"YosemiteCrew: Missing organization authorization on service and PMS library/template routes","description":"YosemiteCrew provides organization-based service and task management. In the source-reported affected main and dev snapshots, YosemiteCrew's service and PMS task-library/template routes omit organization and permission checks. `authorizeCognito` in `apps/backend/src/middlewares/auth.ts` sets the authenticated user's ID but does not provide the `withOrgPermissions()` and `requirePermission(...)` checks used by protected siblings. In `apps/backend/src/routers/service.router.ts`, `PATCH /fhir/v1/service/:id` and `DELETE /fhir/v1/service/:id` are authentication-only, while `GET /fhir/v1/service/:id` has no authentication middleware. The trace through `apps/backend/src/controllers/web/service.controller.ts` to `apps/backend/src/services/service.service.ts` passes a global record ID into `ServiceModel.findById(oid)` without an `organisationId` filter. In `apps/backend/src/routers/task.router.ts`, `PUT /v1/task/pms/library/:libraryId`, `POST /v1/task/pms/templates`, `PATCH /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` and `DELETE /v1/task/pms/templates/:templateId` likewise lack organization/role enforcement. Any registered platform user, including a patient/companion-app account, can modify or delete another organization's service catalogue and PMS task-library/template data, affecting bookings and billing; service records can additionally be read without authentication. An earlier security change protected create routes but left these sibling operations exposed. A fixed release cannot be established from the available evidence.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T15:36:57.833Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:31:07.671781264Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:54:44.889498Z"}]}}