{"id":"CVE-2026-61572","aliases":["EUVD-2026-112512","GHSA-cvhm-j9cp-8w59"],"status":"published","title":"AVideo-Encoder: unauthenticated full-response server-side request forgery","description":"AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00254,"percentile":0.16975,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-10-28T21:47:39Z","modified":"2026-10-31T02:31:01Z","products":[{"vendor":"wwbn","product":"avideo-encoder"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/security/advisories/GHSA-cvhm-j9cp-8w59","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/commit/60430ee18f669798485e81276a1fb6d26b06eb9a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo-Encoder/releases/tag/v8.1.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61572.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61572","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61572","title":"AVideo-Encoder: unauthenticated full-response server-side request forgery","description":"AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T21:47:39.328Z","modified":"2026-10-29T15:14:17.879Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:53.786088Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-112512","description":"AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T21:47:39Z","modified":"2026-10-29T15:14:17Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:59:16.056394Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61572","description":"AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T22:17:16.347Z","modified":"2026-10-29T16:18:11.027Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:04.6346Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61572","title":"AVideo-Encoder: unauthenticated full-response server-side request forgery","description":"AVideo is a video-sharing Platform. Before the initial remediation attempt in 8.1.0, `url_get_contents` in `objects/functions.php` accepts caller-controlled destinations after only `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` syntax validation, without rejecting private, loopback, or link-local addresses, and disables TLS peer verification. `Login::isLogged` reauthenticates using the attacker-settable `encoder_aVideoURL` cookie together with arbitrary nonempty `encoder_user` and `encoder_pass` cookies, and `Login::run` stores the raw fetched body in `result`. The unauthenticated `objects/login.json.php` endpoint returns that session object, enabling full-response exfiltration through a supplied `siteURL`; its `Streamer::isURLAllowed` gate allows all sites when the operator allowlist is empty, the default. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read internal HTTP and HTTPS responses, including cloud instance-metadata credentials, and reach internal TCP services. A further pre-authentication FTP variant in `view/youtubeDl.json.php` routes an ftp `videoURL` into `FTPDownloader`; `parseFtpUrl` in `objects/FTPDownloader.php` accepts its host and port for `ftp_connect`. This also enables requests to internal FTP services. Untrusted self-signed HTTPS certificates are accepted, and no account or operator interaction is required. Version 8.1.0 contains an initial remediation attempt that removes raw-response reflection and adds destination checks, but private-network exemptions and login TLS-verification defaults leave complete remediation of the described internal-network and TLS variants unresolved.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-28T21:47:39.328Z","modified":"2026-10-31T02:31:01.004653885Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:12.933503Z"}]}}