{"id":"CVE-2026-61729","aliases":["EUVD-2026-113994","GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2"],"status":"published","title":"SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00376,"percentile":0.31872,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-306","CWE-798"],"published":"2026-10-30T14:24:04Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:36:29Z","products":[{"vendor":"socfortress","product":"copilot"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-x8gc-f8p4-frc2","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/939","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/1b2c3f97243988301285b395ce4239769c66bd9e","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/tree/v0.1.76","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61729.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61729","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61729","title":"SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T14:24:04.762Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:36:29.031Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-306","CWE-798"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T22:55:20.139479Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-113994","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T14:24:04Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:36:29Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T23:02:20.394374Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61729","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T15:16:53.083Z","modified":"2026-11-05T22:18:50.773Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-306","CWE-798"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T23:57:22.877129Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61729","title":"SOCFortress CoPilot: Hardcoded Default Header Secret - Unauthenticated Active-Response Invocation and Alert Injection","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `verify_graylog_header` in `backend/app/active_response/routes/graylog.py` and `verify_velociraptor_header` in `backend/app/incidents/routes/incident_alert.py` authenticate webhooks against `GRAYLOG_API_HEADER_VALUE` and `VELOCIRAPTOR_API_HEADER_VALUE` with the same publicly hardcoded fallback. The same default is shipped in `.env.example`. Deployments that leave either setting unset or unchanged permit an anonymous caller with the known header value to bypass the JWT authentication required by normal APIs. `POST /api/graylog/invoke` forwards attacker-selected `COMMAND`, `ACTION`, `VALUE` and `AGENT_ID` to the configured Wazuh manager without the command-enum validation of the authenticated invocation route, allowing active-response scripts to disrupt endpoints and manipulate defensive controls. `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/threshold` and `POST /api/incidents/alerts/create/velo-sigma` accept forged alerts for arbitrary `customer_code` values and drive attacker-controlled OpenSearch queries. Active-response delivery requires a configured reachable Wazuh manager. Deployments with independently changed header secrets are not subject to this default-secret bypass. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T14:24:04.762Z","modified":"2026-11-07T02:30:39.840562163Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-306","CWE-798"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T03:08:08.334472Z"}]}}