{"id":"CVE-2026-61738","aliases":["EUVD-2026-114001","GHSA-q3g8-3cf7-744f"],"status":"published","title":"SOCFortress CoPilot: Arbitrary Host File Write as Root via Path Traversal in the ScoutSuite GCP Report Upload (RCE)","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00558,"percentile":0.46973,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-434","CWE-73"],"published":"2026-10-30T14:36:10Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:37:15Z","products":[{"vendor":"socfortress","product":"copilot"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/security/advisories/GHSA-q3g8-3cf7-744f","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/940","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/pull/941","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/1881ef8d28bc7f45ffa88d7ba4fcca7302355508","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/commit/bfa630b65d554670c7462a32ce6fd4e3cbd0254c","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/socfortress/CoPilot/tree/v0.1.77","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/61xxx/CVE-2026-61738.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61738","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61738","title":"SOCFortress CoPilot: Arbitrary Host File Write as Root via Path Traversal in the ScoutSuite GCP Report Upload (RCE)","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T14:36:10.445Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:37:15.231Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-73","CWE-434"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T22:55:20.139479Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-114001","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T14:36:10Z","modified":"2026-11-05T21:37:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T23:02:20.394374Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61738","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T15:16:53.507Z","modified":"2026-11-05T22:18:50.907Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-73","CWE-434"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T23:57:22.877129Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-61738","title":"SOCFortress CoPilot: Arbitrary Host File Write as Root via Path Traversal in the ScoutSuite GCP Report Upload (RCE)","description":"SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.77, `POST /api/scoutsuite/generate-gcp-report` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/routes/scoutsuite.py` admits admin and analyst users and validates the uploaded content as `GCPScoutSuiteJSON`, but passes raw `file.filename` from the multipart header to `save_file_to_directory` in `backend/app/integrations/scoutsuite/services/scoutsuite.py`. The writer combines this filename with `scoutsuite-report` using `os.path.join` without sanitization or a resolved-path containment check. A traversal filename therefore writes the supplied JSON outside the intended report directory. In the reported root-running backend, the researcher demonstrated root-owned writes outside that directory and into the application source directory. This permits host-file overwrite subject to the accepted JSON-content constraint and can disrupt application operation; the demonstrated primitive does not establish unrestricted executable contents or unconditional cross-tenant confidentiality loss. Version 0.1.77 removes caller-controlled filenames from the affected route; unrestricted-content and direct-code-execution claims require separate curator reconciliation.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T14:36:10.445Z","modified":"2026-11-07T02:30:55.3780583Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-22","CWE-434","CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T03:08:08.334472Z"}]}}