{"id":"CVE-2026-62301","aliases":["EUVD-2026-114368","GHSA-hcm6-w6x8-6jhr"],"status":"published","title":"MyTube: Visitor Can Access Hidden Video Metadata and Content","description":"MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-08","score":0.00412,"percentile":0.35685,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-862"],"published":"2026-10-30T19:26:59Z","modified":"2026-11-06T17:37:03Z","products":[{"vendor":"franklioxygen","product":"mytube"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/security/advisories/GHSA-hcm6-w6x8-6jhr","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/456d09892b599e78538ef1a795f49b91256c3ca6","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/7cc7c6a7d297ccbd8bd2c76755129381b96f8456","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/905cecc010f320ab4e575eb3054179e9616a0b39","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/commit/f9ae048cc37c98a3576115d8841f8e96bade5c76","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"ttps://github.com/franklioxygen/MyTube/tree/v1.10.3","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/62xxx/CVE-2026-62301.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62301","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-62301","title":"MyTube: Visitor Can Access Hidden Video Metadata and Content","description":"MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T19:26:59.821Z","modified":"2026-11-06T17:37:03.085Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T18:59:08.885567Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-114368","description":"MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T19:26:59Z","modified":"2026-11-06T17:37:03Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T18:05:39.47551Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-62301","description":"MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T20:17:11.91Z","modified":"2026-11-06T18:18:16.44Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T20:01:16.0125Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-62301","title":"MyTube: Visitor Can Access Hidden Video Metadata and Content","description":"MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T19:26:59.821Z","modified":"2026-11-07T02:31:10.492610615Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.1,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-07T03:08:08.334472Z"}]}}