{"id":"CVE-2026-62331","aliases":["EUVD-2026-114361","GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99","GO-2026-6908"],"status":"published","title":"praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection","description":"praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00778,"percentile":0.56294,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-10-30T19:00:25.777Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:53Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","fixed_in":["0.9.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.9.0"},{"fixed":"0.9.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.1"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"mtzanidakis","product":"praktor"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62331","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/62xxx/CVE-2026-62331.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-62331","title":"praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection","description":"praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T19:00:25.777Z","modified":"2026-10-30T19:46:25.082Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:14.665567Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-114361","description":"praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T17:27:25Z","modified":"2026-11-03T17:27:25Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T19:19:17.549112Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99","title":"praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)","description":"### Impact\n\nA remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk-\u003cworkspace\u003e`, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory.\n\nThe attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`.\n\nBecause the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside `uploads/` lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. `CLAUDE.md`, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under `/workspace/agent`. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).\n\n### Reachability\n\nBy default the bot has no user allowlist (`allow_from: []` means \"allow all\"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nThrough `v0.9.0` (and HEAD `3902d29`).\n\n### Patched versions\n\n`v0.9.1`, containing PR #228.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict `telegram.allow_from` to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to `v0.9.1` is the recommended fix.\n\n### Fix (defense in depth)\n\n- `internal/telegram/bot.go`: apply `path.Base()` to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and `..`.\n- `internal/container/manager.go`: `WriteVolumeBytes` now rejects any path that escapes `/vol` after `path.Join`, protecting future callers.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported privately by [tonghuaroot](https://github.com/tonghuaroot), who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real `container.Manager`, and fix verification.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T17:27:25Z","modified":"2026-11-03T17:27:26Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T17:59:55.458475Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-62331","description":"praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T19:18:33.45Z","modified":"2026-10-30T20:17:12.21Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:13:05.268617Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-62331","title":"praktor: Telegram upload traversal permits persistent agent instruction injection","description":"praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-30T19:00:25.777Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:53.42350028Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T00:02:13.631839Z"},{"id":"GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99","title":"praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection)","description":"### Impact\n\nA remote Telegram user can write files to arbitrary paths inside an agent's persistent workspace volume (`praktor-wk-\u003cworkspace\u003e`, mounted at `/workspace/agent`), escaping the documented `uploads/` directory.\n\nThe attacker controls the Telegram document filename, which was concatenated into the destination path without sanitization (`internal/telegram/bot.go`, at both upload sites) and resolved with `path.Join`, which collapses `../` sequences. A filename like `../../../CLAUDE.md` resolved to the root of the agent workspace volume, outside `uploads/`.\n\nBecause the agent workspace is the persistent working directory the Claude agent reads from and operates on across runs, writing outside `uploads/` lets an attacker plant or overwrite files the agent later consumes — e.g. `CLAUDE.md`, agent instruction/skill/hook files, or other config under `/workspace/agent`. This turns a file upload into a stored injection into the agent's instruction/execution surface (CWE-22 path traversal escalating to stored instruction injection).\n\n### Reachability\n\nBy default the bot has no user allowlist (`allow_from: []` means \"allow all\"), so the only precondition is that a user can message the bot. No authentication or prior privilege is required.\n\n### Affected versions\n\nThrough `v0.9.0` (and HEAD `3902d29`).\n\n### Patched versions\n\n`v0.9.1`, containing PR #228.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict `telegram.allow_from` to trusted user IDs to limit who can send uploads to the bot. Upgrading to `v0.9.1` is the recommended fix.\n\n### Fix (defense in depth)\n\n- `internal/telegram/bot.go`: apply `path.Base()` to the attacker-controlled filename at both upload sites, stripping directory components and `..`.\n- `internal/container/manager.go`: `WriteVolumeBytes` now rejects any path that escapes `/vol` after `path.Join`, protecting future callers.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported privately by [tonghuaroot](https://github.com/tonghuaroot), who provided a detailed root-cause analysis, a deployed end-to-end proof of concept against the real `container.Manager`, and fix verification.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T17:27:25Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:25:53.42350028Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-06T00:02:13.631839Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6908","title":"praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection) in github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","description":"praktor: Path traversal in Telegram file uploads allows writing outside the agent workspace uploads/ directory (stored instruction injection) in github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor","status":"published","published":"2026-11-05T22:55:09Z","modified":"2026-11-05T23:15:18.139699562Z","updated_at":"2026-11-06T00:02:13.631839Z"}]}}