{"id":"CVE-2026-63502","aliases":["EUVD-2026-116266","GHSA-4q3w-w2g5-8wqq"],"status":"published","title":"Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write","description":"Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00412,"percentile":0.35757,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-11-03T19:36:06Z","modified":"2026-11-09T15:43:01Z","products":[{"vendor":"yeti-platform","product":"yeti"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/security/advisories/GHSA-4q3w-w2g5-8wqq","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/pull/1280","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/commit/bfd7c2424dc05dea2d46b5b106b5071f959d5d5a","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/yeti-platform/yeti/releases/tag/2.5.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/63xxx/CVE-2026-63502.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63502","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-63502","title":"Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write","description":"Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T19:36:06.607Z","modified":"2026-11-09T15:43:01.437Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T16:33:53.922525Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-116266","description":"Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T19:36:06Z","modified":"2026-11-09T15:43:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T17:17:30.806151Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-63502","description":"Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T20:18:17.28Z","modified":"2026-11-09T16:17:34.477Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-09T18:15:13.699929Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-63502","title":"Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write","description":"Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-11-03T19:36:06.607Z","modified":"2026-11-11T10:47:34.80865117Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:21:18.82478Z"}]}}