{"id":"CVE-2026-65626","aliases":["AZL-112196","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65626","EEF-CVE-2026-65626","EUVD-2026-110304","GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626"],"status":"published","title":"Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00092,"percentile":0.00496,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-203"],"published":"2026-10-26T19:53:05Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"rabbitmq-server","fixed_in":["3.13.7-10"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"rabbitmq-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.13.7-10"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.10-1~bpo12+1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1","1.11.5-1","1.11.6-1","1.11.6-1~bpo12+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13-1"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.3.0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13"}]}],"versions":["1.10.0","1.10.1","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.11.10","1.11.11","1.11.12","1.11.2","1.11.4","1.11.5","1.11.6","1.11.7","1.11.8","1.11.9","1.3.0","1.4.0","1.4.1","1.4.2","1.5.0","1.5.1","1.5.2","1.6.0","1.6.1","1.7.0","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.7.4","1.7.5","1.7.6","1.7.7","1.7.8","1.7.9","1.8.0","1.8.1","1.8.2","1.8.3","1.8.4","1.9.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:18.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2","10-2build1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-3","11-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["11-2","11-3","11-3build1","11-3build2","13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1","14-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"appsup-dart","product":"jose"},{"vendor":"potatosalad","product":"jose"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-vwvr-f994-6j9j","tags":["vendor-advisory","related","advisory"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65626.html","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65626","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/853c5d4c4c0bd2a7ecb055b237f4284184e176c8","tags":["related","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/0eac8cef9aaa48fb6846f4e47a0002dc4a73966d","tags":["patch","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65626","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://repo.hex.pm","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65626.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-65626","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://hex.pm/packages/jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65626","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65626","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65626.html","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-vwvr-f994-6j9j","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65626.json","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65626","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65626","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65626","title":"Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:05.62Z","modified":"2026-11-02T19:43:05.115Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-203"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T20:51:25.833244Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-110304","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:05Z","modified":"2026-11-02T19:43:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T05:08:38.228652Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65626","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.103Z","modified":"2026-11-02T20:17:58.847Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-203"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:02:36.126212Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65626","title":"Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:05.62Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:30:45.622165172Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-203"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:54:44.889498Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65626","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.  An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.  This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.103Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09.892024227Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-10T04:22:10.004764Z"},{"id":"EEF-CVE-2026-65626","title":"Bleichenbacher padding oracle in RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in jose","description":"## Summary\n\nThe pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. `eme_pkcs1_decode/2` returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid `PKCS#1` v1.5 padding (a leading `0x00 0x02`, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a `0x00` separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and `rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2` additionally returns `{error, {badsize, _}}` when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in `dp/2` is a raw, non-blinded `crypto:mod_pow/3`, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls `decrypt_private/3` with `rsa_pkcs1_padding`) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.\n\n## Configurations\n\nThe vulnerable code path is only reached when jose performs RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption with its pure-Erlang fallback (the `jose_jwa_pkcs1` module) instead of the native OTP `public_key` implementation. This requires the crypto_fallback option to be enabled (`application:set_env(jose, crypto_fallback, true)`, or `JOSE.crypto_fallback(true)` in Elixir) and the OTP runtime not to provide native RSA1_5 decryption. When native OTP RSA support is selected, decryption does not go through `jose_jwa_pkcs1`.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:05.62Z","modified":"2026-10-26T20:11:07.651789963Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-203"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.520522Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65626","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value. An unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. This issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T20:17:48.02953654Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:53.710209Z"},{"id":"AZL-112196","title":"CVE-2026-65626 affecting package rabbitmq-server for versions less than 3.13.7-10","description":"The pure-Erlang RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 decryption in the jose_jwa_pkcs1 module is a Bleichenbacher padding oracle. eme_pkcs1_decode/2 returns the recovered message when a decrypted block has valid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (a leading 0x00 0x02, a padding string of at least eight non-zero bytes, and a 0x00 separator) and returns a distinct error result otherwise, and rsaes_pkcs1_decrypt/2 additionally returns {error, {badsize, _}} when the length check fails. The implementation applies no implicit-rejection countermeasure (RFC 8017 §7.2.2): it does not substitute a deterministic pseudo-random plaintext on a padding failure, so a one-bit padding-conformance signal leaks to the caller. Because the underlying modular exponentiation in dp/2 is a raw, non-blinded crypto:mod_pow/3, the padding check also stays distinguishable by timing even when an application normalizes every failure to a single error value.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker who knows only the public RSA key and can submit ciphertexts to a decryption endpoint that unwraps RSA1_5 JWE keys (or otherwise calls decrypt_private/3 with rsa_pkcs1_padding) can use this oracle to recover the plaintext of intercepted ciphertexts, such as content-encryption keys and thus the protected message, or to forge signatures, through roughly 10^4 to 10^6 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.3.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58Z","modified":"2026-11-05T05:40:51Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:41:19.001909Z"}]}}