{"id":"CVE-2026-65627","aliases":["AZL-111152","AZL-112199","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65627","EEF-CVE-2026-65627","EUVD-2026-110306","GHSA-wfpv-qxp8-x5gm","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65627"],"status":"published","title":"Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00249,"percentile":0.16312,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-409"],"published":"2026-10-26T19:53:16Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"14-3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"rabbitmq-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.13.7-10"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.10-1~bpo12+1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1","1.11.5-1","1.11.6-1","1.11.6-1~bpo12+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13-1"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.0.0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0","1.0.1","1.1.0","1.1.1","1.1.2","1.1.3","1.10.0","1.10.1","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.11.10","1.11.11","1.11.12","1.11.2","1.11.4","1.11.5","1.11.6","1.11.7","1.11.8","1.11.9","1.2.0","1.3.0","1.4.0","1.4.1","1.4.2","1.5.0","1.5.1","1.5.2","1.6.0","1.6.1","1.7.0","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.7.4","1.7.5","1.7.6","1.7.7","1.7.8","1.7.9","1.8.0","1.8.1","1.8.2","1.8.3","1.8.4","1.9.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:18.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2","10-2build1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-3","11-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["11-2","11-3","11-3build1","11-3build2","13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1","14-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"appsup-dart","product":"jose"},{"vendor":"potatosalad","product":"jose"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-wfpv-qxp8-x5gm","tags":["vendor-advisory","related","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65627.html","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65627","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/a7746ecd4950f85a393136e449a91dac62b5c429","tags":["related","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/857eb8e7f2d33e2c9ca2189e77226561cacaf2ad","tags":["patch","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65627","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://repo.hex.pm","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65627.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-65627","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://hex.pm/packages/jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65627","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65627","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65627.html","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-wfpv-qxp8-x5gm","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65627.json","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65627","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65627","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65627","title":"Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:16.336Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:25:56.908Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-409"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:01:31.308004Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-110306","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:16Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:25:56Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T05:08:36.865312Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65627","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.29Z","modified":"2026-11-02T22:17:22.133Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-409"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:02:36.126212Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65627","title":"Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:16.336Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:31:08.001579011Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-409"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:54:44.889498Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65627","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.  The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.  Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.  This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.29Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09.824146657Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-10T04:22:10.004764Z"},{"id":"EEF-CVE-2026-65627","title":"Decompression bomb via unbounded zlib:inflate in jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2","description":"## Summary\n\nImproper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe `jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2` function in `src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl` decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional `zip: DEF` header by calling `zlib:inflate/2` on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through `jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2` (`JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2` in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nReject JWE tokens that carry a `zip` header before passing them to `jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2`. DEFLATE compression is rarely used in legitimate JWE traffic, so untrusted tokens whose protected header contains `zip: DEF` can be inspected and filtered out before decryption.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:16.336Z","modified":"2026-10-26T20:11:07.749600993Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-409"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.520522Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65627","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token. The jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call. Decompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users. This issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T20:17:48.435403615Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"4.0","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:53.710209Z"},{"id":"AZL-111152","title":"CVE-2026-65627 affecting package jose 14-3","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58Z","modified":"2026-10-30T05:32:16Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:02.368326Z"},{"id":"AZL-112199","title":"CVE-2026-65627 affecting package rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-10","description":"Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in potatosalad jose (erlang-jose) allows a remote attacker to exhaust a node's memory with a small crafted JWE token.\n\nThe jose_jwe_zip:uncompress/2 function in src/jwe/jose_jwe_zip.erl decompresses the DEFLATE-compressed plaintext of a JWE that carries the optional zip: DEF header by calling zlib:inflate/2 on the entire attacker-controlled stream, with no bound on the output size or the inflation ratio. Raw DEFLATE reaches ratios around 1000:1 on highly repetitive input, so a few-kilobyte token inflates to hundreds of megabytes or gigabytes in a single call.\n\nDecompression runs automatically during decryption through jose_jwe:block_decrypt/2 (JOSE.JWE.block_decrypt/2 in Elixir), before the recipient can inspect or reject the payload. With the common asymmetric key-management algorithms (RSA-OAEP, ECDH-ES) an attacker needs only the recipient's public key to craft such a token, so no authentication or secret material is required. A single small token can exhaust the node's memory and crash the BEAM, denying service to all users.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.0.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58Z","modified":"2026-11-03T05:33:06Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:41:19.001909Z"}]}}