{"id":"CVE-2026-65628","aliases":["AZL-111155","AZL-112205","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65628","EEF-CVE-2026-65628","EUVD-2026-110307","GHSA-fpj2-9h59-32pp","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65628"],"status":"published","title":"Infinite recursion (CPU denial-of-service) in JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2 on mismatched key types","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00136,"percentile":0.03103,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-674"],"published":"2026-10-26T19:53:27Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"14-3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"rabbitmq-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.13.7-10"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.10-1~bpo12+1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1","1.11.5-1","1.11.6-1","1.11.6-1~bpo12+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13-1"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.5.0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13"}]}],"versions":["1.10.0","1.10.1","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.11.10","1.11.11","1.11.12","1.11.2","1.11.4","1.11.5","1.11.6","1.11.7","1.11.8","1.11.9","1.5.0","1.5.1","1.5.2","1.6.0","1.6.1","1.7.0","1.7.1","1.7.2","1.7.3","1.7.4","1.7.5","1.7.6","1.7.7","1.7.8","1.7.9","1.8.0","1.8.1","1.8.2","1.8.3","1.8.4","1.9.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:18.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2","10-2build1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-3","11-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["11-2","11-3","11-3build1","11-3build2","13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1","14-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"appsup-dart","product":"jose"},{"vendor":"potatosalad","product":"jose"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-fpj2-9h59-32pp","tags":["vendor-advisory","related","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65628.html","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65628","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/7b80b9f55b9898e1a6901ce136061b241b021d7c","tags":["related","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/26182a7de63b91550035d3f08741f7d17f1f675a","tags":["patch","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65628","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://repo.hex.pm","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65628.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-65628","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://hex.pm/packages/jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65628","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65628","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65628.html","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-fpj2-9h59-32pp","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65628.json","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65628","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65628","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65628","title":"Infinite recursion (CPU denial-of-service) in JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2 on mismatched key types","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:27.625Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:29:15.472Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:01:31.308004Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-110307","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:27Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:29:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T05:08:36.865312Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65628","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.473Z","modified":"2026-11-02T22:17:22.333Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:02:36.126212Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65628","title":"Infinite recursion (CPU denial-of-service) in JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2 on mismatched key types","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:27.625Z","modified":"2026-11-04T02:30:41.226600427Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T02:54:44.889498Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65628","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.  An application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.  This issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.473Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09.815170037Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-10T04:22:10.004764Z"},{"id":"EEF-CVE-2026-65628","title":"Infinite recursion (CPU denial-of-service) in JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2 on mismatched key types","description":"## Summary\n\n`jose_jwk:shared_secret/2` (exposed in Elixir as `JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2`) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (`kty`) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as `shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK))`. Because `from/1` returns an already-parsed `jose_jwk` record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nBefore calling `JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2`, verify that the externally supplied peer key's type (`kty`) and curve match your own key, and reject any key whose type does not match before attempting derivation.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:27.625Z","modified":"2026-10-26T20:11:08.179977862Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-674"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.520522Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65628","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes. An application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service. This issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T20:17:35.173931383Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"4.0","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:53.710209Z"},{"id":"AZL-111155","title":"CVE-2026-65628 affecting package jose 14-3","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58Z","modified":"2026-10-30T05:32:16Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:02.368326Z"},{"id":"AZL-112205","title":"CVE-2026-65628 affecting package rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-10","description":"jose_jwk:shared_secret/2 (exposed in Elixir as JOSE.JWK.shared_secret/2) derives an ECDH shared secret from two JWKs. Its first function clause only matches when both JWKs carry the same key type (kty) module, and its fallback clause re-invokes itself as shared_secret(from(YourJWK), from(MyJWK)). Because from/1 returns an already-parsed jose_jwk record unchanged, passing two JWKs whose key types differ (for example an EC key and an RSA key) makes the fallback clause re-enter with identical arguments, producing an unbounded tail-recursive loop that never returns and never crashes.\n\nAn application that derives a shared secret from an externally supplied peer public key without first checking that the peer key's type and curve match its own key can be driven into this loop by an attacker-controlled JWK, pinning an Erlang scheduler at 100% CPU. Repeated requests exhaust the available schedulers, resulting in a denial of service.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.5.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58Z","modified":"2026-11-03T05:33:06Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:41:19.001909Z"}]}}