{"id":"CVE-2026-65629","aliases":["AZL-112190","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65629","EEF-CVE-2026-65629","EUVD-2026-110308","GHSA-h4gx-8jq2-mfhc","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65629"],"status":"published","title":"Weak PBKDF2 parameters for password-encrypted private-key export in jose","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00062,"percentile":0.00008,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-916"],"published":"2026-10-26T19:53:35Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","fixed_in":["1.11.13"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Azure Linux:3","package":"rabbitmq-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.13.7-10"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.10-1~bpo12+1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1","1.11.5-1","1.11.6-1","1.11.6-1~bpo12+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1","1.11.13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"erlang-jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13-1"}]}],"versions":["1.11.10-1","1.11.12-1","1.11.12-1.1","1.11.12-2","1.11.12-2~bpo13+1","1.11.12-3","1.11.12-3~bpo13+1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Hex","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.10.0"},{"fixed":"1.11.13"}]}],"versions":["1.10.0","1.10.1","1.11.0","1.11.1","1.11.10","1.11.11","1.11.12","1.11.2","1.11.4","1.11.5","1.11.6","1.11.7","1.11.8","1.11.9"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:18.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2","10-2build1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["10-3","11-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["11-2","11-3","11-3build1","11-3build2","13-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1","14-2build2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"jose","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["14-2build1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"appsup-dart","product":"jose"},{"vendor":"potatosalad","product":"jose"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-h4gx-8jq2-mfhc","tags":["vendor-advisory","related","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65629.html","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65629","tags":["related","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/85fddd89ee56b6f9c19eff7d9cfffeef62c330b9","tags":["related","fix","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/461b261902531ca016190e780bb70862d561a7e0","tags":["patch","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65629","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://repo.hex.pm","tags":["web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65629.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-65629","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://hex.pm/packages/jose","tags":["package","report"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-65629","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-65629","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://cna.erlef.org/cves/cve-2026-65629.html","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/ghsa-h4gx-8jq2-mfhc","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/cveproject/cvelistv5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/cve-2026-65629.json","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2026-65629","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/eef-cve-2026-65629","tags":["report"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65629","title":"Weak PBKDF2 parameters for password-encrypted private-key export in jose","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:35.646Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:30:09.201Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-916"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:01:31.308004Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-110308","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:35Z","modified":"2026-11-02T21:30:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T05:08:36.865312Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65629","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.647Z","modified":"2026-11-02T22:17:22.527Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-916"],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T00:02:36.126212Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65629","title":"Weak PBKDF2 parameters for password-encrypted private-key export in jose","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:35.646Z","modified":"2026-11-11T02:48:24.001712272Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-916"],"updated_at":"2026-11-11T03:22:10.85011Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-65629","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.  When jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.  Both values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.  This issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58.647Z","modified":"2026-11-10T04:00:09.817792929Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-10T04:22:10.004764Z"},{"id":"EEF-CVE-2026-65629","title":"Weak PBKDF2 parameters for password-encrypted private-key export in jose","description":"## Summary\n\nUse of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with `jose_jwk:to_der/2` (`JOSE.JWK.to_der/2`), the `jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3` function in `src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl` serializes the key as a `PKCS#8` `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nWhen exporting a password-encrypted private key with `jose_jwk:to_der/2` (`JOSE.JWK.to_der/2`), use a long, high-entropy passphrase, since the weak key-derivation work factor only meaningfully lowers the cost of cracking guessable passwords. Restrict access to exported `EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo` blobs and keep them out of backups, repositories, object storage, and logs that an attacker could read.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T19:53:35.646Z","modified":"2026-10-26T20:11:07.577062118Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-916"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:33.520522Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-65629","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack. When jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller. Both values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key. This issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T20:17:35.180334065Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"},{"version":"4.0","score":7.4,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:53.710209Z"},{"id":"AZL-112190","title":"CVE-2026-65629 affecting package rabbitmq-server 3.13.7-10","description":"Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort in the jose library allows an attacker who obtains a password-encrypted private-key export to recover the private key through an offline password-cracking attack.\n\nWhen jose exports a password-encrypted private key with jose_jwk:to_der/2 (JOSE.JWK.to_der/2), the jose_jwk_der:to_binary/3 function in src/jwk/jose_jwk_der.erl serializes the key as a PKCS#8 EncryptedPrivateKeyInfo using the PBES2 scheme with hardcoded key-derivation parameters: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 with an iteration count of 2048 and an 8-byte (64-bit) random salt. Neither value can be overridden by the caller.\n\nBoth values are far below current guidance (OWASP recommends on the order of 600,000 iterations for PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, and NIST recommends salts of at least 128 bits), so the key-stretching work factor is roughly 300 times lower than intended and the short salt reduces the cost of precomputation across keys. The symmetric encryption (AES-256-CBC with a 16-byte random IV) is not affected; the weakness is entirely in the derivation strength. An attacker who obtains one of these exported blobs (for example from a backup, configuration repository, object storage, or logs) can mount a cheap offline dictionary or brute-force attack against the export password, and success yields the full private key.\n\nThis issue affects jose: from 1.10.0 before 1.11.13.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-26T20:17:58Z","modified":"2026-11-03T05:33:06Z","updated_at":"2026-11-05T16:41:19.001909Z"}]}}