{"id":"CVE-2026-65831","aliases":["EUVD-2026-78662","GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr"],"status":"published","title":"ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00598,"percentile":0.48985,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-07-16T20:13:20Z","modified":"2026-10-28T10:55:12Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server","fixed_in":["26.7.1"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"26.7.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Maven","package":"com.arcadedb:arcadedb-server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"26.7.1"}]}],"versions":["21.10.1","21.10.2","21.11.1","21.12.1","21.9.1","21.9.1-beta","22.1.1","22.1.2","22.1.3","22.10.1","22.11.1","22.12.1","22.2.1","22.8.1","22.9.1","23.1.1","23.1.2","23.10.1","23.11.1","23.12.1","23.12.2","23.2.1","23.3.1","23.4.1","23.5.1","23.6.1","23.7.1","23.9.1","24.1.1","24.10.1","24.11.1","24.11.2","24.2.1","24.4.1","24.5.1","24.6.1","25.1.1","25.10.1","25.11.1","25.12.1","25.2.1","25.3.1","25.3.2","25.4.1","25.5.1","25.6.1","25.7.1","25.8.1","25.9.1","26.1.1","26.2.1","26.2.2","26.3.1","26.3.2","26.4.2","26.5.1","26.6.1"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"arcadedata","product":"arcadedb"},{"vendor":"com.arcadedb","product":"arcadedb-server"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/security/advisories/GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/commit/8ca396c07e471a0b97fee075eeb956b5e24a23be","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb/releases/tag/26.7.1","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/65xxx/CVE-2026-65831.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65831","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ArcadeData/arcadedb","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65831","title":"ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:18:32.339Z","modified":"2026-09-15T15:41:15.121Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:37:13.934727Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-78662","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:18:32Z","modified":"2026-09-15T15:41:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:17.768191Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr","title":"ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read","description":"### Impact\n\nA user holding only `reader` (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a `\"language\": \"js\"` command to the `POST /api/v1/command/{database}` HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself.\n\nTwo cooperating defects made this possible:\n\n1. **Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269).** Polyglot script execution (`js` and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to SQL/Cypher, so any authenticated principal - regardless of database role - could run scripts.\n2. **Sandbox whitelist bypass.** The GraalVM sandbox restricts direct class lookups to a configured `allowedPackages` list, but a script could reach arbitrary classes by reflecting off the bound `database` object: `database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass(\"java.io.File\")`.\n\nProcess creation was already blocked (`allowCreateProcess(false)`), so the confirmed impact is host **file read**, not OS command execution. Confidentiality: High. Integrity/Availability: None.\n\nThis is a distinct entry point and root cause from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076 and CVE-2026-54077, and is reproducible on builds that already contain those fixes.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix is applied in the engine so it covers every entry point (HTTP command, HA-forwarded commands, MCP `analyze`), not only the HTTP handler:\n\n- Polyglot script execution now requires the `updateSecurity` database-administrator permission on `command`, `analyze` and `registerFunctions`. The check runs on the request thread that carries the authenticated user and is a no-op in embedded mode and internal/system contexts (schema load, HA replication apply).\n- The GraalVM host-access policy now denies access to `java.lang.Class`, `java.lang.ClassLoader` and `java.lang.reflect` members, closing the reflection escape that bypassed `allowedPackages` - even for authorized administrators - while leaving normal method calls on bound objects and explicit `Java.type(...)` lookups (governed by `allowedPackages`) working.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUntil upgraded, do not grant command/query access on the HTTP API to untrusted users, and treat any account that can reach `/api/v1/command` as capable of code execution. Note that after the fix, non-administrator accounts can no longer run `js`/polyglot scripts over HTTP.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @kyojune76.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-16T20:13:20Z","modified":"2026-07-16T20:13:20Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:44.915484Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65831","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T16:17:22.387Z","modified":"2026-09-30T17:51:56.193Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:47.668237Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-65831","title":"ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read","description":"ArcadeDB is a Multi-Model DBMS. Prior to 26.7.1, a reader-role user can submit POST /api/v1/command/{database} with language: js because PolyglotQueryEngine.command, PolyglotQueryEngine.analyze, and PolyglotQueryEngine.registerFunctions do not enforce database-administrator authorization. GraalPolyglotEngine also permits scripts to bypass the allowedPackages whitelist by reflecting from the bound database object through database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass to arbitrary host classes. These cooperating defects allow a read-only database user to read arbitrary host files outside the database scope. Process creation is already blocked, so OS command execution is not confirmed. The issue is distinct from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076, and CVE-2026-54077. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-15T15:18:32.339Z","modified":"2026-10-28T10:55:12.824922315Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:14.46177Z"},{"id":"GHSA-48qw-824m-86pr","title":"ArcadeDB: Privilege escalation via reader role in /api/v1/command JS scripting language — arbitrary host file read","description":"### Impact\n\nA user holding only `reader` (read-only) privileges on a single database could execute arbitrary JVM code by sending a `\"language\": \"js\"` command to the `POST /api/v1/command/{database}` HTTP endpoint, and use it to read arbitrary files on the host filesystem (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, configuration files), outside the scope of the database itself.\n\nTwo cooperating defects made this possible:\n\n1. **Missing authorization on the scripting path (CWE-863 / CWE-269).** Polyglot script execution (`js` and other GraalVM languages) never went through the database authorization checks applied to SQL/Cypher, so any authenticated principal - regardless of database role - could run scripts.\n2. **Sandbox whitelist bypass.** The GraalVM sandbox restricts direct class lookups to a configured `allowedPackages` list, but a script could reach arbitrary classes by reflecting off the bound `database` object: `database.getClass().getClassLoader().loadClass(\"java.io.File\")`.\n\nProcess creation was already blocked (`allowCreateProcess(false)`), so the confirmed impact is host **file read**, not OS command execution. Confidentiality: High. Integrity/Availability: None.\n\nThis is a distinct entry point and root cause from CVE-2026-44221, CVE-2026-54076 and CVE-2026-54077, and is reproducible on builds that already contain those fixes.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix is applied in the engine so it covers every entry point (HTTP command, HA-forwarded commands, MCP `analyze`), not only the HTTP handler:\n\n- Polyglot script execution now requires the `updateSecurity` database-administrator permission on `command`, `analyze` and `registerFunctions`. The check runs on the request thread that carries the authenticated user and is a no-op in embedded mode and internal/system contexts (schema load, HA replication apply).\n- The GraalVM host-access policy now denies access to `java.lang.Class`, `java.lang.ClassLoader` and `java.lang.reflect` members, closing the reflection escape that bypassed `allowedPackages` - even for authorized administrators - while leaving normal method calls on bound objects and explicit `Java.type(...)` lookups (governed by `allowedPackages`) working.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUntil upgraded, do not grant command/query access on the HTTP API to untrusted users, and treat any account that can reach `/api/v1/command` as capable of code execution. Note that after the fix, non-administrator accounts can no longer run `js`/polyglot scripts over HTTP.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @kyojune76.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-16T20:13:20Z","modified":"2026-09-16T03:56:06.395820071Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-269","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:36.782754Z"}]}}