{"id":"CVE-2026-71313","aliases":["BIT-rclone-2026-71313","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-71313","EUVD-2026-53643","GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567","GO-2026-6186","SUSE-SU-2026:23625-1","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-71313","openSUSE-SU-2026:21761-1"],"status":"published","title":"rclone: Local Encoding Path Traversal","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00298,"percentile":0.2272,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-22"],"published":"2026-08-05T20:47:48Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:13Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/rclone/rclone","fixed_in":["1.75.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"rclone","fixed_in":["1.75.0"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/rclone/rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"1.51.0"},{"last_affected":"1.74.4"},{"fixed":"1.75.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Bitnami","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.51.0"},{"fixed":"1.75.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.60.1+dfsg-2","1.60.1+dfsg-3","1.60.1+dfsg-4","1.65.0+dfsg-1","1.65.0+dfsg-2","1.69.3+dfsg-1","1.69.3+dfsg-2","1.69.3+dfsg-3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.60.1+dfsg-4","1.65.0+dfsg-1","1.65.0+dfsg-2","1.69.3+dfsg-1","1.69.3+dfsg-2","1.69.3+dfsg-3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/rclone/rclone","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.51.0"},{"fixed":"1.75.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/rclone/rclone","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"1.51.0"},{"fixed":"1.75.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":181},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"SUSE:Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":181},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:18.04:LTS","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.36-3","1.36-3ubuntu0.1","1.36-3ubuntu0.2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:20.04:LTS","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.47.0+ex1-6","1.47.0+ex1-7","1.49.5-2","1.49.5-3","1.50.2-2","1.50.2-2ubuntu0.1","1.50.2-2ubuntu0.2","1.50.2-2ubuntu0.2+esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:22.04:LTS","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.53.3-1","1.53.3-2","1.53.3-4","1.53.3-4ubuntu1","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.1","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.2","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.3","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.3+esm1","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.4","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.4+esm1","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.5","1.53.3-4ubuntu1.22.04.5+esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.60.1+dfsg-2build1","1.60.1+dfsg-3","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.1","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.2","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.3","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.4","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.4+esm1","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.5","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.5+esm1","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.6","1.60.1+dfsg-3ubuntu0.24.04.6+esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu3","1.69.3+dfsg-3","1.69.3+dfsg-3ubuntu1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS","package":"rclone","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu2","1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu3","1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu3.1","1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu3.1+esm1","1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu3.2","1.60.1+dfsg-4ubuntu3.2+esm1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Leap 16.0","package":"govulncheck-vulndb","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.20260827T195228-160000.1.1"}]}],"bundled":181}],"products":[{"vendor":"rclone","product":"rclone"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","web","advisory","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/6a69713864b1d8f6edbc03d8af735f9624576d6e","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71313","tags":["web","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/71xxx/CVE-2026-71313.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-71313","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/rclone/rclone","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-202623625-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-10722","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-11465","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-11479","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-11481","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-11500","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-11624","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-17106","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25688","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25699","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-25700","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-32637","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-33582","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-33818","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34031","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34033","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34177","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34178","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34179","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-3433","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34905","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-34976","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-35172","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-35511","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39821","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39832","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39833","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-39904","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-40173","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41179","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41181","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41327","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41568","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42350","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42508","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-43983","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-45099","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-45404","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46600","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46603","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-47427","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48119","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48491","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-48786","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-49446","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-49447","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-49980","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50567","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50568","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50569","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50570","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50879","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50884","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-50891","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-52855","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-52856","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-52857","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53469","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53470","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53471","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53474","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53475","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53476","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53551","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53622","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53657","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53658","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53941","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54061","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54162","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54167","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54168","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54245","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54332","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54345","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54523","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54526","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54563","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54572","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54593","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54638","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54650","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54680","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54693","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54719","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54725","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54735","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54763","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54764","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54765","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54787","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54908","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54909","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54910","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-54917","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55061","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55062","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55092","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55149","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55477","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55495","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55496","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55497","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55499","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55502","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55580","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55581","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55582","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55637","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-55677","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56852","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56853","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56858","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56859","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56860","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56862","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56864","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56865","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56867","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56868","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56869","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56870","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56871","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56872","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56873","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-56874","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-57210","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-57497","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-59732","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-59733","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-6046","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-61711","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-61712","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-62323","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-62325","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-63328","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64679","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64859","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64863","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64865","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64866","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64868","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-65600","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-65601","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-65602","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-65834","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-65835","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-66063","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-66064","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-6689","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67309","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-6739","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67437","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67438","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67439","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67447","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67448","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-6961","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71309","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71310","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71311","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71312","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71313","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71324","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71325","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71326","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71327","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71479","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71556","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-71557","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7184","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73080","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73499","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73500","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73502","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73505","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73506","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73509","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73564","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-7387","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76905","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-77354","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-71313","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-71313","tags":["report"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-71313","title":"rclone: Local Encoding Path Traversal","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:47:48.099Z","modified":"2026-08-06T14:40:45.375Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:49.559463Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-53643","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:47:48Z","modified":"2026-08-06T14:40:45Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:08.553271Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567","title":"rclone: Local Encoding Path Traversal","description":"## Summary\n\nThe local backend relies on its configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax. If a local destination uses an encoding that omits `Dot`, such as `Slash`, `None`, or `Raw`, a remote object's standard-encoded `．．` component is decoded into an actual `..` component. `backend/local.localPath` then passes the decoded name to `filepath.Join`, which resolves the component and produces a path outside the configured local root.\n\nAn attacker who can create object names in a remote source that a victim copies or synchronizes to such a local destination can create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory, with the permissions of the rclone process.\n\nThe default local encoding includes `Dot` and is not affected by that exact path. This finding requires a non-default local encoding that preserves filesystem path syntax. On Windows, a second confirmed form uses a preserved backslash to turn a remote filename into a native `..\\file` path even when the destination encoding still includes `Dot`.\n\nThis is not merely an odd filename-conversion result. The local remote's configured root is the destination selected by the user, and ordinary backend operations are expected to remain within it. Rclone documents custom and `Raw` encodings as filename-conversion controls; it does not document them as an opt-out from destination confinement. The defect is that confinement depends on an encoding mask instead of an independent post-conversion path check.\n\n## Affected Assets \u0026 Attack Surface\n\n### Confirmed affected versions\n\n- `v1.51.0` through `v1.74.4`\n- Local development commit tested: `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058`\n- Public `master` inspected through commit `c99b2d11edb0986cd2b1190e9fa25a58a3f12661` (2026-07-23)\n\n`v1.51.0` introduced the configurable encoding option for the local backend. Encodings such as `None` or `Slash` could omit `Dot` from that version onward. The explicit `Raw` encoding was introduced later, in `v1.68.0`.\n\n### Required destination configuration\n\nThe destination is a local backend whose effective encoding does not safely encode `.` and `..` components. Examples include:\n\n```text\n--local-encoding Slash\n--local-encoding None\n--local-encoding Raw\n```\n\nThe first PoC below uses `Slash`. Default configurations are not affected because the platform-specific `encoder.OS` masks include `Dot`.\n\nOn Windows, custom encodings that omit `BackSlash` can introduce an additional traversal form: an object-key component such as `..\\marker.txt` can become a native path separator plus `..`, even if the encoding still contains `Dot`. The fix therefore should enforce containment after conversion to the native path format rather than only require the `Dot` flag.\n\n### Attacker-controlled input\n\nThe relevant input is an object name returned by a source backend. The confirmed source case is S3:\n\n- `backend/s3/s3.go:2554` converts raw object keys to rclone's standard path representation with `f.opt.Enc.ToStandardPath`.\n- A raw `..` component becomes the standard component `．．`.\n- When the destination local encoder omits `Dot`, `FromStandardPath` decodes `．．` back to `..`.\n\nAmazon S3 permits relative path components when their left-to-right cumulative count does not exceed the preceding non-relative components. Consequently, an object named:\n\n```text\ntenant/../marker.txt\n```\n\nis valid. When the victim's source remote is rooted at `bucket/tenant/`, the relative object name becomes `../marker.txt` before standard encoding. A malicious S3-compatible endpoint can return equivalent keys without relying on Amazon S3.\n\n### Reachable operations\n\nThe unsafe path resolver is used throughout the local backend, including:\n\n- `backend/local/local.go:798` — `localPath`\n- `backend/local/local.go:803` — `Put`\n- `backend/local/local.go:979` — `Move`\n- `backend/local/local.go:1534` — `Object.Update`\n- `backend/local/local.go:1747` — `Object.Remove`\n- Local directory creation and object lookup operations that call `localPath`\n\nNormal copy and synchronization propagate the source name to the destination:\n\n- `fs/sync/sync.go:518` passes `src.Remote()` to `operations.Copy`.\n- `fs/operations/copy.go:390` uses that remote name for destination `Put` or `Update`.\n\nCommands that copy attacker-controlled source objects to a local destination are therefore in scope, including `copy`, `sync`, and `move`.\n\n## Technical Root Cause Analysis\n\nRclone represents backend filenames using its standard encoding. `lib/encoder/standard.go` defines `encoder.Standard` with `EncodeDot`, causing raw names equal to `.` or `..` to be represented by fullwidth characters:\n\n```text\n.   -\u003e ．\n..  -\u003e ．．\n```\n\nWhen a standard path is converted for a destination backend, `lib/encoder/encoder.go:1214-1240` performs the following transformation for every path component:\n\n```go\nfunc FromStandardName(e Encoder, s string) string {\n\tif e == Standard {\n\t\treturn s\n\t}\n\treturn e.Encode(Standard.Decode(s))\n}\n```\n\nFor a destination encoding that omits `Dot`:\n\n1. `Standard.Decode(\"．．\")` returns `\"..\"`.\n2. The destination encoder leaves `\"..\"` unchanged.\n3. `FromStandardPath` returns a path containing an actual parent-directory component.\n\nThe local backend then constructs the native path without validating containment:\n\n```go\nfunc (f *Fs) localPath(name string) string {\n\treturn filepath.Join(f.root, filepath.FromSlash(f.opt.Enc.FromStandardPath(name)))\n}\n```\n\n`filepath.Join` cleans the resulting path. For example:\n\n```text\nroot:    /tmp/destination\nname:    ../marker.txt\nresult:  /tmp/marker.txt\n```\n\n`Put` creates an object from `src.Remote()`, and `Object.Update` eventually opens that resolved path using:\n\n```go\nos.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREATE | os.O_TRUNC\n```\n\nThere is no subsequent `filepath.Rel` check, anchored filesystem operation, or rejection of an absolute, volume-qualified, `.` or `..` result.\n\nThe default encoder masks the defect because it re-encodes `..` as a literal fullwidth directory name. That is not a sufficient security boundary: the encoding is explicitly configurable, including an officially documented `Raw` value that disables conversion.\n\nThe local backend contains an existing `os.Root` mechanism used while translating symlinks, but ordinary local writes do not use it. In the default non-`--links` mode, `mkdirAll`, `openFile`, rename, and remove operations use ordinary filesystem paths.\n\n## Proof of Concept \u0026 Evidence\n\n### Deterministic regression test\n\nAdd the following test to the `backend/local` package. It requires no external storage service. It uses S3's actual default encoding mask to construct the same standard `Remote()` value that an S3 key with a relative `..` component produces.\n\n```go\npackage local\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/config/configmap\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/object\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/lib/encoder\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n)\n\nfunc TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot(t *testing.T) {\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\touter := t.TempDir()\n\n\t// S3's default encoder converts a raw \"..\" object-key component\n\t// into rclone's standard fullwidth representation.\n\ts3Encoding := encoder.EncodeInvalidUtf8 | encoder.EncodeSlash | encoder.EncodeDot\n\tremote := s3Encoding.ToStandardPath(\"../marker.txt\")\n\trequire.NotEqual(t, \"../marker.txt\", remote)\n\n\t// The default local encoding includes Dot and keeps the path confined.\n\tsafeRaw, err := NewFs(ctx, \"safe\", filepath.Join(outer, \"safe\"),\n\t\tconfigmap.Simple{\"encoding\": encoder.OS.String()})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tsafe := safeRaw.(*Fs)\n\trel, err := filepath.Rel(safe.root, safe.localPath(remote))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.False(t,\n\t\trel == \"..\" ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(filepath.Separator)))\n\n\t// Removing Dot converts the same component to a real \"..\".\n\tunsafeRaw, err := NewFs(ctx, \"unsafe\", filepath.Join(outer, \"destination\"),\n\t\tconfigmap.Simple{\"encoding\": \"Slash\"})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tunsafe := unsafeRaw.(*Fs)\n\n\t// Place an existing file outside the configured destination.\n\tescaped := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(unsafe.root), \"marker.txt\")\n\trequire.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(escaped, []byte(\"original\"), 0600))\n\n\tpayload := \"attacker-controlled\"\n\tsrc := object.NewStaticObjectInfo(\n\t\tremote, time.Now(), int64(len(payload)), true, nil, nil)\n\n\t_, err = unsafe.Put(ctx, bytes.NewBufferString(payload), src)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tgot, err := os.ReadFile(escaped)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.Equal(t, payload, string(got))\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```text\ngo test ./backend/local -run '^TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot$' -count=1 -v\n```\n\nObserved result against commit `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058`:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot\n--- PASS: TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot\nPASS\n```\n\nThe test establishes both sides of the issue:\n\n- The default local encoding keeps the generated path under the root.\n- `encoding=Slash` causes `Put` to overwrite a pre-existing file outside the root.\n\n### Confirmed Windows backslash variant\n\nA second regression test was run on Windows using the standard remote name:\n\n```text\n..\\backslash-marker.txt\n```\n\nand a local destination configured with:\n\n```text\nencoding = Slash,Dot\n```\n\nThis mask retains `Dot`, so it is not vulnerable to the fullwidth-dot decoding sequence above, but it omits `BackSlash`. `FromStandardPath` consequently preserves the backslash; after native conversion, `filepath.Join` interprets it as a separator and resolves the preceding `..`. Calling `Put` overwrote a marker next to the destination root. The test passed on Windows/amd64 against commit `a0c09f138`.\n\nThis variant demonstrates why rejecting only configurations that omit `Dot` is incomplete. The security check must run after conversion to the platform's native path representation.\n\n### S3 command-line reproduction\n\nPerform this test only with a disposable bucket and temporary local paths.\n\n```bash\nprintf 'attacker-controlled\\n' \u003e payload.txt\n\naws s3api put-object \\\n  --bucket \"$BUCKET\" \\\n  --key 'tenant/../rclone-traversal-marker.txt' \\\n  --body payload.txt\n\nrm -rf /tmp/rclone-destination\nrm -f /tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\nmkdir -p /tmp/rclone-destination\n\nrclone copy \\\n  \"s3remote:${BUCKET}/tenant/\" \\\n  /tmp/rclone-destination \\\n  --local-encoding Slash \\\n  -vv\n\ntest ! -e /tmp/rclone-destination/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\ntest -f /tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\ngrep -F 'attacker-controlled' /tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\n/tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\n```\n\nis created outside:\n\n```text\n/tmp/rclone-destination\n```\n\nThe S3 key is rooted under the string prefix `tenant/`, so it is returned by a listing of that prefix. Rclone preserves its logical `..` component using standard encoding until the custom local destination encoder decodes it.\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\nThe direct impact is creation or overwrite of files outside the configured local destination as the rclone process user.\n\nRealistic consequences include:\n\n- Destruction or corruption of files accessible to the rclone account.\n- Modification of user startup files, application configuration, service data, or executable search paths.\n- Possible persistence or code execution in the rclone user's security context if the attacker can target a file that another component subsequently executes or loads.\n- Greater host impact when rclone runs as a privileged backup, synchronization, container, or system service account.\n\nDefault local configurations are protected from the demonstrated `..` component by `Dot` encoding. The required non-default encoding materially reduces exploitability but does not make the behavior safe or expected: disabling filename conversion should cause unrepresentable names to fail, not reinterpret an object name as a path outside the selected destination.\n\n## Remediation Guidance\n\n### Enforce containment after native-path conversion\n\nThe primary fix should be in the local backend, after `FromStandardPath` and `filepath.FromSlash` have produced the native path. Security must not depend on any particular encoding mask.\n\nRefactor `localPath`, or introduce a checked equivalent, so it can return an error. The check should:\n\n1. Convert the standard remote name using the configured local encoding.\n2. Convert separators to the native format.\n3. Reject any non-empty result for which `filepath.IsLocal` is false. This rejects absolute, volume-qualified, and lexically escaping paths using platform-aware rules.\n4. Join the result to `f.root`.\n5. Calculate `filepath.Rel(f.root, candidate)` using the normalized `f.root`, not the original user-supplied root string.\n6. Reject `rel == \"..\"`, any relative path beginning with `\"..\" + filepath.Separator`, and any absolute relative result.\n\nIllustrative logic:\n\n```go\nfunc (f *Fs) checkedLocalPath(remote string) (string, error) {\n\tnative := filepath.FromSlash(f.opt.Enc.FromStandardPath(remote))\n\n\t// Some root-level backend operations legitimately resolve the empty name.\n\tif native != \"\" \u0026\u0026 !filepath.IsLocal(native) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid local object path %q: not a local relative path\", remote)\n\t}\n\n\tcandidate := filepath.Join(f.root, native)\n\trel, err := filepath.Rel(f.root, candidate)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid local object path %q: %w\", remote, err)\n\t}\n\tif filepath.IsAbs(rel) ||\n\t\trel == \"..\" ||\n\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(filepath.Separator)) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"local object path %q escapes the configured root\", remote)\n\t}\n\treturn candidate, nil\n}\n```\n\nThis is illustrative rather than a complete patch. The implementation should account for the local backend's Windows UNC normalization and return an existing rclone path-validation error type if one is available.\n\nA naive string-prefix comparison must not be used because paths such as `/root-other` share a textual prefix with `/root`. `filepath.IsLocal` protects the decoded relative name, while the independent `filepath.Rel` check verifies the final candidate against the normalized root. Retaining both makes the intended invariant explicit.\n\n### Apply the check to every local filesystem entry point\n\nThe checked resolver must protect all operations that accept an `fs` remote name, not only `Put`. At minimum, review and update:\n\n- `NewObject` and object construction.\n- `Put`, `PutStream`, and `Update`.\n- `Mkdir`, `Rmdir`, and directory metadata operations.\n- `Move`, `DirMove`, and copy/rename helpers.\n- `Remove` and cleanup of failed or partial transfers.\n- Metadata and hash operations that resolve a remote name to a local path.\n\nIf changing `localPath` to return an error is impractical, validate the decoded path before constructing an `Object` or `Directory` and ensure no public backend operation can reach the unchecked helper.\n\n### Consider anchored filesystem operations\n\nThe existing `os.Root` support in `backend/local/local.go` rejects paths that escape its root and may be reusable. Applying anchored operations to all local mutations would provide stronger protection against both lexical traversal and symlink races.\n\nThis requires compatibility review: ordinary local copies currently may intentionally follow pre-existing destination symlinks when symlink translation is disabled. A lexical containment check can fix this finding without changing that behavior, whereas applying `os.Root` universally may intentionally prevent writes through symlinks that point outside the root.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:48:46Z","modified":"2026-08-05T20:48:47Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:57.999375Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-71313","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T21:16:59.003Z","modified":"2026-09-09T20:50:00.95Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.031043Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-71313","title":"rclone: Local Encoding Path Traversal","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:47:48.099Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:13.010261505Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:15.164658Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-71313","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T21:16:59.003Z","modified":"2026-10-01T03:03:32.705639527Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:02.094661Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567","title":"rclone: Local Encoding Path Traversal","description":"## Summary\n\nThe local backend relies on its configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax. If a local destination uses an encoding that omits `Dot`, such as `Slash`, `None`, or `Raw`, a remote object's standard-encoded `．．` component is decoded into an actual `..` component. `backend/local.localPath` then passes the decoded name to `filepath.Join`, which resolves the component and produces a path outside the configured local root.\n\nAn attacker who can create object names in a remote source that a victim copies or synchronizes to such a local destination can create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory, with the permissions of the rclone process.\n\nThe default local encoding includes `Dot` and is not affected by that exact path. This finding requires a non-default local encoding that preserves filesystem path syntax. On Windows, a second confirmed form uses a preserved backslash to turn a remote filename into a native `..\\file` path even when the destination encoding still includes `Dot`.\n\nThis is not merely an odd filename-conversion result. The local remote's configured root is the destination selected by the user, and ordinary backend operations are expected to remain within it. Rclone documents custom and `Raw` encodings as filename-conversion controls; it does not document them as an opt-out from destination confinement. The defect is that confinement depends on an encoding mask instead of an independent post-conversion path check.\n\n## Affected Assets \u0026 Attack Surface\n\n### Confirmed affected versions\n\n- `v1.51.0` through `v1.74.4`\n- Local development commit tested: `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058`\n- Public `master` inspected through commit `c99b2d11edb0986cd2b1190e9fa25a58a3f12661` (2026-07-23)\n\n`v1.51.0` introduced the configurable encoding option for the local backend. Encodings such as `None` or `Slash` could omit `Dot` from that version onward. The explicit `Raw` encoding was introduced later, in `v1.68.0`.\n\n### Required destination configuration\n\nThe destination is a local backend whose effective encoding does not safely encode `.` and `..` components. Examples include:\n\n```text\n--local-encoding Slash\n--local-encoding None\n--local-encoding Raw\n```\n\nThe first PoC below uses `Slash`. Default configurations are not affected because the platform-specific `encoder.OS` masks include `Dot`.\n\nOn Windows, custom encodings that omit `BackSlash` can introduce an additional traversal form: an object-key component such as `..\\marker.txt` can become a native path separator plus `..`, even if the encoding still contains `Dot`. The fix therefore should enforce containment after conversion to the native path format rather than only require the `Dot` flag.\n\n### Attacker-controlled input\n\nThe relevant input is an object name returned by a source backend. The confirmed source case is S3:\n\n- `backend/s3/s3.go:2554` converts raw object keys to rclone's standard path representation with `f.opt.Enc.ToStandardPath`.\n- A raw `..` component becomes the standard component `．．`.\n- When the destination local encoder omits `Dot`, `FromStandardPath` decodes `．．` back to `..`.\n\nAmazon S3 permits relative path components when their left-to-right cumulative count does not exceed the preceding non-relative components. Consequently, an object named:\n\n```text\ntenant/../marker.txt\n```\n\nis valid. When the victim's source remote is rooted at `bucket/tenant/`, the relative object name becomes `../marker.txt` before standard encoding. A malicious S3-compatible endpoint can return equivalent keys without relying on Amazon S3.\n\n### Reachable operations\n\nThe unsafe path resolver is used throughout the local backend, including:\n\n- `backend/local/local.go:798` — `localPath`\n- `backend/local/local.go:803` — `Put`\n- `backend/local/local.go:979` — `Move`\n- `backend/local/local.go:1534` — `Object.Update`\n- `backend/local/local.go:1747` — `Object.Remove`\n- Local directory creation and object lookup operations that call `localPath`\n\nNormal copy and synchronization propagate the source name to the destination:\n\n- `fs/sync/sync.go:518` passes `src.Remote()` to `operations.Copy`.\n- `fs/operations/copy.go:390` uses that remote name for destination `Put` or `Update`.\n\nCommands that copy attacker-controlled source objects to a local destination are therefore in scope, including `copy`, `sync`, and `move`.\n\n## Technical Root Cause Analysis\n\nRclone represents backend filenames using its standard encoding. `lib/encoder/standard.go` defines `encoder.Standard` with `EncodeDot`, causing raw names equal to `.` or `..` to be represented by fullwidth characters:\n\n```text\n.   -\u003e ．\n..  -\u003e ．．\n```\n\nWhen a standard path is converted for a destination backend, `lib/encoder/encoder.go:1214-1240` performs the following transformation for every path component:\n\n```go\nfunc FromStandardName(e Encoder, s string) string {\n\tif e == Standard {\n\t\treturn s\n\t}\n\treturn e.Encode(Standard.Decode(s))\n}\n```\n\nFor a destination encoding that omits `Dot`:\n\n1. `Standard.Decode(\"．．\")` returns `\"..\"`.\n2. The destination encoder leaves `\"..\"` unchanged.\n3. `FromStandardPath` returns a path containing an actual parent-directory component.\n\nThe local backend then constructs the native path without validating containment:\n\n```go\nfunc (f *Fs) localPath(name string) string {\n\treturn filepath.Join(f.root, filepath.FromSlash(f.opt.Enc.FromStandardPath(name)))\n}\n```\n\n`filepath.Join` cleans the resulting path. For example:\n\n```text\nroot:    /tmp/destination\nname:    ../marker.txt\nresult:  /tmp/marker.txt\n```\n\n`Put` creates an object from `src.Remote()`, and `Object.Update` eventually opens that resolved path using:\n\n```go\nos.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREATE | os.O_TRUNC\n```\n\nThere is no subsequent `filepath.Rel` check, anchored filesystem operation, or rejection of an absolute, volume-qualified, `.` or `..` result.\n\nThe default encoder masks the defect because it re-encodes `..` as a literal fullwidth directory name. That is not a sufficient security boundary: the encoding is explicitly configurable, including an officially documented `Raw` value that disables conversion.\n\nThe local backend contains an existing `os.Root` mechanism used while translating symlinks, but ordinary local writes do not use it. In the default non-`--links` mode, `mkdirAll`, `openFile`, rename, and remove operations use ordinary filesystem paths.\n\n## Proof of Concept \u0026 Evidence\n\n### Deterministic regression test\n\nAdd the following test to the `backend/local` package. It requires no external storage service. It uses S3's actual default encoding mask to construct the same standard `Remote()` value that an S3 key with a relative `..` component produces.\n\n```go\npackage local\n\nimport (\n\t\"bytes\"\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"path/filepath\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/config/configmap\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/fs/object\"\n\t\"github.com/rclone/rclone/lib/encoder\"\n\t\"github.com/stretchr/testify/require\"\n)\n\nfunc TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot(t *testing.T) {\n\tctx := context.Background()\n\touter := t.TempDir()\n\n\t// S3's default encoder converts a raw \"..\" object-key component\n\t// into rclone's standard fullwidth representation.\n\ts3Encoding := encoder.EncodeInvalidUtf8 | encoder.EncodeSlash | encoder.EncodeDot\n\tremote := s3Encoding.ToStandardPath(\"../marker.txt\")\n\trequire.NotEqual(t, \"../marker.txt\", remote)\n\n\t// The default local encoding includes Dot and keeps the path confined.\n\tsafeRaw, err := NewFs(ctx, \"safe\", filepath.Join(outer, \"safe\"),\n\t\tconfigmap.Simple{\"encoding\": encoder.OS.String()})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tsafe := safeRaw.(*Fs)\n\trel, err := filepath.Rel(safe.root, safe.localPath(remote))\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.False(t,\n\t\trel == \"..\" ||\n\t\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(filepath.Separator)))\n\n\t// Removing Dot converts the same component to a real \"..\".\n\tunsafeRaw, err := NewFs(ctx, \"unsafe\", filepath.Join(outer, \"destination\"),\n\t\tconfigmap.Simple{\"encoding\": \"Slash\"})\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\tunsafe := unsafeRaw.(*Fs)\n\n\t// Place an existing file outside the configured destination.\n\tescaped := filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(unsafe.root), \"marker.txt\")\n\trequire.NoError(t, os.WriteFile(escaped, []byte(\"original\"), 0600))\n\n\tpayload := \"attacker-controlled\"\n\tsrc := object.NewStaticObjectInfo(\n\t\tremote, time.Now(), int64(len(payload)), true, nil, nil)\n\n\t_, err = unsafe.Put(ctx, bytes.NewBufferString(payload), src)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\n\tgot, err := os.ReadFile(escaped)\n\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n\trequire.Equal(t, payload, string(got))\n}\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```text\ngo test ./backend/local -run '^TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot$' -count=1 -v\n```\n\nObserved result against commit `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058`:\n\n```text\n=== RUN   TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot\n--- PASS: TestLocalEncodingWithoutDotEscapesRoot\nPASS\n```\n\nThe test establishes both sides of the issue:\n\n- The default local encoding keeps the generated path under the root.\n- `encoding=Slash` causes `Put` to overwrite a pre-existing file outside the root.\n\n### Confirmed Windows backslash variant\n\nA second regression test was run on Windows using the standard remote name:\n\n```text\n..\\backslash-marker.txt\n```\n\nand a local destination configured with:\n\n```text\nencoding = Slash,Dot\n```\n\nThis mask retains `Dot`, so it is not vulnerable to the fullwidth-dot decoding sequence above, but it omits `BackSlash`. `FromStandardPath` consequently preserves the backslash; after native conversion, `filepath.Join` interprets it as a separator and resolves the preceding `..`. Calling `Put` overwrote a marker next to the destination root. The test passed on Windows/amd64 against commit `a0c09f138`.\n\nThis variant demonstrates why rejecting only configurations that omit `Dot` is incomplete. The security check must run after conversion to the platform's native path representation.\n\n### S3 command-line reproduction\n\nPerform this test only with a disposable bucket and temporary local paths.\n\n```bash\nprintf 'attacker-controlled\\n' \u003e payload.txt\n\naws s3api put-object \\\n  --bucket \"$BUCKET\" \\\n  --key 'tenant/../rclone-traversal-marker.txt' \\\n  --body payload.txt\n\nrm -rf /tmp/rclone-destination\nrm -f /tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\nmkdir -p /tmp/rclone-destination\n\nrclone copy \\\n  \"s3remote:${BUCKET}/tenant/\" \\\n  /tmp/rclone-destination \\\n  --local-encoding Slash \\\n  -vv\n\ntest ! -e /tmp/rclone-destination/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\ntest -f /tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\ngrep -F 'attacker-controlled' /tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\n```\n\nExpected result:\n\n```text\n/tmp/rclone-traversal-marker.txt\n```\n\nis created outside:\n\n```text\n/tmp/rclone-destination\n```\n\nThe S3 key is rooted under the string prefix `tenant/`, so it is returned by a listing of that prefix. Rclone preserves its logical `..` component using standard encoding until the custom local destination encoder decodes it.\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\nThe direct impact is creation or overwrite of files outside the configured local destination as the rclone process user.\n\nRealistic consequences include:\n\n- Destruction or corruption of files accessible to the rclone account.\n- Modification of user startup files, application configuration, service data, or executable search paths.\n- Possible persistence or code execution in the rclone user's security context if the attacker can target a file that another component subsequently executes or loads.\n- Greater host impact when rclone runs as a privileged backup, synchronization, container, or system service account.\n\nDefault local configurations are protected from the demonstrated `..` component by `Dot` encoding. The required non-default encoding materially reduces exploitability but does not make the behavior safe or expected: disabling filename conversion should cause unrepresentable names to fail, not reinterpret an object name as a path outside the selected destination.\n\n## Remediation Guidance\n\n### Enforce containment after native-path conversion\n\nThe primary fix should be in the local backend, after `FromStandardPath` and `filepath.FromSlash` have produced the native path. Security must not depend on any particular encoding mask.\n\nRefactor `localPath`, or introduce a checked equivalent, so it can return an error. The check should:\n\n1. Convert the standard remote name using the configured local encoding.\n2. Convert separators to the native format.\n3. Reject any non-empty result for which `filepath.IsLocal` is false. This rejects absolute, volume-qualified, and lexically escaping paths using platform-aware rules.\n4. Join the result to `f.root`.\n5. Calculate `filepath.Rel(f.root, candidate)` using the normalized `f.root`, not the original user-supplied root string.\n6. Reject `rel == \"..\"`, any relative path beginning with `\"..\" + filepath.Separator`, and any absolute relative result.\n\nIllustrative logic:\n\n```go\nfunc (f *Fs) checkedLocalPath(remote string) (string, error) {\n\tnative := filepath.FromSlash(f.opt.Enc.FromStandardPath(remote))\n\n\t// Some root-level backend operations legitimately resolve the empty name.\n\tif native != \"\" \u0026\u0026 !filepath.IsLocal(native) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid local object path %q: not a local relative path\", remote)\n\t}\n\n\tcandidate := filepath.Join(f.root, native)\n\trel, err := filepath.Rel(f.root, candidate)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"invalid local object path %q: %w\", remote, err)\n\t}\n\tif filepath.IsAbs(rel) ||\n\t\trel == \"..\" ||\n\t\tstrings.HasPrefix(rel, \"..\"+string(filepath.Separator)) {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"local object path %q escapes the configured root\", remote)\n\t}\n\treturn candidate, nil\n}\n```\n\nThis is illustrative rather than a complete patch. The implementation should account for the local backend's Windows UNC normalization and return an existing rclone path-validation error type if one is available.\n\nA naive string-prefix comparison must not be used because paths such as `/root-other` share a textual prefix with `/root`. `filepath.IsLocal` protects the decoded relative name, while the independent `filepath.Rel` check verifies the final candidate against the normalized root. Retaining both makes the intended invariant explicit.\n\n### Apply the check to every local filesystem entry point\n\nThe checked resolver must protect all operations that accept an `fs` remote name, not only `Put`. At minimum, review and update:\n\n- `NewObject` and object construction.\n- `Put`, `PutStream`, and `Update`.\n- `Mkdir`, `Rmdir`, and directory metadata operations.\n- `Move`, `DirMove`, and copy/rename helpers.\n- `Remove` and cleanup of failed or partial transfers.\n- Metadata and hash operations that resolve a remote name to a local path.\n\nIf changing `localPath` to return an error is impractical, validate the decoded path before constructing an `Object` or `Directory` and ensure no public backend operation can reach the unchecked helper.\n\n### Consider anchored filesystem operations\n\nThe existing `os.Root` support in `backend/local/local.go` rejects paths that escape its root and may be reusable. Applying anchored operations to all local mutations would provide stronger protection against both lexical traversal and symlink races.\n\nThis requires compatibility review: ordinary local copies currently may intentionally follow pre-existing destination symlinks when symlink translation is disabled. A lexical containment check can fix this finding without changing that behavior, whereas applying `os.Root` universally may intentionally prevent writes through symlinks that point outside the root.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T20:48:46Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:53.502645107Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-22"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:41.349637Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-71313","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T21:16:00Z","modified":"2026-10-17T13:00:44.969684844Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:57:03.035847Z"},{"id":"BIT-rclone-2026-71313","title":"rclone: Local Encoding Path Traversal","description":"rclone is a command-line program to sync files and directories to and from different cloud storage providers. From v1.51.0 until v1.75.0, the local backend in backend/local/local.go relies on the configurable filename encoder to prevent remote filename data from becoming operating-system path syntax, so a local destination using Slash, None, Raw, or on Windows an encoding that preserves backslash can decode a standard-encoded fullwidth dot-dot component or native backslash form into an actual parent-directory component before filepath.Join resolves it outside the configured local root, allowing an attacker-controlled source object to create or overwrite files outside the selected destination directory as the rclone process. This issue is fixed in v1.75.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-17T05:53:35.162Z","modified":"2026-08-18T17:24:05.873915682Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:28:35.111822Z"},{"id":"GO-2026-6186","title":"Path traversal via local backend encoding in github.com/rclone/rclone","description":"Path traversal via local backend encoding in github.com/rclone/rclone","status":"published","published":"2026-08-18T16:38:10Z","modified":"2026-08-18T17:24:05.873915682Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:03.11707Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:21761-1","title":"Security update for govulncheck-vulndb","description":"This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260827T195228 2026-08-27T19:52:28Z (jsc#PED-11136).\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-5026 CVE-2026-39821\n  * GO-2026-6225\n  * GO-2026-6250 CVE-2026-63328 GHSA-8rc5-4fr6-64pw\n  * GO-2026-6253 CVE-2026-17106 GHSA-hfg8-hc9c-6c3h\n  * GO-2026-6254 CVE-2026-53941 GHSA-vjhx-2cqw-3q6q\n  * GO-2026-6255 CVE-2026-61711 GHSA-7236-3392-c5c6\n  * GO-2026-6256 CVE-2026-61712 GHSA-72x6-4j93-7w86\n  * GO-2026-6258 CVE-2026-45404 GHSA-42cj-99w8-cp2p\n  * GO-2026-6259 CVE-2026-32637 GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6\n  * GO-2026-6260 CVE-2026-55149 GHSA-qqff-5854-px68\n  * GO-2026-6261 CVE-2026-54061 GHSA-rrwh-6jrq-wp5v\n  * GO-2026-6262 GHSA-22w5-2fxg-vrwx\n  * GO-2026-6263 CVE-2026-54168 GHSA-6f2p-296r-cc28\n  * GO-2026-6264 CVE-2026-54245 GHSA-7q96-f8xw-jv5j\n  * GO-2026-6265 GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f\n  * GO-2026-6266 CVE-2026-54167 GHSA-f5f4-3hh4-f54m\n  * GO-2026-6267 GHSA-h58c-xccx-75m3\n  * GO-2026-6268 GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g\n  * GO-2026-6269 GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw\n  * GO-2026-6270 CVE-2026-54162 GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5\n  * GO-2026-6271 CVE-2026-67448 GHSA-8r62-w5wh-fc5m\n  * GO-2026-6272 CVE-2026-67447 GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97\n  * GO-2026-6273 CVE-2026-64679 GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28\n  * GO-2026-6274 CVE-2026-76905 GHSA-mmfr-pmjx-hw9w\n  * GO-2026-6275 CVE-2026-77354 GHSA-xhj3-7xw9-vr34\n  * GO-2026-6277 GHSA-4ph6-mjv7-3fq6\n  * GO-2026-6278 GHSA-w67g-5rqw-f597\n  * GO-2026-6279 CVE-2026-6046 GHSA-3vmp-whvv-5v9v\n  * GO-2026-6280 CVE-2026-7387 GHSA-6hxm-w4hv-vgvw\n  * GO-2026-6281 CVE-2026-6961 GHSA-8qq9-cqj8-82w4\n  * GO-2026-6282 CVE-2026-7184 GHSA-9p44-r552-4wp9\n  * GO-2026-6283 CVE-2026-6689 GHSA-c28q-m4gf-vg4q\n  * GO-2026-6284 CVE-2026-55477 GHSA-jm48-m3rr-9hgg\n  * GO-2026-6285 CVE-2026-6739 GHSA-m2w9-h2mm-79qr\n  * GO-2026-6286 CVE-2026-3433 GHSA-rp4v-qc77-phm4\n  * GO-2026-6287 GHSA-vx2m-jpxr-xv7w\n  * GO-2026-6288 CVE-2026-11624 GHSA-76g7-m3xw-x9gr\n  * GO-2026-6289 GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59\n  * GO-2026-6290 CVE-2026-55581 GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3\n  * GO-2026-6291 CVE-2026-55582 GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58\n  * GO-2026-6292 CVE-2026-55580 GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m\n  * GO-2026-6293 CVE-2026-55677 GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq\n  * GO-2026-6294 CVE-2026-55092 GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff\n  * GO-2026-6295 CVE-2026-55637 GHSA-cmwv-wf9p-p8wx\n  * GO-2026-6296 CVE-2026-54523 GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9\n  * GO-2026-6297 CVE-2026-50879 GHSA-g743-m6x3-v6wm\n  * GO-2026-6298 CVE-2026-54563 GHSA-w5fv-7x5q-g8qp\n  * GO-2026-6299 CVE-2026-50884 GHSA-5442-mh7f-72px\n  * GO-2026-6300 CVE-2026-50891 GHSA-rcqf-cpv9-g5jf\n  * GO-2026-6301 CVE-2026-42350 GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260819T170606 2026-08-19T17:06:06Z.\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-4720 GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7\n  * GO-2026-4942 CVE-2026-35172 GHSA-f2g3-hh2r-cwgc\n  * GO-2026-4950\n  * GO-2026-6093 GHSA-464c-974j-9xm6\n  * GO-2026-6094 GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g\n  * GO-2026-6095 GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw\n  * GO-2026-6097 CVE-2026-55495 GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737\n  * GO-2026-6098 CVE-2026-55496 GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv\n  * GO-2026-6099 CVE-2026-57497 GHSA-g35j-m5xg-vh3q\n  * GO-2026-6100 CVE-2026-55497 GHSA-g9j2-8w95-3vwv\n  * GO-2026-6101 CVE-2026-55502 GHSA-hq88-5x99-x3gf\n  * GO-2026-6102 CVE-2026-55499 GHSA-w8x7-h2px-xmq8\n  * GO-2026-6103 CVE-2026-73564 GHSA-26gq-p25f-99cp\n  * GO-2026-6104 CVE-2026-62323 GHSA-c3jm-gv5r-9wcp\n  * GO-2026-6105 GHSA-c534-2w9c-x7fm\n  * GO-2026-6106 GHSA-v6w6-358x-2433\n  * GO-2026-6107 CVE-2026-73500 GHSA-6vch-q96h-7gc3\n  * GO-2026-6108 CVE-2026-73505 GHSA-6xj8-qv9j-xcjq\n  * GO-2026-6109 GHSA-86cx-wwf4-phq4\n  * GO-2026-6110 CVE-2026-73509 GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75\n  * GO-2026-6111 CVE-2026-73506 GHSA-fwjx-9p69-h25h\n  * GO-2026-6112 CVE-2026-73502 GHSA-jpcw-4wr7-c3vq\n  * GO-2026-6113 GHSA-p6ph-3jx2-3337\n  * GO-2026-6114 CVE-2026-73499 GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8\n  * GO-2026-6115 CVE-2026-56867\n  * GO-2026-6117 GHSA-hp74-gm6m-2qm5\n  * GO-2026-6118 CVE-2026-47427 GHSA-w4q6-qw23-4rg7\n  * GO-2026-6119 CVE-2026-43983 GHSA-w6p7-2fxx-4f44\n  * GO-2026-6120 CVE-2026-54593 GHSA-8r6w-3qq5-4p4r\n  * GO-2026-6121 CVE-2026-54345 GHSA-6r28-9ppf-4hj5\n  * GO-2026-6122 CVE-2026-54332 GHSA-g6v3-7xmc-w563\n  * GO-2026-6123 CVE-2026-49446 GHSA-2rx5-2g7j-2659\n  * GO-2026-6124 CVE-2026-49447 GHSA-5fqm-cc34-fcf5\n  * GO-2026-6125 CVE-2026-11479 GHSA-6h35-9p2w-3j3r\n  * GO-2026-6126 CVE-2026-11465 GHSA-7v3v-cp44-vc8m\n  * GO-2026-6127 CVE-2026-50567 GHSA-q6vm-xqc9-v3ff\n  * GO-2026-6128 CVE-2026-11481 GHSA-q76h-p6jh-9rw3\n  * GO-2026-6129 CVE-2026-50570 GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp\n  * GO-2026-6130 CVE-2026-50568 GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4\n  * GO-2026-6131 CVE-2026-50569 GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw\n  * GO-2026-6132 CVE-2026-62325 GHSA-rjrw-mjq6-hpmm\n  * GO-2026-6133 CVE-2026-54719 GHSA-rmxw-pq4x-3fvh\n  * GO-2026-6134 CVE-2026-66064 GHSA-964w-f6gj-5236\n  * GO-2026-6135 CVE-2026-54650 GHSA-fh2f-xfxc-q9cc\n  * GO-2026-6136 CVE-2026-64863 GHSA-hq33-8jgp-8qq3\n  * GO-2026-6137 CVE-2026-66063 GHSA-wg2q-39h6-66x9\n  * GO-2026-6138 CVE-2026-54638 GHSA-whmm-qj9r-wvr2\n  * GO-2026-6139 CVE-2026-54735 GHSA-4p3g-4hcj-wpvx\n  * GO-2026-6140 CVE-2026-11500 GHSA-jqpm-wf57-qx5c\n  * GO-2026-6141 CVE-2026-54693 GHSA-jq8w-8q2f-ffm9\n  * GO-2026-6142 CVE-2026-54680 GHSA-mjqf-28ph-426h\n  * GO-2026-6143 GHSA-xvg2-cgv6-6h7v\n  * GO-2026-6144 CVE-2026-67439 GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h\n  * GO-2026-6145 CVE-2026-67438 GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65\n  * GO-2026-6146 CVE-2026-67437 GHSA-xpxj-f2fm-rqch\n  * GO-2026-6147 CVE-2026-25688 GHSA-hmr2-99jm-8x45\n  * GO-2026-6148 CVE-2026-25699 GHSA-w754-5646-xq9j\n  * GO-2026-6151 CVE-2026-34033 GHSA-6qwm-5fm9-cvjx\n  * GO-2026-6152 CVE-2026-34905 GHSA-85r2-pvg8-89r9\n  * GO-2026-6153 CVE-2026-33582 GHSA-v553-g2w6-295p\n  * GO-2026-6154 CVE-2026-34031 GHSA-x4f6-mqg6-28xx\n  * GO-2026-6155 CVE-2026-65834 GHSA-68cj-mvg9-rgm2\n  * GO-2026-6156 CVE-2026-52856 GHSA-ghrq-5wpp-hxx5\n  * GO-2026-6157 CVE-2026-65835 GHSA-jr6p-8pjj-mfx6\n  * GO-2026-6158 CVE-2026-52855 GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6\n  * GO-2026-6159 CVE-2026-52857 GHSA-q6hh-gp44-4hcm\n  * GO-2026-6160 CVE-2026-54725 GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm\n  * GO-2026-6161 CVE-2026-53551 GHSA-qj55-47fp-p62j\n  * GO-2026-6162 CVE-2026-54787 GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm\n  * GO-2026-6163 CVE-2026-54909 GHSA-34rh-wp3j-6cxc\n  * GO-2026-6164 CVE-2026-54910 GHSA-vvp7-h4fj-m28w\n  * GO-2026-6165 CVE-2026-54908 GHSA-wg4g-wm44-ch5j\n  * GO-2026-6166 CVE-2026-56868\n  * GO-2026-6168 CVE-2026-56869\n  * GO-2026-6169 CVE-2026-56870\n  * GO-2026-6170 CVE-2026-56871\n  * GO-2026-6171 CVE-2026-56872\n  * GO-2026-6172 CVE-2026-56873\n  * GO-2026-6173 CVE-2026-56874\n  * GO-2026-6181 GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv\n  * GO-2026-6182 CVE-2026-71312 GHSA-2m8m-jhrm-w6j2\n  * GO-2026-6183 GHSA-3x6r-wxxg-53vv\n  * GO-2026-6184 CVE-2026-71309 GHSA-45pq-889g-fcgh\n  * GO-2026-6185 CVE-2026-59732 GHSA-4vr5-p2gc-h23p\n  * GO-2026-6186 CVE-2026-71313 GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567\n  * GO-2026-6187 CVE-2026-71311 GHSA-8c48-q9wj-3w37\n  * GO-2026-6188 GHSA-8mxv-9xhp-86h4\n  * GO-2026-6189 GHSA-8v25-v8p6-qf7v\n  * GO-2026-6190 GHSA-945v-v9p3-v5xw\n  * GO-2026-6191 CVE-2026-54572 GHSA-cf44-9pgv-m4xc\n  * GO-2026-6192 CVE-2026-65602 GHSA-42cj-m3vj-89wv\n  * GO-2026-6195 CVE-2026-59733 GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg\n  * GO-2026-6196 GHSA-gx4c-2hqx-cw2r\n  * GO-2026-6197 GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj\n  * GO-2026-6198 CVE-2026-65601 GHSA-qq9q-x9w4-chhj\n  * GO-2026-6199 CVE-2026-71310 GHSA-xhf4-832v-7xcr\n  * GO-2026-6201 CVE-2026-71324 GHSA-3ccp-42pg-hgv6\n  * GO-2026-6202 CVE-2026-54764 GHSA-3q9r-p662-5j8m\n  * GO-2026-6203 CVE-2026-71325 GHSA-62fc-8686-hfmq\n  * GO-2026-6204 CVE-2026-71326 GHSA-6765-c87h-8mrf\n  * GO-2026-6205 CVE-2026-54765 GHSA-6p8f-p8j2-rqmv\n  * GO-2026-6207 CVE-2026-67309 GHSA-8rxv-jg7p-wvg3\n  * GO-2026-6208 CVE-2026-65600 GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv\n  * GO-2026-6209 CVE-2026-71327 GHSA-fgjj-px3w-67xx\n  * GO-2026-6211 CVE-2026-54763 GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5\n  * GO-2026-6212 CVE-2026-39904 GHSA-42jc-v69j-g38f\n  * GO-2026-6213 CVE-2026-71556 GHSA-hc8v-wwc9-vgxm\n  * GO-2026-6214 CVE-2026-71557 GHSA-qgq7-7hm3-q39j\n  * GO-2026-6216\n  * GO-2026-6219 CVE-2026-73080 GHSA-87fv-vqqr-m4jr\n  * GO-2026-6220 CVE-2026-48786 GHSA-88p2-jj8w-j8qg\n  * GO-2026-6221 CVE-2026-54917 GHSA-w62w-66v9-vvgv\n  * GO-2026-6223 CVE-2026-54526 GHSA-48p8-g2fx-3wwm\n  * GO-2026-6224 CVE-2026-53469 GHSA-6xvf-9742-48w2\n  * GO-2026-6227 CVE-2026-35511 GHSA-29rf-f4vv-pvq6\n  * GO-2026-6228 CVE-2026-53471 GHSA-2fqw-7c6r-2cq6\n  * GO-2026-6229 CVE-2026-53470 GHSA-v5m8-5455-qw2x\n  * GO-2026-6230 CVE-2026-53657 GHSA-2j9v-p4xj-cjw2\n  * GO-2026-6231 CVE-2026-53476 GHSA-7j4w-x8x8-5mvg\n  * GO-2026-6232 CVE-2026-53475 GHSA-8g5p-jxp9-457c\n  * GO-2026-6233 CVE-2026-53474 GHSA-vf2h-7x3w-97fr\n  * GO-2026-6234 CVE-2026-53658 GHSA-xghw-p77p-3r7x\n  * GO-2026-6237\n  * GO-2026-6238 CVE-2026-10722 GHSA-xhgw-qwwf-pg32\n  * GO-2026-6240 CVE-2026-64859 GHSA-6x2c-phff-wx57\n  * GO-2026-6241 CVE-2026-45099 GHSA-8394-6f8r-whxg\n  * GO-2026-6242 CVE-2026-71479 GHSA-8r8v-xf7q-rcpr\n  * GO-2026-6243 CVE-2026-64865 GHSA-j6gc-4893-qwmp\n  * GO-2026-6244 CVE-2026-64866 GHSA-p845-629j-rcj6\n  * GO-2026-6245 CVE-2026-64868 GHSA-v828-m3pf-vq9q\n  * GO-2026-6246 GHSA-fhgh-wq4q-r37x\n  * GO-2026-6247 CVE-2026-55062 GHSA-m6jg-wr9m-cg2f\n  * GO-2026-6248 CVE-2026-55061 GHSA-qmcq-xw74-w667\n  * GO-2026-6249 CVE-2026-25700 GHSA-4gw2-vg4x-7p29\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260814T162254 2026-08-14T16:22:54Z.\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-5021 CVE-2026-42508 GHSA-5cgq-3rg8-m6cv\n  * GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600\n  * GO-2026-5972 CVE-2026-33818\n  * GO-2026-6088 CVE-2026-56859\n  * GO-2026-6089 CVE-2026-56853\n  * GO-2026-6090 CVE-2026-56862\n  * GO-2026-6091 CVE-2026-56858\n  * GO-2026-6179 CVE-2026-56865\n  * GO-2026-6180 CVE-2026-56864\n  * GO-2026-6218 CVE-2026-56860\n  * GO-2026-6222 CVE-2026-46603\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260811T232133 2026-08-11T23:21:33Z.\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-5005 CVE-2026-39833 GHSA-jppx-rxg9-jmrx\n  * GO-2026-5006 CVE-2026-39832 GHSA-f5wc-c3c7-36mc\n  * GO-2026-5075 CVE-2026-57210 GHSA-38x9-25wx-7fg2\n  * GO-2026-5119 CVE-2026-48119 GHSA-4g6j-g789-rghm\n  * GO-2026-5152 CVE-2026-48491 GHSA-5r4w-85f3-pw66\n  * GO-2026-5274 CVE-2026-40173 GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p\n  * GO-2026-5287 CVE-2026-53622 GHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7\n  * GO-2026-5306 CVE-2026-34179 GHSA-c3h3-89qf-jqm5\n  * GO-2026-5368 CVE-2026-34177 GHSA-fm2x-c5qw-4h6f\n  * GO-2026-5466 CVE-2026-41179 GHSA-jfwf-28xr-xw6q\n  * GO-2026-5516 CVE-2026-41327 GHSA-mrxx-39g5-ph77\n  * GO-2026-5529 CVE-2026-34976 GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw\n  * GO-2026-5532 CVE-2026-41181 GHSA-p6hg-qh38-555r\n  * GO-2026-5576 CVE-2026-34178 GHSA-q96j-3fmm-7fv4\n  * GO-2026-5596 CVE-2026-49980 GHSA-qw24-gh76-8rvv\n  * GO-2026-5668 CVE-2026-41568 GHSA-vp62-88p7-qqf5\n  * GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-04T12:30:23Z","modified":"2026-09-09T18:23:14.573173825Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:42.426393Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2026:23625-1","title":"Security update for govulncheck-vulndb","description":"This update for govulncheck-vulndb fixes the following issues:\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260827T195228 2026-08-27T19:52:28Z (jsc#PED-11136).\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-5026 CVE-2026-39821\n  * GO-2026-6225\n  * GO-2026-6250 CVE-2026-63328 GHSA-8rc5-4fr6-64pw\n  * GO-2026-6253 CVE-2026-17106 GHSA-hfg8-hc9c-6c3h\n  * GO-2026-6254 CVE-2026-53941 GHSA-vjhx-2cqw-3q6q\n  * GO-2026-6255 CVE-2026-61711 GHSA-7236-3392-c5c6\n  * GO-2026-6256 CVE-2026-61712 GHSA-72x6-4j93-7w86\n  * GO-2026-6258 CVE-2026-45404 GHSA-42cj-99w8-cp2p\n  * GO-2026-6259 CVE-2026-32637 GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6\n  * GO-2026-6260 CVE-2026-55149 GHSA-qqff-5854-px68\n  * GO-2026-6261 CVE-2026-54061 GHSA-rrwh-6jrq-wp5v\n  * GO-2026-6262 GHSA-22w5-2fxg-vrwx\n  * GO-2026-6263 CVE-2026-54168 GHSA-6f2p-296r-cc28\n  * GO-2026-6264 CVE-2026-54245 GHSA-7q96-f8xw-jv5j\n  * GO-2026-6265 GHSA-8fxq-53rx-ph5f\n  * GO-2026-6266 CVE-2026-54167 GHSA-f5f4-3hh4-f54m\n  * GO-2026-6267 GHSA-h58c-xccx-75m3\n  * GO-2026-6268 GHSA-q9c5-pp7m-fm2g\n  * GO-2026-6269 GHSA-rxhg-vcww-2mpw\n  * GO-2026-6270 CVE-2026-54162 GHSA-x3g7-qrwc-f6c5\n  * GO-2026-6271 CVE-2026-67448 GHSA-8r62-w5wh-fc5m\n  * GO-2026-6272 CVE-2026-67447 GHSA-r553-m4fv-5v97\n  * GO-2026-6273 CVE-2026-64679 GHSA-26w5-6g95-gj28\n  * GO-2026-6274 CVE-2026-76905 GHSA-mmfr-pmjx-hw9w\n  * GO-2026-6275 CVE-2026-77354 GHSA-xhj3-7xw9-vr34\n  * GO-2026-6277 GHSA-4ph6-mjv7-3fq6\n  * GO-2026-6278 GHSA-w67g-5rqw-f597\n  * GO-2026-6279 CVE-2026-6046 GHSA-3vmp-whvv-5v9v\n  * GO-2026-6280 CVE-2026-7387 GHSA-6hxm-w4hv-vgvw\n  * GO-2026-6281 CVE-2026-6961 GHSA-8qq9-cqj8-82w4\n  * GO-2026-6282 CVE-2026-7184 GHSA-9p44-r552-4wp9\n  * GO-2026-6283 CVE-2026-6689 GHSA-c28q-m4gf-vg4q\n  * GO-2026-6284 CVE-2026-55477 GHSA-jm48-m3rr-9hgg\n  * GO-2026-6285 CVE-2026-6739 GHSA-m2w9-h2mm-79qr\n  * GO-2026-6286 CVE-2026-3433 GHSA-rp4v-qc77-phm4\n  * GO-2026-6287 GHSA-vx2m-jpxr-xv7w\n  * GO-2026-6288 CVE-2026-11624 GHSA-76g7-m3xw-x9gr\n  * GO-2026-6289 GHSA-w8j7-39hp-8x59\n  * GO-2026-6290 CVE-2026-55581 GHSA-3x77-wg38-92r3\n  * GO-2026-6291 CVE-2026-55582 GHSA-74hp-mggr-hv58\n  * GO-2026-6292 CVE-2026-55580 GHSA-f5pj-2738-996m\n  * GO-2026-6293 CVE-2026-55677 GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq\n  * GO-2026-6294 CVE-2026-55092 GHSA-mcj4-mphf-j9ff\n  * GO-2026-6295 CVE-2026-55637 GHSA-cmwv-wf9p-p8wx\n  * GO-2026-6296 CVE-2026-54523 GHSA-79gf-7frw-68m9\n  * GO-2026-6297 CVE-2026-50879 GHSA-g743-m6x3-v6wm\n  * GO-2026-6298 CVE-2026-54563 GHSA-w5fv-7x5q-g8qp\n  * GO-2026-6299 CVE-2026-50884 GHSA-5442-mh7f-72px\n  * GO-2026-6300 CVE-2026-50891 GHSA-rcqf-cpv9-g5jf\n  * GO-2026-6301 CVE-2026-42350 GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260819T170606 2026-08-19T17:06:06Z.\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-4720 GHSA-v3mg-9v85-fcm7\n  * GO-2026-4942 CVE-2026-35172 GHSA-f2g3-hh2r-cwgc\n  * GO-2026-4950\n  * GO-2026-6093 GHSA-464c-974j-9xm6\n  * GO-2026-6094 GHSA-gcjh-h69q-9w9g\n  * GO-2026-6095 GHSA-r277-6w6q-xmqw\n  * GO-2026-6097 CVE-2026-55495 GHSA-49h3-cwhj-4737\n  * GO-2026-6098 CVE-2026-55496 GHSA-8r7f-r8hj-r3rv\n  * GO-2026-6099 CVE-2026-57497 GHSA-g35j-m5xg-vh3q\n  * GO-2026-6100 CVE-2026-55497 GHSA-g9j2-8w95-3vwv\n  * GO-2026-6101 CVE-2026-55502 GHSA-hq88-5x99-x3gf\n  * GO-2026-6102 CVE-2026-55499 GHSA-w8x7-h2px-xmq8\n  * GO-2026-6103 CVE-2026-73564 GHSA-26gq-p25f-99cp\n  * GO-2026-6104 CVE-2026-62323 GHSA-c3jm-gv5r-9wcp\n  * GO-2026-6105 GHSA-c534-2w9c-x7fm\n  * GO-2026-6106 GHSA-v6w6-358x-2433\n  * GO-2026-6107 CVE-2026-73500 GHSA-6vch-q96h-7gc3\n  * GO-2026-6108 CVE-2026-73505 GHSA-6xj8-qv9j-xcjq\n  * GO-2026-6109 GHSA-86cx-wwf4-phq4\n  * GO-2026-6110 CVE-2026-73509 GHSA-95cv-r8x4-vh75\n  * GO-2026-6111 CVE-2026-73506 GHSA-fwjx-9p69-h25h\n  * GO-2026-6112 CVE-2026-73502 GHSA-jpcw-4wr7-c3vq\n  * GO-2026-6113 GHSA-p6ph-3jx2-3337\n  * GO-2026-6114 CVE-2026-73499 GHSA-xg4h-6gfc-h4m8\n  * GO-2026-6115 CVE-2026-56867\n  * GO-2026-6117 GHSA-hp74-gm6m-2qm5\n  * GO-2026-6118 CVE-2026-47427 GHSA-w4q6-qw23-4rg7\n  * GO-2026-6119 CVE-2026-43983 GHSA-w6p7-2fxx-4f44\n  * GO-2026-6120 CVE-2026-54593 GHSA-8r6w-3qq5-4p4r\n  * GO-2026-6121 CVE-2026-54345 GHSA-6r28-9ppf-4hj5\n  * GO-2026-6122 CVE-2026-54332 GHSA-g6v3-7xmc-w563\n  * GO-2026-6123 CVE-2026-49446 GHSA-2rx5-2g7j-2659\n  * GO-2026-6124 CVE-2026-49447 GHSA-5fqm-cc34-fcf5\n  * GO-2026-6125 CVE-2026-11479 GHSA-6h35-9p2w-3j3r\n  * GO-2026-6126 CVE-2026-11465 GHSA-7v3v-cp44-vc8m\n  * GO-2026-6127 CVE-2026-50567 GHSA-q6vm-xqc9-v3ff\n  * GO-2026-6128 CVE-2026-11481 GHSA-q76h-p6jh-9rw3\n  * GO-2026-6129 CVE-2026-50570 GHSA-qf5v-m7p4-95rp\n  * GO-2026-6130 CVE-2026-50568 GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4\n  * GO-2026-6131 CVE-2026-50569 GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw\n  * GO-2026-6132 CVE-2026-62325 GHSA-rjrw-mjq6-hpmm\n  * GO-2026-6133 CVE-2026-54719 GHSA-rmxw-pq4x-3fvh\n  * GO-2026-6134 CVE-2026-66064 GHSA-964w-f6gj-5236\n  * GO-2026-6135 CVE-2026-54650 GHSA-fh2f-xfxc-q9cc\n  * GO-2026-6136 CVE-2026-64863 GHSA-hq33-8jgp-8qq3\n  * GO-2026-6137 CVE-2026-66063 GHSA-wg2q-39h6-66x9\n  * GO-2026-6138 CVE-2026-54638 GHSA-whmm-qj9r-wvr2\n  * GO-2026-6139 CVE-2026-54735 GHSA-4p3g-4hcj-wpvx\n  * GO-2026-6140 CVE-2026-11500 GHSA-jqpm-wf57-qx5c\n  * GO-2026-6141 CVE-2026-54693 GHSA-jq8w-8q2f-ffm9\n  * GO-2026-6142 CVE-2026-54680 GHSA-mjqf-28ph-426h\n  * GO-2026-6143 GHSA-xvg2-cgv6-6h7v\n  * GO-2026-6144 CVE-2026-67439 GHSA-jm28-2wcr-qf3h\n  * GO-2026-6145 CVE-2026-67438 GHSA-xc5w-4v5w-7x65\n  * GO-2026-6146 CVE-2026-67437 GHSA-xpxj-f2fm-rqch\n  * GO-2026-6147 CVE-2026-25688 GHSA-hmr2-99jm-8x45\n  * GO-2026-6148 CVE-2026-25699 GHSA-w754-5646-xq9j\n  * GO-2026-6151 CVE-2026-34033 GHSA-6qwm-5fm9-cvjx\n  * GO-2026-6152 CVE-2026-34905 GHSA-85r2-pvg8-89r9\n  * GO-2026-6153 CVE-2026-33582 GHSA-v553-g2w6-295p\n  * GO-2026-6154 CVE-2026-34031 GHSA-x4f6-mqg6-28xx\n  * GO-2026-6155 CVE-2026-65834 GHSA-68cj-mvg9-rgm2\n  * GO-2026-6156 CVE-2026-52856 GHSA-ghrq-5wpp-hxx5\n  * GO-2026-6157 CVE-2026-65835 GHSA-jr6p-8pjj-mfx6\n  * GO-2026-6158 CVE-2026-52855 GHSA-pfvc-3p5h-x7h6\n  * GO-2026-6159 CVE-2026-52857 GHSA-q6hh-gp44-4hcm\n  * GO-2026-6160 CVE-2026-54725 GHSA-r2v3-8gwf-7ghm\n  * GO-2026-6161 CVE-2026-53551 GHSA-qj55-47fp-p62j\n  * GO-2026-6162 CVE-2026-54787 GHSA-wqqc-jjcq-vfxm\n  * GO-2026-6163 CVE-2026-54909 GHSA-34rh-wp3j-6cxc\n  * GO-2026-6164 CVE-2026-54910 GHSA-vvp7-h4fj-m28w\n  * GO-2026-6165 CVE-2026-54908 GHSA-wg4g-wm44-ch5j\n  * GO-2026-6166 CVE-2026-56868\n  * GO-2026-6168 CVE-2026-56869\n  * GO-2026-6169 CVE-2026-56870\n  * GO-2026-6170 CVE-2026-56871\n  * GO-2026-6171 CVE-2026-56872\n  * GO-2026-6172 CVE-2026-56873\n  * GO-2026-6173 CVE-2026-56874\n  * GO-2026-6181 GHSA-gwfq-86j8-7qhv\n  * GO-2026-6182 CVE-2026-71312 GHSA-2m8m-jhrm-w6j2\n  * GO-2026-6183 GHSA-3x6r-wxxg-53vv\n  * GO-2026-6184 CVE-2026-71309 GHSA-45pq-889g-fcgh\n  * GO-2026-6185 CVE-2026-59732 GHSA-4vr5-p2gc-h23p\n  * GO-2026-6186 CVE-2026-71313 GHSA-7p4m-qxvv-g567\n  * GO-2026-6187 CVE-2026-71311 GHSA-8c48-q9wj-3w37\n  * GO-2026-6188 GHSA-8mxv-9xhp-86h4\n  * GO-2026-6189 GHSA-8v25-v8p6-qf7v\n  * GO-2026-6190 GHSA-945v-v9p3-v5xw\n  * GO-2026-6191 CVE-2026-54572 GHSA-cf44-9pgv-m4xc\n  * GO-2026-6192 CVE-2026-65602 GHSA-42cj-m3vj-89wv\n  * GO-2026-6195 CVE-2026-59733 GHSA-fqj9-69pf-6pjg\n  * GO-2026-6196 GHSA-gx4c-2hqx-cw2r\n  * GO-2026-6197 GHSA-h4mf-4v27-hggj\n  * GO-2026-6198 CVE-2026-65601 GHSA-qq9q-x9w4-chhj\n  * GO-2026-6199 CVE-2026-71310 GHSA-xhf4-832v-7xcr\n  * GO-2026-6201 CVE-2026-71324 GHSA-3ccp-42pg-hgv6\n  * GO-2026-6202 CVE-2026-54764 GHSA-3q9r-p662-5j8m\n  * GO-2026-6203 CVE-2026-71325 GHSA-62fc-8686-hfmq\n  * GO-2026-6204 CVE-2026-71326 GHSA-6765-c87h-8mrf\n  * GO-2026-6205 CVE-2026-54765 GHSA-6p8f-p8j2-rqmv\n  * GO-2026-6207 CVE-2026-67309 GHSA-8rxv-jg7p-wvg3\n  * GO-2026-6208 CVE-2026-65600 GHSA-cxjq-mrr5-89rv\n  * GO-2026-6209 CVE-2026-71327 GHSA-fgjj-px3w-67xx\n  * GO-2026-6211 CVE-2026-54763 GHSA-x677-9fxg-v5c5\n  * GO-2026-6212 CVE-2026-39904 GHSA-42jc-v69j-g38f\n  * GO-2026-6213 CVE-2026-71556 GHSA-hc8v-wwc9-vgxm\n  * GO-2026-6214 CVE-2026-71557 GHSA-qgq7-7hm3-q39j\n  * GO-2026-6216\n  * GO-2026-6219 CVE-2026-73080 GHSA-87fv-vqqr-m4jr\n  * GO-2026-6220 CVE-2026-48786 GHSA-88p2-jj8w-j8qg\n  * GO-2026-6221 CVE-2026-54917 GHSA-w62w-66v9-vvgv\n  * GO-2026-6223 CVE-2026-54526 GHSA-48p8-g2fx-3wwm\n  * GO-2026-6224 CVE-2026-53469 GHSA-6xvf-9742-48w2\n  * GO-2026-6227 CVE-2026-35511 GHSA-29rf-f4vv-pvq6\n  * GO-2026-6228 CVE-2026-53471 GHSA-2fqw-7c6r-2cq6\n  * GO-2026-6229 CVE-2026-53470 GHSA-v5m8-5455-qw2x\n  * GO-2026-6230 CVE-2026-53657 GHSA-2j9v-p4xj-cjw2\n  * GO-2026-6231 CVE-2026-53476 GHSA-7j4w-x8x8-5mvg\n  * GO-2026-6232 CVE-2026-53475 GHSA-8g5p-jxp9-457c\n  * GO-2026-6233 CVE-2026-53474 GHSA-vf2h-7x3w-97fr\n  * GO-2026-6234 CVE-2026-53658 GHSA-xghw-p77p-3r7x\n  * GO-2026-6237\n  * GO-2026-6238 CVE-2026-10722 GHSA-xhgw-qwwf-pg32\n  * GO-2026-6240 CVE-2026-64859 GHSA-6x2c-phff-wx57\n  * GO-2026-6241 CVE-2026-45099 GHSA-8394-6f8r-whxg\n  * GO-2026-6242 CVE-2026-71479 GHSA-8r8v-xf7q-rcpr\n  * GO-2026-6243 CVE-2026-64865 GHSA-j6gc-4893-qwmp\n  * GO-2026-6244 CVE-2026-64866 GHSA-p845-629j-rcj6\n  * GO-2026-6245 CVE-2026-64868 GHSA-v828-m3pf-vq9q\n  * GO-2026-6246 GHSA-fhgh-wq4q-r37x\n  * GO-2026-6247 CVE-2026-55062 GHSA-m6jg-wr9m-cg2f\n  * GO-2026-6248 CVE-2026-55061 GHSA-qmcq-xw74-w667\n  * GO-2026-6249 CVE-2026-25700 GHSA-4gw2-vg4x-7p29\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260814T162254 2026-08-14T16:22:54Z.\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-5021 CVE-2026-42508 GHSA-5cgq-3rg8-m6cv\n  * GO-2026-5942 CVE-2026-46600\n  * GO-2026-5972 CVE-2026-33818\n  * GO-2026-6088 CVE-2026-56859\n  * GO-2026-6089 CVE-2026-56853\n  * GO-2026-6090 CVE-2026-56862\n  * GO-2026-6091 CVE-2026-56858\n  * GO-2026-6179 CVE-2026-56865\n  * GO-2026-6180 CVE-2026-56864\n  * GO-2026-6218 CVE-2026-56860\n  * GO-2026-6222 CVE-2026-46603\n\n- Update to version 0.0.20260811T232133 2026-08-11T23:21:33Z.\n\n  Go CVE Numbering Authority IDs added or updated with aliases:\n\n  * GO-2026-5005 CVE-2026-39833 GHSA-jppx-rxg9-jmrx\n  * GO-2026-5006 CVE-2026-39832 GHSA-f5wc-c3c7-36mc\n  * GO-2026-5075 CVE-2026-57210 GHSA-38x9-25wx-7fg2\n  * GO-2026-5119 CVE-2026-48119 GHSA-4g6j-g789-rghm\n  * GO-2026-5152 CVE-2026-48491 GHSA-5r4w-85f3-pw66\n  * GO-2026-5274 CVE-2026-40173 GHSA-95mq-xwj4-r47p\n  * GO-2026-5287 CVE-2026-53622 GHSA-9cr8-q42q-g8m7\n  * GO-2026-5306 CVE-2026-34179 GHSA-c3h3-89qf-jqm5\n  * GO-2026-5368 CVE-2026-34177 GHSA-fm2x-c5qw-4h6f\n  * GO-2026-5466 CVE-2026-41179 GHSA-jfwf-28xr-xw6q\n  * GO-2026-5516 CVE-2026-41327 GHSA-mrxx-39g5-ph77\n  * GO-2026-5529 CVE-2026-34976 GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw\n  * GO-2026-5532 CVE-2026-41181 GHSA-p6hg-qh38-555r\n  * GO-2026-5576 CVE-2026-34178 GHSA-q96j-3fmm-7fv4\n  * GO-2026-5596 CVE-2026-49980 GHSA-qw24-gh76-8rvv\n  * GO-2026-5668 CVE-2026-41568 GHSA-vp62-88p7-qqf5\n  * GO-2026-5970 CVE-2026-56852\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-04T12:32:03Z","modified":"2026-09-29T18:23:20.110594263Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:54:03.991985Z"}]}}