{"id":"CVE-2026-72889","aliases":["DEBIAN-CVE-2026-72889","EUVD-2026-62347","GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5","MGASA-2026-0365","UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72889","openSUSE-SU-2026:11551-1"],"status":"published","title":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"adp","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00448,"percentile":0.3946,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-347","CWE-757"],"published":"2026-08-19T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-10-29T02:31:07Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","fixed_in":["0.33-1"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.28-4","0.30-1","0.31-1","0.31-2","0.32-1","0.33-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.31-1","0.31-2","0.32-1","0.33-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.33-1"}]}],"versions":["0.31-1","0.31-2","0.32-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Mageia:10","package":"perl-Net-OAuth","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.330.0-1.mga10"}]}],"bundled":4},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Mageia:9","package":"perl-Net-OAuth","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.330.0-1.mga9"}]}],"bundled":4},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:16.04:LTS","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.28-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:18.04:LTS","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.28-2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:20.04:LTS","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.28-3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:22.04:LTS","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.28-3"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:24.04:LTS","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.28-4"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.10","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.31-1","0.33-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Ubuntu:26.04:LTS","package":"libnet-oauth-perl","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"}]}],"versions":["0.31-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openSUSE:Tumbleweed","package":"perl-Net-OAuth","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.330.0-1.1"}]}],"bundled":4}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory","report"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch","tags":["patch","fix","report"]},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes","tags":["release-notes","advisory","report"]},{"url":"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2","tags":["technical-description","article","report"]},{"url":"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3","tags":["technical-description","article","report"]},{"url":"http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://cpan.org/modules","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/72xxx/CVE-2026-72889.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72889","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-72889","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2026-0365.html","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=36145","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/16/3","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-jh72-4qq2-8j6g","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/16/4","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-m2cv-cq5x-47ph","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/3","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-g8xr-69p3-gw56","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2026-72889","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-72889","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://lists.security.metacpan.org/cve-announce/msg/42818761/","tags":["report"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-72887","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-72888","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-72889","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-75589","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-72889","title":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T07:20:09.095Z","modified":"2026-08-26T18:03:05.016Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"adp"}],"cwes":["CWE-347","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:19:51.277563Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-62347","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T07:20:09Z","modified":"2026-08-26T18:03:05Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:30.08255Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-72889","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T08:17:13.833Z","modified":"2026-10-27T12:10:00.343Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-347","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:39.620837Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-72889","title":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T07:20:09.095Z","modified":"2026-10-29T02:31:07.662014973Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-347","CWE-757"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:15.88521Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-72889","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.  verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.  A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T08:17:13.833Z","modified":"2026-10-28T09:47:33.887041975Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:02.499355Z"},{"id":"UBUNTU-CVE-2026-72889","description":"Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify. verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed. A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T08:17:00Z","modified":"2026-10-17T13:00:55.699828408Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":9.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:57:08.628462Z"},{"id":"MGASA-2026-0365","title":"Updated perl-Net-OAuth packages fix security vulnerabilities","description":"Net::OAuth::Client versions before 0.32 for Perl allow the service\nprovider to silently downgrade OAuth 1.0a to OAuth 1.0 in\nget_request_token\nNet::OAuth versions before 0.32 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via\nunbounded caching of failed module loads in smart_require\nNet::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the\nsignature algorithm in verify\nNet::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl check HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256\nand PLAINTEXT signatures with a non-constant-time comparison in verify\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-02T16:59:28Z","modified":"2026-09-02T17:00:05.838567384Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:49:43.795591Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:11551-1","title":"perl-Net-OAuth-0.330.0-1.1 on GA media","description":"These are all security issues fixed in the perl-Net-OAuth-0.330.0-1.1 package on the GA media of openSUSE Tumbleweed.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T00:00:00Z","modified":"2026-08-21T09:15:32.501431927Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:39.516824Z"}]}}