{"id":"CVE-2026-73304","aliases":["EUVD-2026-58527","GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f"],"status":"published","title":"Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users","description":"Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00485,"percentile":0.42088,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-200"],"published":"2026-07-24T21:14:31Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:05Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@budibase/server","fixed_in":["3.39.25"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@budibase/server","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.39.25"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@budibase/server","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.39.25"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"budibase","product":"budibase"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19110","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/80a31f6c3354620aa90e50af8a2c614333084621","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.25","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/7b8ba11a2c8b233c35e7728dd752dba25ef919a4","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/73xxx/CVE-2026-73304.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73304","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/Budibase/budibase","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-73304","title":"Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users","description":"Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T22:05:00.355Z","modified":"2026-08-14T15:09:18.395Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:33.766176Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-58527","description":"Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T22:05:00Z","modified":"2026-08-14T15:09:18Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:54.910263Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f","title":" Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `/api/users/metadata` and `/api/users/metadata/:id` endpoints in `@budibase/server` return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes `oauth2.accessToken` and `oauth2.refreshToken` fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at `packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173`:\n\n```typescript\ndbUser.oauth2 = {\n  ...dbUser.oauth2,\n  ...details,\n}\nawait db.put(dbUser)\n```\n\nThe user metadata endpoints are protected by `PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11`), which maps to the POWER permission set (`packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99`).\n\n**Path 1 — List all users** (`GET /api/users/metadata`):\n1. `controller.fetchMetadata` → `sdk.users.fetchMetadata()` (`packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78`)\n2. → `getGlobalUsers()` → `getRawGlobalUsers()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122`) — strips only `password` and `forceResetPassword`\n3. → `processUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76`) — strips only `password` and `roles`\n4. The `oauth2` field containing `accessToken` and `refreshToken` is **never removed**\n\n**Path 2 — Single user** (`GET /api/users/metadata/:id`):\n1. `controller.findMetadata` → `getFullUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6`)\n2. → `getGlobalUser()` → `getRawGlobalUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92`) — raw CouchDB fetch, **no field stripping at all**\n3. → `processUser()` — strips only `password` and `roles`\n4. Same result: `oauth2` tokens are returned\n\nThere is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app.\n\n**Step 1 — As the POWER user, list all users:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=\u003cpower-user-jwt\u003e' \\\n  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_\u003cappid\u003e' | jq '.[].oauth2'\n```\n\n**Expected output:** `null` for all users (tokens should not be exposed)\n\n**Actual output:** For SSO users, the response includes:\n```json\n{\n  \"accessToken\": \"ya29.a0ARrdaM...\",\n  \"refreshToken\": \"1//0eXxXxXxXx...\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Fetch a specific SSO user's profile:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_\u003csso-user-id\u003e' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=\u003cpower-user-jwt\u003e' \\\n  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_\u003cappid\u003e' | jq '.oauth2'\n```\n\nThis also returns the full OAuth2 tokens.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A user with POWER role in any app can read **all SSO users' OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens** via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs.\n- Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user.\n- Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires.\n- Additionally, `admin`, `builder`, `tenantId`, `ssoId`, and `userGroups` fields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nStrip sensitive SSO fields in `processUser()` at `packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15`:\n\n```typescript\nexport async function processUser(\n  user: ContextUser,\n  opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {}\n) {\n  if (!user || (!user.roles \u0026\u0026 !user.userGroups)) {\n    return user\n  }\n  user = cloneDeep(user)\n  delete user.password\n+ delete (user as any).oauth2\n+ delete (user as any).provider\n+ delete (user as any).providerType\n+ delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile\n+ delete (user as any).profile\n+ delete (user as any).ssoId\n+ delete (user as any).forceResetPassword\n  // ... rest of function\n```\n\nAdditionally, `getRawGlobalUsers()` at line 101 should also strip `oauth2` alongside its existing `password`/`forceResetPassword` stripping for defense in depth.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T21:14:31Z","modified":"2026-08-12T18:57:13Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:58.888637Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-73304","description":"Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T22:17:25.5Z","modified":"2026-09-08T20:56:50.52Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:37.557758Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-73304","title":"Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users","description":"Budibase is an open-source low-code platform. Prior to 3.39.25, GET /api/users/metadata and GET /api/users/metadata/:id returned user objects processed by packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts without removing oauth2.accessToken or oauth2.refreshToken. A user with the POWER role could retrieve the identity-provider credentials of SSO-authenticated users and use the refresh tokens for persistent access to connected services. This issue is fixed in version 3.39.25.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-13T22:05:00.355Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:05.668133178Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:16.365946Z"},{"id":"GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f","title":" Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users","description":"## Summary\n\nThe `/api/users/metadata` and `/api/users/metadata/:id` endpoints in `@budibase/server` return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes `oauth2.accessToken` and `oauth2.refreshToken` fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at `packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173`:\n\n```typescript\ndbUser.oauth2 = {\n  ...dbUser.oauth2,\n  ...details,\n}\nawait db.put(dbUser)\n```\n\nThe user metadata endpoints are protected by `PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11`), which maps to the POWER permission set (`packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99`).\n\n**Path 1 — List all users** (`GET /api/users/metadata`):\n1. `controller.fetchMetadata` → `sdk.users.fetchMetadata()` (`packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78`)\n2. → `getGlobalUsers()` → `getRawGlobalUsers()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122`) — strips only `password` and `forceResetPassword`\n3. → `processUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76`) — strips only `password` and `roles`\n4. The `oauth2` field containing `accessToken` and `refreshToken` is **never removed**\n\n**Path 2 — Single user** (`GET /api/users/metadata/:id`):\n1. `controller.findMetadata` → `getFullUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6`)\n2. → `getGlobalUser()` → `getRawGlobalUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92`) — raw CouchDB fetch, **no field stripping at all**\n3. → `processUser()` — strips only `password` and `roles`\n4. Same result: `oauth2` tokens are returned\n\nThere is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app.\n\n**Step 1 — As the POWER user, list all users:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=\u003cpower-user-jwt\u003e' \\\n  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_\u003cappid\u003e' | jq '.[].oauth2'\n```\n\n**Expected output:** `null` for all users (tokens should not be exposed)\n\n**Actual output:** For SSO users, the response includes:\n```json\n{\n  \"accessToken\": \"ya29.a0ARrdaM...\",\n  \"refreshToken\": \"1//0eXxXxXxXx...\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2 — Fetch a specific SSO user's profile:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_\u003csso-user-id\u003e' \\\n  -H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=\u003cpower-user-jwt\u003e' \\\n  -H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_\u003cappid\u003e' | jq '.oauth2'\n```\n\nThis also returns the full OAuth2 tokens.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A user with POWER role in any app can read **all SSO users' OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens** via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs.\n- Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user.\n- Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires.\n- Additionally, `admin`, `builder`, `tenantId`, `ssoId`, and `userGroups` fields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nStrip sensitive SSO fields in `processUser()` at `packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15`:\n\n```typescript\nexport async function processUser(\n  user: ContextUser,\n  opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {}\n) {\n  if (!user || (!user.roles \u0026\u0026 !user.userGroups)) {\n    return user\n  }\n  user = cloneDeep(user)\n  delete user.password\n+ delete (user as any).oauth2\n+ delete (user as any).provider\n+ delete (user as any).providerType\n+ delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile\n+ delete (user as any).profile\n+ delete (user as any).ssoId\n+ delete (user as any).forceResetPassword\n  // ... rest of function\n```\n\nAdditionally, `getRawGlobalUsers()` at line 101 should also strip `oauth2` alongside its existing `password`/`forceResetPassword` stripping for defense in depth.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-24T21:14:31Z","modified":"2026-08-15T05:20:18.532413055Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":4.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:46.39441Z"}]}}