{"id":"CVE-2026-73419","aliases":["EUVD-2026-57601","GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279"],"status":"published","title":"NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them","description":"NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00249,"percentile":0.16378,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-346","CWE-940"],"published":"2026-07-23T14:31:51Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:13Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"@auth/core","fixed_in":["0.41.3"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-auth","fixed_in":["5.0.0-beta.32","4.24.15"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@auth/core","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"0.41.2"},{"fixed":"0.41.3"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-auth","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0-beta.1"},{"last_affected":"5.0.0-beta.31"},{"fixed":"5.0.0-beta.32"}]}]},{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-auth","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"4.24.14"},{"fixed":"4.24.15"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"@auth/core","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.41.3"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-auth","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"5.0.0-beta.1"},{"fixed":"5.0.0-beta.32"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"npm","package":"next-auth","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"4.24.15"}]}]}],"products":[{"vendor":"@auth","product":"core"},{"vendor":"nextauthjs","product":"next-auth"},{"vendor":"opnsense","product":"core"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/pull/13469","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/5bca2399a79ba8d116ca5179b4b1ebcd152e7f05","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/9f7a97fade9b1319bb9ac19fc9828d62e0a2a852","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/core@0.41.3","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@4.24.15","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73419","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/73xxx/CVE-2026-73419.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-73419","title":"NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them","description":"NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T20:23:39.174Z","modified":"2026-08-13T15:32:15.689Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-346","CWE-940"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:43:33.766176Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-57601","description":"NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T20:23:39Z","modified":"2026-08-13T15:32:15Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:56.066325Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279","title":"Auth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them","description":"## Summary\n\nAuth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (`state`, `nonce`, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim's user.\n\n## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if **all** of the following hold:\n\n- You use `next-auth` `\u003c= 4.24.14` or `\u003e= 5.0.0-beta.1, \u003c= 5.0.0-beta.31`, or `@auth/core` `\u003c= 0.41.2`.\n- You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers.\n- You allow users to link additional providers while logged in.\n- At least one configured provider's authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider's callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on `state` or only on `nonce`).\n\nYou are **not** affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim's Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account through that linked provider.\n- Exploitation requires luring the victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow; it cannot be performed by cross-site request forgery alone, which reduces practical likelihood.\n\n## Patched version\n\nThe fix binds the OAuth check cookies to the provider/authorization flow that created them, so a callback cannot consume a check value minted for a different provider. Upgrade to the first releases containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with exact patched versions before publication).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Enable PKCE (`checks: [\"pkce\"]`, in addition to `state`/`nonce`) on every provider that supports it; PKCE blocks the practical code-swap variant because the attacker cannot observe the relying party's verifier.\n- Avoid offering logged-in account linking across multiple providers where one provider is lower-trust or attacker-observable.\n- Treat `events.linkAccount` as sensitive: add audit logging, user notification, or out-of-band confirmation so that any unexpected link is visible (defense-in-depth, not a root-cause fix).\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @Nadav0077. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-23T14:31:51Z","modified":"2026-08-13T19:05:32Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-346","CWE-940"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:01.23108Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-73419","description":"NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T21:17:41.033Z","modified":"2026-09-09T20:58:37.713Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-346","CWE-940"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:37.217486Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-73419","title":"NextAuth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them","description":"NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to@auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, Auth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks state, nonce, and the PKCE verifier in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity, including the provider ID, issuer, client ID, or redirect URI. In a multi-provider application that permits account linking while logged in, when one provider's authorization request is observable and a target provider callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier, an attacker can lure a victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow and link the attacker's target-provider account to the victim's Auth.js user. The linked provider grants the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account, while cross-site request forgery alone is insufficient. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-12T20:23:39.174Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:13.492648167Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-346","CWE-940"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:16.365946Z"},{"id":"GHSA-x445-f3h2-j279","title":"Auth.js: OAuth state, nonce, and PKCE check cookies are not bound to the provider that created them","description":"## Summary\n\nAuth.js stores the OAuth/OIDC anti-CSRF checks (`state`, `nonce`, and the PKCE verifier) in global cookies that are not bound to the provider that created them. On callback, a check value minted during a sign-in started with one provider can satisfy the callback for a different provider, because the stored cookie is not verified against the callback provider's identity (provider id, issuer, client id, or redirect URI). In a multi-provider app that allows account linking while logged in, this provider-confusion / mix-up condition can let an attacker link their account at a second provider to a victim's user.\n\n## Am I affected?\n\nYou may be affected if **all** of the following hold:\n\n- You use `next-auth` `\u003c= 4.24.14` or `\u003e= 5.0.0-beta.1, \u003c= 5.0.0-beta.31`, or `@auth/core` `\u003c= 0.41.2`.\n- You configure multiple OAuth/OIDC providers.\n- You allow users to link additional providers while logged in.\n- At least one configured provider's authorization request is observable by an attacker, and at least one target provider's callback can be satisfied without a PKCE verifier (i.e. it relies only on `state` or only on `nonce`).\n\nYou are **not** affected if you use a single OAuth provider, do not allow logged-in account linking, or all providers enforce PKCE.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Account-linking confusion: an attacker can get their account at a target provider linked to the victim's Auth.js user, granting the attacker persistent sign-in to the victim's account through that linked provider.\n- Exploitation requires luring the victim into starting a legitimate same-origin flow; it cannot be performed by cross-site request forgery alone, which reduces practical likelihood.\n\n## Patched version\n\nThe fix binds the OAuth check cookies to the provider/authorization flow that created them, so a callback cannot consume a check value minted for a different provider. Upgrade to the first releases containing this fix (pending; this advisory will be updated with exact patched versions before publication).\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n- Enable PKCE (`checks: [\"pkce\"]`, in addition to `state`/`nonce`) on every provider that supports it; PKCE blocks the practical code-swap variant because the attacker cannot observe the relying party's verifier.\n- Avoid offering logged-in account linking across multiple providers where one provider is lower-trust or attacker-observable.\n- Treat `events.linkAccount` as sensitive: add audit logging, user notification, or out-of-band confirmation so that any unexpected link is visible (defense-in-depth, not a root-cause fix).\n\n## Credit\n\nReported by @Nadav0077. Thank you for the responsible disclosure.","status":"published","published":"2026-07-23T14:31:51Z","modified":"2026-09-10T03:50:53.095011411Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-345","CWE-346","CWE-940"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:59.484835Z"}]}}