{"id":"CVE-2026-75084","aliases":["EUVD-2026-101341","GHSA-pgg5-wwxw-vmj8"],"status":"published","title":"Out-of-bounds write in the TI CC1200 IEEE 802.15.4 driver from an unvalidated radio-supplied packet length","description":"The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-12","score":0.00286,"percentile":0.21361,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-787"],"published":"2026-10-14T16:46:01Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:19:00Z","products":[{"vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr"},{"vendor":"zephyrproject-rtos","product":"zephyr"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/26a8b8294bf28523c7aa2f15cf728517980ee593","tags":["patch","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-pgg5-wwxw-vmj8","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/75xxx/CVE-2026-75084.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75084","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-75084","title":"Out-of-bounds write in the TI CC1200 IEEE 802.15.4 driver from an unvalidated radio-supplied packet length","description":"The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T16:46:01.701Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:01:06.611Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-787"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T06:53:01.479776Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-101341","description":"The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T16:46:01Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:01:06Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T07:00:56.104537Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-75084","description":"The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T17:19:10.457Z","modified":"2026-11-04T05:19:00.677Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-787"],"updated_at":"2026-11-04T06:53:25.251493Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-75084","title":"Out-of-bounds write in the TI CC1200 IEEE 802.15.4 driver from an unvalidated radio-supplied packet length","description":"The CC1200 sub-GHz IEEE 802.15.4 driver takes the PHY packet length from the first byte of the radio's RX FIFO in get_packet_length() and validates it in verify_rxfifo_validity() (drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_cc1200.c). That validation only enforced a lower bound (pkt_len \u003c 3); its second clause rejects a FIFO that holds more bytes than declared and therefore never bounds large values. Because the driver configures the radio for variable packet length with PKT_LEN = 0xFF, the length byte is an over-the-air value of 0-255 that reached net_pkt_rx_alloc_with_buffer() and the subsequent SPI burst read unclamped.\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker within radio range can transmit a frame that presents a length byte above the IEEE 802.15.4 maximum of 127 while the chip's 128-byte RX FIFO has not overflowed, so the driver's RX_FIFO_ERROR pre-check does not fire. Reaching this state depends on RF framing and timing, since the RX thread is driven off the PKT_SYNC_RXTX signal and may sample the FIFO before a packet is complete; no pairing, authentication, or user interaction is required.\n\nWith the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE and CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE=128, an allocation larger than one fragment is satisfied by a chain of fragments, but read_rxfifo_content() performs a single SPI burst of pkt_len bytes into the first fragment's buf-\u003edata and then calls net_buf_add() with the same length. A length above 128 therefore writes up to 127 bytes past the end of a fragment in the contiguous rx_bufs pool and leaves a net_buf whose len exceeds its capacity. The overflowing bytes are FIFO-underflow output rather than attacker-chosen data, so the practical impact is network-buffer-pool corruption and crashes rather than a controlled write. Only builds that enable CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC1200 with an attached CC1200 radio are affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-14T16:46:01.701Z","modified":"2026-11-05T13:08:36.541230893Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":6.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-787"],"updated_at":"2026-11-05T13:30:00.949926Z"}]}}