{"id":"CVE-2026-76237","aliases":["EUVD-2026-62477","GHSA-w2cf-363h-rwff","GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r"],"status":"published","title":"stigmem before 0.9.0a12 Cross-Tenant BOLA via quarantine","description":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00364,"percentile":0.30506,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-863"],"published":"2026-06-19T21:43:00Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:27Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stigmem-node","fixed_in":["0.9.0a12"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stigmem-node","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.0a12"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"stigmem-node","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.9.0a12"}]}],"versions":["0.9.0a1","0.9.0a10","0.9.0a11","0.9.0a2","0.9.0a3","0.9.0a4","0.9.0a5","0.9.0a6","0.9.0a7","0.9.0a8","0.9.0a9"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"eidetic-labs","product":"stigmem-node"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/security/advisories/GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r","tags":["vendor-advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/stigmem-before-0a12-cross-tenant-bola-via-quarantine","tags":["third-party-advisory","advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76237","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w2cf-363h-rwff"},{"url":"https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem/pull/728","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r"},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/76xxx/CVE-2026-76237.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/eidetic-labs/stigmem","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-76237","title":"stigmem before 0.9.0a12 Cross-Tenant BOLA via quarantine","description":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:02:15.899Z","modified":"2026-08-21T11:21:09.073Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:21.568011Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-62477","description":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:02:15Z","modified":"2026-08-21T11:21:09Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:01:37.96401Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-w2cf-363h-rwff","title":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA)...","description":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T15:32:36Z","modified":"2026-08-19T15:32:46Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:39.892418Z"},{"id":"GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r","title":"stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants' quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)","description":"### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and **admit or reject** quarantined facts belonging to **other** tenants. The list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact` in `routes/quarantine.py` lacked an `f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the `/v1/quarantine` list and admit/reject endpoints.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a plain tenant `write` capability rather than a node-level admin authority.\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` was added to the list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact`; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind `can_admin_federation()` (node superadmin), not a tenant `write` capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A's quarantined facts.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-19T21:43:00Z","modified":"2026-06-19T21:43:01Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:40:31.656952Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-76237","description":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:17:55.84Z","modified":"2026-09-24T20:06:30.133Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:39.962615Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-76237","title":"stigmem before 0.9.0a12 Cross-Tenant BOLA via quarantine","description":"stigmem-node before 0.9.0a12 contains a broken object level authorization (cross-tenant BOLA) vulnerability in the quarantine review endpoints. On multi-tenant deployments running the opt-in stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant, the list/count queries and _get_quarantined_fact in routes/quarantine.py lacked a tenant_id predicate and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped, allowing a tenant administrator with only a plain tenant write capability to list, read, and admit or reject quarantined facts belonging to other tenants via the /v1/quarantine endpoints. Default single-tenant deployments are not affected.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-19T14:02:15.899Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:27.464302241Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:17.102988Z"},{"id":"GHSA-xhv3-q4xx-349r","title":"stistigmem-node: quarantine review surface exposes and mutates other tenants' quarantined facts (cross-tenant BOLA)","description":"### Summary\nOn a multi-tenant stigmem node, a tenant administrator could list, read, and **admit or reject** quarantined facts belonging to **other** tenants. The list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact` in `routes/quarantine.py` lacked an `f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` predicate, and the garden lookup was not tenant-scoped — reached via the `/v1/quarantine` list and admit/reject endpoints.\n\n### Impact\nCross-tenant confidentiality (reading another tenant's quarantined content) and cross-tenant integrity (moderating — admitting or rejecting — another tenant's facts), gated only by a plain tenant `write` capability rather than a node-level admin authority.\n\n### Affected configurations\nThis is a cross-**tenant** break. It is exploitable **only** on deployments running the opt-in `stigmem-plugin-multi-tenant` (multiple tenants on one node). A default single-tenant node has only `tenant=\"default\"` — there is no second tenant to cross — so it is **not exploitable** on default deployments. The rating is HIGH for the multi-tenant deployments the plugin exists to isolate.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `0.9.0a12` (PR #728): `AND f.tenant_id = identity.tenant_id` was added to the list/count queries and `_get_quarantined_fact`; the garden lookup is now tenant-scoped; and any genuinely cross-tenant moderation is gated behind `can_admin_federation()` (node superadmin), not a tenant `write` capability. A tenant-B admin can no longer list, admit, or reject tenant-A's quarantined facts.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone other than upgrading to `0.9.0a12`. Single-tenant deployments are unaffected.","status":"published","published":"2026-06-19T21:43:00Z","modified":"2026-08-20T04:04:12.294857332Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-639","CWE-863"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:47:00.198893Z"}]}}