{"id":"CVE-2026-76898","aliases":["EUVD-2026-84009","GHSA-m3q9-cwfq-hcjc"],"status":"published","title":"draw.io: Unauthenticated SSRF via IPv6 ULA blocklist bypass in /embed2.js","description":"draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.3.8, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java checks IPv6 Unique Local Addresses in Utils.sanitizeUrl() by comparing the text prefixes fc00:: and fd00::, but the JDK returns the expanded address form, so the fc00::/7 range, including the AWS metadata range fd00:ec2::/32, is not blocked. An unauthenticated request to /embed2.js?fetch= can therefore make src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/EmbedServlet2.java fetch an IPv6 ULA internal resource and reflect the response to the requester. Utils.validatedAddress() uses the same private-address check for the separate ProxyServlet path, which requires ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1. The primary /embed2.js path requires no proxy feature flag or DNS rebinding, and it can disclose cloud metadata credentials or data from other IPv6-reachable internal services. This issue is fixed in version 30.3.8.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00351,"percentile":0.28948,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-09-21T16:31:54Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:17:51Z","products":[{"vendor":"jgraph","product":"drawio"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/security/advisories/GHSA-m3q9-cwfq-hcjc","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/commit/73c4a91196246bbdb60f52b15871e82006b7972d","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","fix"]},{"url":"https://github.com/jgraph/drawio/releases/tag/v30.3.8","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/76xxx/CVE-2026-76898.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76898","tags":["advisory"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-76898","title":"draw.io: Unauthenticated SSRF via IPv6 ULA blocklist bypass in /embed2.js","description":"draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.3.8, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java checks IPv6 Unique Local Addresses in Utils.sanitizeUrl() by comparing the text prefixes fc00:: and fd00::, but the JDK returns the expanded address form, so the fc00::/7 range, including the AWS metadata range fd00:ec2::/32, is not blocked. An unauthenticated request to /embed2.js?fetch= can therefore make src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/EmbedServlet2.java fetch an IPv6 ULA internal resource and reflect the response to the requester. Utils.validatedAddress() uses the same private-address check for the separate ProxyServlet path, which requires ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1. The primary /embed2.js path requires no proxy feature flag or DNS rebinding, and it can disclose cloud metadata credentials or data from other IPv6-reachable internal services. This issue is fixed in version 30.3.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T16:31:54.813Z","modified":"2026-09-24T22:21:52.041Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:46:21.568011Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-84009","description":"draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.3.8, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java checks IPv6 Unique Local Addresses in Utils.sanitizeUrl() by comparing the text prefixes fc00:: and fd00::, but the JDK returns the expanded address form, so the fc00::/7 range, including the AWS metadata range fd00:ec2::/32, is not blocked. An unauthenticated request to /embed2.js?fetch= can therefore make src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/EmbedServlet2.java fetch an IPv6 ULA internal resource and reflect the response to the requester. Utils.validatedAddress() uses the same private-address check for the separate ProxyServlet path, which requires ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1. The primary /embed2.js path requires no proxy feature flag or DNS rebinding, and it can disclose cloud metadata credentials or data from other IPv6-reachable internal services. This issue is fixed in version 30.3.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T16:31:54Z","modified":"2026-09-24T22:21:52Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:56.296478Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-76898","description":"draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.3.8, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java checks IPv6 Unique Local Addresses in Utils.sanitizeUrl() by comparing the text prefixes fc00:: and fd00::, but the JDK returns the expanded address form, so the fc00::/7 range, including the AWS metadata range fd00:ec2::/32, is not blocked. An unauthenticated request to /embed2.js?fetch= can therefore make src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/EmbedServlet2.java fetch an IPv6 ULA internal resource and reflect the response to the requester. Utils.validatedAddress() uses the same private-address check for the separate ProxyServlet path, which requires ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1. The primary /embed2.js path requires no proxy feature flag or DNS rebinding, and it can disclose cloud metadata credentials or data from other IPv6-reachable internal services. This issue is fixed in version 30.3.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T17:18:50.35Z","modified":"2026-09-24T23:18:58.51Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:50.368368Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-76898","title":"draw.io: Unauthenticated SSRF via IPv6 ULA blocklist bypass in /embed2.js","description":"draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.3.8, src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java checks IPv6 Unique Local Addresses in Utils.sanitizeUrl() by comparing the text prefixes fc00:: and fd00::, but the JDK returns the expanded address form, so the fc00::/7 range, including the AWS metadata range fd00:ec2::/32, is not blocked. An unauthenticated request to /embed2.js?fetch= can therefore make src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/EmbedServlet2.java fetch an IPv6 ULA internal resource and reflect the response to the requester. Utils.validatedAddress() uses the same private-address check for the separate ProxyServlet path, which requires ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1. The primary /embed2.js path requires no proxy feature flag or DNS rebinding, and it can disclose cloud metadata credentials or data from other IPv6-reachable internal services. This issue is fixed in version 30.3.8.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-21T16:31:54.813Z","modified":"2026-10-28T11:17:51.213543507Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:17.102988Z"}]}}