{"id":"CVE-2026-7693","aliases":["EUVD-2026-53182","GHSA-982q-x59v-3xjj"],"status":"published","title":"Backup Migration \u003c= 2.1.5.1 - Authenticated (Administrator+) OS Command Injection via 'file' Parameter","description":"The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore \u003cfile\u003e \u003cremote\u003e` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-08","score":0.02954,"percentile":0.87271,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-77"],"published":"2026-08-05T06:37:59Z","modified":"2026-08-12T21:00:37Z","products":[{"vendor":"inisev","product":"backup migration"},{"vendor":"unknown","product":"backup migration"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/af6a7052-6dab-42f0-a2af-0cf459d309d7?source=cve"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backup-backup/trunk/includes/ajax.php#L3025"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backup-backup/tags/2.1.5.1/includes/ajax.php#L3025"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backup-backup/tags/2.1.5.1/includes/ajax.php#L3019"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backup-backup/tags/2.1.5.1/includes/ajax.php#L3422"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backup-backup/tags/2.1.5.1/includes/ajax.php#L3444"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/backup-backup/tags/2.1.5.1/includes/initializer.php#L136"},{"url":"https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?new=3540041%40backup-backup%2Ftags%2F2.1.5.2\u0026old=3512153%40backup-backup%2Ftags%2F2.1.5.1"},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-7693"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-982q-x59v-3xjj"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-7693","title":"Backup Migration \u003c= 2.1.5.1 - Authenticated (Administrator+) OS Command Injection via 'file' Parameter","description":"The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore \u003cfile\u003e \u003cremote\u003e` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T06:37:59.818Z","modified":"2026-08-05T15:59:28.888Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:06.216584Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-53182","description":"The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore \u003cfile\u003e \u003cremote\u003e` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T06:37:59Z","modified":"2026-08-05T15:59:28Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T18:02:09.87889Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-982q-x59v-3xjj","title":"The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions...","description":"The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore \u003cfile\u003e \u003cremote\u003e` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T09:31:19Z","modified":"2026-08-05T09:31:27Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:06.632203Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-7693","description":"The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore \u003cfile\u003e \u003cremote\u003e` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin's `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST['url']` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-05T08:16:44.703Z","modified":"2026-08-12T21:00:37.147Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.2,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-77"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:35.031043Z"}]}}