{"id":"CVE-2026-77265","aliases":["EUVD-2026-84606","GHSA-49xv-9743-pw8w","PYSEC-2026-4083"],"status":"published","title":"MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow","description":"MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, header-supplied Jira or Confluence URLs are resolved and validated before the HTTP client resolves the hostname again for the connection. An unauthenticated caller can use a DNS-rebinding hostname that returns a public address during validation and an internal address during connection, causing requests to internal or metadata services. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through X-Atlassian-Jira-Url, X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url, validate_url_for_ssrf, and DNS rebinding, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.","severity":{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-09","score":0.00291,"percentile":0.21829,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-918"],"published":"2026-09-22T17:47:58Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:03Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"mcp-atlassian","fixed_in":["0.22.0"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"mcp-atlassian","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.22.0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"mcp-atlassian","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.22.0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.1","0.1.10","0.1.11","0.1.12","0.1.13","0.1.14","0.1.15","0.1.16","0.1.2","0.1.3","0.1.4","0.1.6","0.1.7","0.1.8","0.1.9","0.10.0","0.10.1","0.10.2","0.10.3","0.10.4","0.10.5","0.10.6","0.11.0","0.11.1","0.11.10","0.11.11","0.11.12","0.11.2","0.11.2a2","0.11.3","0.11.4","0.11.5","0.11.6","0.11.7","0.11.8","0.11.9","0.12.0","0.13.0","0.13.1","0.14.0","0.14.1","0.14.2","0.14.3","0.15.0","0.16.0","0.16.1","0.17.0","0.18.0","0.18.1","0.19.0","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.2.6","0.20.0","0.20.1","0.21.0","0.21.1","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.4.0","0.5.0","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.6.3","0.6.4","0.6.5","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.9.0"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"mcp-atlassian","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.22.0"}]}],"versions":["0.1.1","0.1.10","0.1.11","0.1.12","0.1.13","0.1.14","0.1.15","0.1.16","0.1.2","0.1.3","0.1.4","0.1.6","0.1.7","0.1.8","0.1.9","0.10.0","0.10.1","0.10.2","0.10.3","0.10.4","0.10.5","0.10.6","0.11.0","0.11.1","0.11.10","0.11.11","0.11.12","0.11.2","0.11.2a2","0.11.3","0.11.4","0.11.5","0.11.6","0.11.7","0.11.8","0.11.9","0.12.0","0.13.0","0.13.1","0.14.0","0.14.1","0.14.2","0.14.3","0.15.0","0.16.0","0.16.1","0.17.0","0.18.0","0.18.1","0.19.0","0.2.0","0.2.1","0.2.2","0.2.3","0.2.4","0.2.5","0.2.6","0.20.0","0.20.1","0.21.0","0.21.1","0.3.0","0.3.1","0.4.0","0.5.0","0.6.0","0.6.1","0.6.2","0.6.3","0.6.4","0.6.5","0.7.0","0.7.1","0.8.0","0.8.1","0.8.2","0.8.3","0.8.4","0.9.0"]}],"products":[{"vendor":"mcp-atlassian","product":"mcp_atlassian"},{"vendor":"sooperset","product":"mcp-atlassian"}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-49xv-9743-pw8w","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM","exploit","Exploit","Vendor Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Issue Tracking","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Patch","fix","web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0","tags":["x_refsource_MISC","Release Notes","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77265","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-49xv-9743-pw8w","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/77xxx/CVE-2026-77265.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://pypi.org/project/mcp-atlassian","tags":["package"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-77265","title":"MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow","description":"MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, header-supplied Jira or Confluence URLs are resolved and validated before the HTTP client resolves the hostname again for the connection. An unauthenticated caller can use a DNS-rebinding hostname that returns a public address during validation and an internal address during connection, causing requests to internal or metadata services. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through X-Atlassian-Jira-Url, X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url, validate_url_for_ssrf, and DNS rebinding, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T17:47:58.553Z","modified":"2026-09-28T17:46:45.112Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:15.712761Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-84606","description":"MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, header-supplied Jira or Confluence URLs are resolved and validated before the HTTP client resolves the hostname again for the connection. An unauthenticated caller can use a DNS-rebinding hostname that returns a public address during validation and an internal address during connection, causing requests to internal or metadata services. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through X-Atlassian-Jira-Url, X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url, validate_url_for_ssrf, and DNS rebinding, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T17:47:58Z","modified":"2026-09-28T17:46:45Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:53.091489Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-49xv-9743-pw8w","title":"MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow","description":"## Summary\n\nThe SSRF protection for header-based authentication uses a validate-then-use pattern vulnerable to DNS rebinding. validate_url_for_ssrf resolves the hostname via DNS and checks that the resolved IP is globally routable. However, the actual HTTP request happens later, during which the DNS record may have changed to point to an internal IP (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.). The SSRF redirect hook only validates redirect targets, not the initial connection.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans main.py (validation) and dependencies.py (use).\n\n**Step 1 -- URL validation at middleware time:**\n\nIn src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:524-531, the URL from X-Atlassian-Jira-Url is validated:\n\n    if jira_url_str:\n        ssrf_error = validate_url_for_ssrf(jira_url_str)\n        if ssrf_error:\n            # blocked\n\nvalidate_url_for_ssrf (src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py:113-116) resolves DNS and checks is_global:\n\n    dns_error = _check_dns_resolution(hostname)\n    if dns_error:\n        return dns_error\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP request happens later with a separate DNS resolution:**\n\nIn src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:544-562, a JiraFetcher is created with the attacker URL and makes HTTP requests to it. The SSRF redirect hook (attach_ssrf_hook=True) is applied but only checks redirect Location headers, not the initial connection target.\n\n**DNS rebinding timeline:**\n\n1. Attacker sets up rebind.attacker.com with short TTL (1 second)\n2. First DNS resolution (validate_url_for_ssrf): returns 1.2.3.4 (public) -- passes\n3. TTL expires\n4. Second DNS resolution (requests.get): returns 169.254.169.254 (metadata)\n5. HTTP request reaches internal IP, bypassing the SSRF check\n\n## PoC\n\nUse a DNS rebinding service like rbndr.us. Send a request with X-Atlassian-Jira-Url set to a rebinding hostname (e.g., rebind-169.254.169.254-1.2.3.4.rbndr.us) and X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token set to any value. With approximately 50% probability per attempt, the request reaches the internal metadata service.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access**: Steal IAM credentials via 169.254.169.254\n- **Internal network scanning**: Proxy requests to internal services\n- **AC:H**: DNS rebinding is probabilistic and requires multiple attempts\n- **Limited to header_pat branch**: Only affects deployments accepting header-based PAT authentication\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nPin DNS resolution: resolve the hostname once during validation, then connect to the resolved IP directly (with the original hostname in the Host header). This eliminates the TOCTOU gap between validation and use.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T20:35:08Z","modified":"2026-09-22T20:35:10Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:19.455935Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-77265","description":"MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, header-supplied Jira or Confluence URLs are resolved and validated before the HTTP client resolves the hostname again for the connection. An unauthenticated caller can use a DNS-rebinding hostname that returns a public address during validation and an internal address during connection, causing requests to internal or metadata services. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through X-Atlassian-Jira-Url, X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url, validate_url_for_ssrf, and DNS rebinding, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T18:17:18.647Z","modified":"2026-09-29T19:00:07.85Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:50.368368Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"CVE-2026-77265","title":"MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow","description":"MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, header-supplied Jira or Confluence URLs are resolved and validated before the HTTP client resolves the hostname again for the connection. An unauthenticated caller can use a DNS-rebinding hostname that returns a public address during validation and an internal address during connection, causing requests to internal or metadata services. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through X-Atlassian-Jira-Url, X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url, validate_url_for_ssrf, and DNS rebinding, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T17:47:58.553Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:31:03.662690637Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:17.102988Z"},{"id":"GHSA-49xv-9743-pw8w","title":"MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow","description":"## Summary\n\nThe SSRF protection for header-based authentication uses a validate-then-use pattern vulnerable to DNS rebinding. validate_url_for_ssrf resolves the hostname via DNS and checks that the resolved IP is globally routable. However, the actual HTTP request happens later, during which the DNS record may have changed to point to an internal IP (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.). The SSRF redirect hook only validates redirect targets, not the initial connection.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans main.py (validation) and dependencies.py (use).\n\n**Step 1 -- URL validation at middleware time:**\n\nIn src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:524-531, the URL from X-Atlassian-Jira-Url is validated:\n\n    if jira_url_str:\n        ssrf_error = validate_url_for_ssrf(jira_url_str)\n        if ssrf_error:\n            # blocked\n\nvalidate_url_for_ssrf (src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py:113-116) resolves DNS and checks is_global:\n\n    dns_error = _check_dns_resolution(hostname)\n    if dns_error:\n        return dns_error\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP request happens later with a separate DNS resolution:**\n\nIn src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:544-562, a JiraFetcher is created with the attacker URL and makes HTTP requests to it. The SSRF redirect hook (attach_ssrf_hook=True) is applied but only checks redirect Location headers, not the initial connection target.\n\n**DNS rebinding timeline:**\n\n1. Attacker sets up rebind.attacker.com with short TTL (1 second)\n2. First DNS resolution (validate_url_for_ssrf): returns 1.2.3.4 (public) -- passes\n3. TTL expires\n4. Second DNS resolution (requests.get): returns 169.254.169.254 (metadata)\n5. HTTP request reaches internal IP, bypassing the SSRF check\n\n## PoC\n\nUse a DNS rebinding service like rbndr.us. Send a request with X-Atlassian-Jira-Url set to a rebinding hostname (e.g., rebind-169.254.169.254-1.2.3.4.rbndr.us) and X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token set to any value. With approximately 50% probability per attempt, the request reaches the internal metadata service.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access**: Steal IAM credentials via 169.254.169.254\n- **Internal network scanning**: Proxy requests to internal services\n- **AC:H**: DNS rebinding is probabilistic and requires multiple attempts\n- **Limited to header_pat branch**: Only affects deployments accepting header-based PAT authentication\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nPin DNS resolution: resolve the hostname once during validation, then connect to the resolved IP directly (with the original hostname in the Host header). This eliminates the TOCTOU gap between validation and use.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T20:35:08Z","modified":"2026-10-01T17:56:07.539087067Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"cwes":["CWE-918"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:36.782754Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-4083","title":"MCP Atlassian: SSRF via DNS Rebinding in Header-Based Authentication Flow","description":"## Summary\n\nThe SSRF protection for header-based authentication uses a validate-then-use pattern vulnerable to DNS rebinding. validate_url_for_ssrf resolves the hostname via DNS and checks that the resolved IP is globally routable. However, the actual HTTP request happens later, during which the DNS record may have changed to point to an internal IP (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, etc.). The SSRF redirect hook only validates redirect targets, not the initial connection.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability spans main.py (validation) and dependencies.py (use).\n\n**Step 1 -- URL validation at middleware time:**\n\nIn src/mcp_atlassian/servers/main.py:524-531, the URL from X-Atlassian-Jira-Url is validated:\n\n    if jira_url_str:\n        ssrf_error = validate_url_for_ssrf(jira_url_str)\n        if ssrf_error:\n            # blocked\n\nvalidate_url_for_ssrf (src/mcp_atlassian/utils/urls.py:113-116) resolves DNS and checks is_global:\n\n    dns_error = _check_dns_resolution(hostname)\n    if dns_error:\n        return dns_error\n\n**Step 2 -- HTTP request happens later with a separate DNS resolution:**\n\nIn src/mcp_atlassian/servers/dependencies.py:544-562, a JiraFetcher is created with the attacker URL and makes HTTP requests to it. The SSRF redirect hook (attach_ssrf_hook=True) is applied but only checks redirect Location headers, not the initial connection target.\n\n**DNS rebinding timeline:**\n\n1. Attacker sets up rebind.attacker.com with short TTL (1 second)\n2. First DNS resolution (validate_url_for_ssrf): returns 1.2.3.4 (public) -- passes\n3. TTL expires\n4. Second DNS resolution (requests.get): returns 169.254.169.254 (metadata)\n5. HTTP request reaches internal IP, bypassing the SSRF check\n\n## PoC\n\nUse a DNS rebinding service like rbndr.us. Send a request with X-Atlassian-Jira-Url set to a rebinding hostname (e.g., rebind-169.254.169.254-1.2.3.4.rbndr.us) and X-Atlassian-Jira-Personal-Token set to any value. With approximately 50% probability per attempt, the request reaches the internal metadata service.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access**: Steal IAM credentials via 169.254.169.254\n- **Internal network scanning**: Proxy requests to internal services\n- **AC:H**: DNS rebinding is probabilistic and requires multiple attempts\n- **Limited to header_pat branch**: Only affects deployments accepting header-based PAT authentication\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nPin DNS resolution: resolve the hostname once during validation, then connect to the resolved IP directly (with the original hostname in the Host header). This eliminates the TOCTOU gap between validation and use.","status":"published","published":"2026-10-01T16:38:35.564447Z","modified":"2026-10-01T17:45:06.264941839Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","level":"medium"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:57.255153Z"}]}}