{"id":"CVE-2026-77998","aliases":["EUVD-2026-65476","GHSA-mp5v-46h8-gw29"],"status":"published","title":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4","description":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-10","score":0.00595,"percentile":0.48785,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":false},"cwes":["CWE-639"],"published":"2026-08-25T12:50:46Z","modified":"2026-09-08T11:17:44Z","products":[{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sp single sign on – login with adfs extension for joomla"},{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sso basic for joomla extension for joomla"},{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sso enterprise for joomla extension for joomla"},{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sso free for joomla extension for joomla"},{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sso login with google apps extension for joomla"},{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sso premium for joomla extension for joomla"},{"vendor":"miniorange.com","product":"saml sso standard for joomla extension for joomla"}],"references":[{"url":"https://www.miniorange.com/","tags":["product"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77998"},{"url":"https://www.miniorange.com"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mp5v-46h8-gw29"}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-77998","title":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4","description":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T12:50:46.506Z","modified":"2026-09-08T10:38:41.779Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:20:15.712761Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-65476","description":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T12:50:46Z","modified":"2026-09-08T10:38:41Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:28:29.861344Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-mp5v-46h8-gw29","title":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse...","description":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T15:32:58Z","modified":"2026-08-25T15:33:06Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:10:57.434403Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-77998","description":"Joomla Extension - miniorange.com - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass via SAMLResponse Parameter in miniOrange SAML SSO \u003c 11.0.2, SAML SP Single Sign On – Login with ADFS \u003c 6.4,  SAML SP Single Sign On – SAML SSO login with Google Apps \u003c 6.4 - This is due to the mo_saml_validate_signature() function performing a loose boolean check on the raw tri-state integer returned by PHP's openssl_verify(), causing an error return value of -1 to be evaluated as truthy and therefore treated as a successful signature verification. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing Joomla user, including administrators, by submitting a crafted SAMLResponse containing an attacker-controlled NameID and a deliberately malformed signature value that triggers an OpenSSL processing error — bypassing verification entirely and resulting in wp_set_auth_cookie() being called for the targeted account.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T13:19:30.817Z","modified":"2026-09-08T11:17:44.56Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":10,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical","assessor":"secondary"}],"cwes":["CWE-639"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:41.347728Z"}]}}